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            he topic for the 2010 edition of the Perspectives is "Pathways for 
            Implementing REDD+: Experiences from Carbon Markets and Communities". 
           This year, the publication goes beyond opportunities afforded 
by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and includes voluntary markets. 
It reflects the current experiences about implementing REDD+ activities at the project 
and community levels. Some of the articles presented discuss or propose ideas about 
how to create incentives to participate in REDD+, its implementation, and possible 
financing; how to involve the private sector; what are the experiences from the carbon 
markets, and how to engage communities in REDD+. The authors have been carefully 
selected to reflect a mix of different perspectives from the private sector, country 
negotiation teams, research institutions, and carbon market organizations. 
They share their insights and ideas on various important aspects and issues for the 
debates on a global REDD+ mechanism in the ongoing climate negotiations. 
This new publication is targeted to a wide audience, including policy makers, 
country negotiators, research institutions, and other people interested in REDD+. 
The Carbon Markets Perspectives 2010, is produced with financial 
assistance by the European Commission, through its joint 
UNEP/EU Program for Capacity Building related to Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) in African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Countries, of which the CDM forms part of 
the ACP-CD4CDM Project. http://www.uneprisoe.org.
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The financial crisis that has marked the second 
half of the first decade of the twenty-first century 
continues to cast its long shadow over the global 
economy. As capital markets continue to reel and 
food prices begin to rise once more, it would be 
easy to focus just on economic solutions. After 
all, it is not that long ago that President Clin-
ton famously reminded us that ‘it’s the economy, 
stupid’. Clearly focusing on the economy is es-
sential, but it is far from sufficient.
As the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment has 
reminded us, we live in a highly interconnected 
world, one that is characterized by dynamic com-
plexity, where cause and effect are often distant 
in time and space, and the delayed and distant 
consequences are often different from, and less 
salient than, proximate effects, if they are known 
at all. In the face of the uncertainty that char-
acterizes complex systems, Nicolis and Prigogine 
have warned us of the ‘dangers of short-term, 
narrow planning based on the direct extrapola-
tion of past experience’. 
This is true, as the TEEB  reports are showing, 
of natural capital, which, while it ‘underpins 
economies, societies and individual well-being’, 
is often overlooked or poorly understood. The 
multiple benefits of natural capital, the report 
goes on to remind us, are rarely fully accounted 
for ‘through economic signals in markets, or in 
day to day decisions by business and citizens, 
nor indeed reflected adequately in the accounts 
of society’. At the nexus between the dynamic, 
adaptive complexity of the interaction between 
natural capital and human economic systems 
lies climate change, where cause and effect are 
indeed distant in time and space. And yet our 
understanding of causality has advanced far 
enough to allow us to have some measure of in-
fluence over distant effects through proximate 
causes. Thus, we now know, any solutions to our 
current predicament have to be found in current 
interactions of economies and ecologies.
One such opportunity is REDD – reducing emis-
sions of green house gases from deforestation 
and forest degradation. In its essence it provides 
for payments to developing countries for reduc-
tions in the amounts of carbon dioxide emitted 
from forests, either by preventing their destruc-
tion or degradation, or by enhancing, conserving 
Ibrahim Thiaw
Director
Division of Environmental Policy 
Implementation
United Nations Environment Programme
8or better managing their ‘forest carbon stocks’, 
i.e. biomass (latter case then known as ‘REDD+’). 
The intention is increase the economic value of 
a significantly greater proportion of forests to lo-
cal people and other stakeholders so that they 
have a greater interest in keeping them stand-
ing, rather than replacing them with other land 
uses or degrading them because they do not fully 
understand or cannot realize their proper value. 
UNEP has placed REDD+ at the heart of its cli-
mate change strategy, not only because 15-17% 
of all greenhouse gases are emitted as a result 
of the destruction of forests in developing coun-
tries, but also because it potentially catalyses the 
realization of economic values from the multiple 
benefits of forests. As a member of the UN-REDD 
Programme, a collaborative partnership in sup-
port of REDD+ bringing together the FAO, UNDP 
and UNEP, we play a leading role on the transfor-
mative potential of REDD+ for livelihoods and 
economies in forested landscapes. We base this 
on the realization of economic benefits from re-
ducing carbon emissions as only the first of the 
multiple benefits of these forests. Forests, clearly, 
are much more than the carbon they store or can 
sequester, but we view REDD+ as the opportuni-
ty that allows us to catalyse further investments 
in other ecosystem services from forests, thus 
adding further ‘layers’ of revenue streams from 
standing forests.
This volume of the ‘Carbon Market Perspective’ 
brings together first, valuable experiences with 
REDD+, exploring in particular perspectives on 
the link between financial markets and payments 
for performance in delivering carbon benefits 
from forests and how to enable developing coun-
tries to engage in REDD+. It also explores the in-
volvement of local communities and community-
based efforts to reorganize the management of 
forests so that the multiple benefits produced in-
clude carbon gains as well as livelihoods. We are 
at the very beginning of our REDD+ journey, and 
the world’s thirst for information and insights 
on how to make it work are great. This book will 
make a significant contribution towards slak-
ing that thirst, a thirst we intend to satisfy com-
pletely in the months and years to come, as the 
UN-REDD Programme continues to deliver on 
its investments. For, with reference to the TEEB 
report, two related challenges lie ahead: the first 
is to understand the multiple values of forests for 
climate, conservation and human development 
and integrate them into decision-making. The 
second is to respond – efficiently and equitably. 
This volume makes a start on both counts.
9The critical role of REDD+ in contributing to the 
global objective of climate change mitigation is 
increasingly recognised. REDD+ offers significant 
potential for rapid and low-cost emission reduc-
tions, with the added co-benefits of biodiversity, 
water and soil conservation, as well as poverty re-
duction. To date, more than four billion dollars in 
additional funding have been pledged by developed 
countries to support REDD+ activities in develop-
ing countries, which have in turn announced ambi-
tious targets for emission reductions in the forestry 
sector. The ongoing international negotiations have 
included options for establishment of both a market 
mechanism, and a fund mechanism, or a combina-
tion of both to channel funds into  REDD+ activities.
Scaling up private investments is essential, as 
public funding pledges, constrained by budget 
deficits and the economic crisis, remain insuf-
ficient to unlock the potential of REDD+. Experi-
ences of market based mechanisms have shown 
that private-sector flexibility and initiative are 
required to complement the role of govern-
ments in establishing the proper institutional 
and financial framework for performance-based 
REDD+ activities.
The compliance carbon market under the Kyo-
to Protocol has already helped pave the way for 
greenhouse gas mitigation through afforestation 
and reforestation activities. However, the com-
plexity of methodologies for estimating and mea-
suring emission reductions, strict eligibility re-
quirements and high associated transaction costs 
have resulted in only fourteen projects registered 
worldwide to date. In contrast, voluntary carbon 
markets have been much more active, with the de-
velopment of carbon standards that allow a whole 
range of REDD+ activities. The total transaction 
volume of the voluntary carbon market was 387 
million US dollars in 2009, of which 31% comes 
from forestry projects (Ecosystem Marketplace & 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2010).
To achieve significant global greenhouse gas 
mitigation while ensuring environmental integ-
rity and protecting the rights of local commu-
nities and indigenous people, the international 
community needs to agree upon the rules and 
principles underpinning a global REDD+ frame-
work. In order to support this process, the cur-
rent report presents experiences from the com-
pliance and voluntary markets.
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This issue of Carbon Market Perspectives on 
‘Pathways for implementing REDD+: Experi-
ence from carbon markets and communities’ 
discusses the role of carbon markets in scal-
ing up investments for REDD+ in developing 
countries. Nine articles authored by experi-
enced negotiators on REDD+, carbon market 
actors, project developers and other leading 
experts share experiences and make sugges-
tions on the key elements of a future interna-
tional REDD+ regime: Architecture and un-
derlying principles, measuring, reporting and 
verification (MRV), private-sector involvement, 
the rights of indigenous people and local com-
munities, biodiversity conservation and envi-
ronmental integrity. The articles are grouped 
under three main topics: the lessons existing 
REDD+ projects; the future REDD+ regime 
and the role of carbon markets; and experi-
ences and ideas about the involvement of in-
digenous people and local communities.
Section 1. Experiences with carbon markets
Starting with pilot projects in the early 1990s, 
carbon markets have experienced rapid growth 
in the past few years. The compliance carbon 
market has proved an effective instrument 
for stimulating private investment in climate 
change mitigation and reducing the overall 
cost of GHG emissions reductions. The carbon 
market has generated tens of billions of dollars 
of private investment in GHG mitigation proj-
ects in developing countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol in the past few years. The World Bank 
publication ‘State and Trends of the Carbon 
Market 2010’ estimate that during 2002-2008, 
the total investment in CDM projects with CER 
sales contracted was worth 106 billion US dol-
lars. However, private investment in carbon 
market projects has started to decline due to 
the stalemate in climate negotiations and the 
high levels of uncertainty about carbon credit 
demand after 2012. Further delay in reaching 
an international agreement could significant-
ly damage investors’ confidence and stall the 
existing momentum of private investment in 
GHG mitigation projects.
This first section of Perspectives consists of 
three articles by authors who have been in-
volved in forestry carbon project development, 
validation and implementation. The authors 
share their experiences with forestry carbon 
projects, ideas on the extent to which carbon 
markets can support REDD+ implementation, 
the application of key concepts such as addi-
tionality, baseline and leakage under REDD+, 
and suggestions to overcome methodology and 
other barriers to rapid and large-scale REDD+ 
implementation.
In the first article, Dr. Chungfeng Wang, a senior 
Chinese negotiator on REDD+ issues and a se-
nior expert on forestry project implementation 
for the regulatory market in China, shares his 
experiences on forestry CDM and discusses the 
implications for the design and implementation 
of a future REDD+ mechanism, as well as China’s 
positions on a REDD+ market mechanism versus 
a fund mechanism.
The second article is by Sebastian Hetsch and 
Juan Chang from TÜV SÜD, a Designated Op-
erational Entity (DOE) which has validated and 
verified the largest number of forestry proj-
ects under compliance and voluntary markets. 
The authors argue that the implementation of 
REDD+ activities under a carbon market mech-
anism requires the continued use of key con-
cepts for carbon accounting, such as baseline 
scenario, project scenario, leakage and addi-
tionality. The authors further assess how these 
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concepts could be applied to various REDD+ 
projects and discuss their environmental and 
socio-economic effects.
The third article is authored by four experi-
enced academics and practitioners from Win-
rock International, a global NGO actively 
promoting carbon finance as an innovative 
approach for sustainable forestry and natural 
resource management. Timothy R.H. Pearson, 
Sandra Brown, Nancy L. Harris and Sarah M. 
Walker argue that a key factor behind the lim-
ited uptake of REDD+ projects in the voluntary 
carbon market has been the slow process of 
methodology development and approval. The 
authors further suggest an improved approach 
for transparent, consistent and rapid methodol-
ogy development and approval for REDD+ proj-
ect implementation.
Section 2. Future role of the carbon market 
and the private sector
This section consists of three articles on the 
main features and components of a possible fu-
ture effective mechanism for REDD+ implemen-
tation. The authors share their ideas on the role 
of private sector and carbon market implemen-
tation, and discuss how to enable and encour-
age early and wide participation by developing 
countries with far different levels of readiness 
regarding REDD+ implementation.
The first article is written by Naomi Swickard 
from the Voluntary Carbon Standard Associa-
tion (VCSA) and Kim Carnahan from the Inter-
national Emissions Trading Association (IETA). 
Based on their deep understanding about car-
bon market operations and the interactions of 
different market players, the two authors note 
that it is critical to maintain private-sector in-
vestment in project activities and supporting 
mechanisms in order to ensure the adequate 
financing and effectiveness of REDD+. In or-
der to sustain REDD+ activities in the long 
term, national and international policies must 
be designed in ways that maintain private-sec-
tor engagement.
The second article discusses the measures to 
guarantee the proper function of the carbon 
market in support of REDD+. Dr Charlottte 
Streck, an experienced climate policy adviser 
and long-time REDD+ negotiator, believes that 
linking REDD+ to carbon markets is one way 
to mobilise additional finance for policies and 
programs that reduce deforestation. However, 
the carbon markets carry inherent environ-
mental and social risks, which should be taken 
into account in the design and supervision of 
market-based REDD+ financing mechanism. 
Solutions to manage REDD+ markets involve 
effective management of the demand and sup-
ply of REDD+ credits. Environmental and so-
cial benefits need to be guaranteed through 
safeguards, participatory approaches and 
transparency that support legitimate and sus-
tainable REDD+ policies.
The third article is about a REDD+ regime 
framework with the necessary flexibility that 
could accommodate the REDD+ actions at 
national, subnational, and project levels, so 
as to enable early and wide participation in 
REDD+ implementation. Lucio Pedroni, a 
leading expert on the nested approach, and 
two experts on carbon market mechanism and 
REDD+ negotiation, Manuel Estrada Porrua 
and Mariano Colini Cenamo, stress that the 
nested approach leaves countries the option 
to implement subnational REDD+ programs 
and project activities, before they are ready 
and eligible for national-level REDD+ imple-
12
mentation. Thus, project developers and sub-
national program implementers may either 
participate in a national program and receive 
credits from national government, or remain 
outside the national program and receive 
international credit issuance directly. This 
flexibility can accommodate the needs of dif-
ferent countries and stimulate fast start im-
plementation by the private sector, national 
and sub-national governments.
Section 3. Community involvement
REDD+ implementation influences the liveli-
hoods of the large number of people living in 
and around forestland. Local communities and 
indigenous people often rely on forest products, 
both timber and non-timber, as their main or 
only source of income. Monetary compensations 
and financial incentives that reach local com-
munities form an essential element of current 
negotiations on a REDD+ funding mechanism. 
Section three discusses different aspects of com-
munity involvement.
In the first article in this section on Community 
Involvement, Carol Mwape, a climate negotiator of 
Zambia, and Dr. Davison Gumbo from Center for 
International Forest Research (CIFOR), argue that 
in much of Africa existing governance systems lack 
clarity on the role of local communities and indig-
enous people in forest management. In Zambia, the 
institutional set up for forest management makes it 
difficult for communities to engage fully in REDD+ 
activities. The article proposes using the framework 
of community-based natural resources manage-
ment to enable local communities to participate in 
REDD+ initiatives. The authors suggest that local 
communities zone local forestry areas based on their 
uses and functions and implement REDD+ activities 
in the forest areas of compatible uses.
In the next article, Tsegaye Tadesse, a pro-
fessional forester from Ethiopia, presents his 
team’s early experience in developing a REDD 
project for the voluntary carbon market. Partic-
ipatory Forest Management (PFM) has proved 
to be a viable strategy in Ethiopia’s efforts to 
curb deforestation and forest degradation, 
which is threatening the livelihoods and food 
security of its largely rural population. Draw-
ing on project activities in the Bale Mountains 
Ecoregion, the author discusses how REDD 
can be pursued through PFM and how forestry 
carbon can catalyze a shift towards sustainable 
forest management in Ethiopia.
The third article in this section explores a 
new role for local communities in carrying 
out mapping and MRV activities (measuring, 
reporting and verification). Based on their ex-
tensive experiences with implementing REDD+ 
activities at community level, the four authors 
of these last article in this publication, Tony 
Knowles, Michael McCall, Margaret Skutsch 
and Leon Theron from University of Twente ar-
gue that modern technology, particularly small 
handheld devices, provide opportunities for 
mapping and storing data. Local communities 
can easily be trained to carry out the monitor-
ing and reporting, thus lowering the costs of 
collecting equally accurate forest data.
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Lessons Learned from Global Forestry 
Projects in the Carbon Market
This paper reviews the lessons learned from the 
implementation of afforestation and reforestation 
CDM projects around the world, and discusses the 
potential challenges of using market mechanisms to 
stimulate REDD+ actions in developing countries. 
From a Chinese perspective, this paper suggests 
how a non-market mechanism may be appropriate 
for REDD+ actions in developing countries. 
The paper concludes that current international 
negotiations and national governments should 
consider a range of policies and incentives to 
integrate both market and non-market mechanisms, 
so as to maximize forestry mitigation potentials in 
developing countries.
abstract
a. Evolution of forest carbon market
After the American electric utility, Applied En-
ergy Services (AES), launched the earliest for-
estry carbon project in 1989, dozens of other 
forest carbon offset projects were implemented 
around the world before the Kyoto Protocol 
(KP) came into force in 2005. The early for-
est carbon projects were mainly initiated by 
industrial companies as direct investors. These 
projects were designed by consultants, academ-
ics and NGOs employed by private companies, 
with limited incentives and opportunities for 
the participation of local people. The price of 
the credits from the project was very low. Many 
developing countries also perceived these proj-
ects as a way for developed countries to avoid 
substantive domestic emission reductions and 
to practice eco-colonialism.
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Since 2005, carbon markets, including regulatory 
and voluntary markets, have grown progressively. 
The regulatory carbon market, based on the cap 
and trade regime, includes the KP and non-KP 
markets. The lion’s share of the regulatory market, 
especially the KP market, is attributed to transac-
tions under the European Union Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (EU ETS), which was formed mainly so 
the EU could meet its KP commitments. Forestry 
carbon transactions were the first offsets in the 
global carbon market, but they were soon side-
lined in the expanding regulatory carbon markets. 
UNFCCC statistics show that, as of August 2010, 
only 17 out of 2379 registered projects under the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) were affor-
estation or reforestation (AR) projects, represent-
ing just 0.59% of all CDM projects1. No CER credit 
from AR CDM has been issued to a project to date.
Unlike the sluggish forestry carbon projects in 
the regulatory carbon market, forestry carbon 
transactions in voluntary carbon markets such 
as Over the Counter (OTC) have steadily in-
creased in volume. Eligible forestry projects in 
voluntary carbon market include Afforestation 
and Reforestation (AR), Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (and more 
broadly, REDD+), Improved Forest Management 
(IFM) and carbon stocks associated with Har-
vested Wood Products (HWP). The voluntary car-
bon credits from forestry projects can be certi-
fied against recognized standards. Purchasers of 
voluntary carbon credits are not only concerned 
about the carbon credits of forestry projects, 
they also appreciate the ability of the projects 
to generate positive benefits for community live-
lihoods, biodiversity conservation, etc. These 
factors make voluntary forestry carbon projects 
highly appealing to large corporations from 
philanthropy or corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) perspectives. For example, China Petro-
leum provided financial support for ten forestry 
carbon projects in China in 2009. However, the 
future development of voluntary carbon markets 
will eventually be influenced by the regulatory 
carbon market, especially by compliance rules 
drawn up as part of international climate-change 
negotiations.
b.  Lessons learned from global aR CDM 
projects
The slow progress of AR CDM projects reflects to 
a great extent the problems of financing forestry 
carbon projects through market mechanisms. The 
lessons learned from AR CDM projects shed light 
on possible mechanisms for stimulating forestry 
mitigation actions discussed in current climate-
change negotiations. The complexity of the AR 
CDM rules has prevented the meaningful partici-
pation of local people, thus undermining sustain-
able development. It also significantly increased 
transaction costs, resulting in little interest on the 
part of CER buyers and project developers.
1. Lengthy and complex rules
Late start and long verification interval. The 
AR CDM rules came into force much later than 
other CDM rules, following lengthy interna-
1 h t t p : / / c d m . u n f c c c . i n t / S t a t i s t i c s / R e g i s t r a t i o n /
RegisteredProjByScopePieChart.html
Purchasers of voluntary credits also 
appreciate the ability of the projects to 
generate positive benefits for community 
livelihoods, biodiversity conservation, etc.
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tional negotiations. The first CDM AR project 
was not registered until 2006. The Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) will not be issued 
until 2011 at the earliest because of time re-
quired for tree growth and because verification 
is only conducted every five years for the sake of 
cost-effectiveness. 
Difficulties in land eligibility. Eligible land 
must have been non-forested for at least fifty 
years or since 31 December 1989. In addition, 
considering the lower price of forestry CERs, a 
minimum scale of some 2000 ha, for example, 
may be necessary for financial viability. For de-
veloping countries, demonstrating eligibility and 
finding available land of suitable size has often 
proved difficult. 
Demonstration of additionality. Having identi-
fied the eligible land, the project developer must 
demonstrate that the proposed AR CDM project 
is additional to what would have happened in a 
business-as-usual scenario. The demonstration 
of additionality uses the tools developed by the 
Executive Board (EB) of the CDM. However, the 
final judgement of additionality is quite subjec-
tive since it may be impossible to determine ac-
curately what would have happened to eligible 
land in the distant future. Some authors argue 
that it is nearly impossible to verify additional-
ity, as it is subject to intense lobbying and ma-
nipulation by profit-seeking market participants 
(Gorte and Ramseur, 2008).
Complicated baseline and carbon monitoring. 
To ensure that the carbon credits from the pro-
posed CDM AR project are not only additional, 
but also measurable, reportable and verifiable, 
the project developer must apply a reliable base-
line methodology and carbon monitoring plan. 
The baseline methodology and monitoring plan 
form major elements of the Project Design Docu-
ment (PDD). The drafting of the PDD requires 
technical expertise beyond the capacity of local 
technicians and local people, especially small 
landowners and the rural poor.
Avoiding possible leakage. Leakage is the in-
creased emissions or reduced sequestration 
outside an AR CDM project that is caused by 
the implementation of the project and must 
be deducted from the total amount of CERs. 
In the PDD, the project developer must take 
leakage into account and try to avoid it. The 
project developer must prove that the pro-
posed AR CDM project does not cause leak-
age or that the leakage caused is qualified and 
monitored, and deducted when calculating 
the project’s emission reductions. The need to 
avoid or quantify leakage further complicates 
the design of the project.
Non-permanent nature of CERs. The project 
developer must address the non-permanence 
issue of CERs from the AR CDM project since 
trees planted under the project could face 
various risks caused by fire, disease, logging, 
forest destruction etc. The issuance of either 
long-term CERs (lCERs)2 or temporary CERs 
(tCERs)3 addresses the problem of non-per-
manence. However, lCERs or tCERs have expi-
ration dates and must eventually be replaced 
by permanent CERs from industrial or energy 
projects. The non-permanent or temporary na-
ture of the CERs from AR CDM project consid-
erably reduces buyers’ interest, dramatically 
2  lCER is a CER issued for an afforestation or reforestation project 
activity under the CDM which expires at the end of the crediting 
period of the afforestation or reforestation project activity.
3  tCER is a CER issued for an afforestation or reforestation project 
activity under the CDM which expires at the end of the commitment 
period following the one during which it was issued.
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lowering the price of credits and weakening 
the competitiveness of AR CDM projects.
Requirements for sustainable development 
benefits. CDM projects are required not only 
to generate CERs for KP compliance by devel-
oped countries, but also to facilitate sustainable 
development in developing countries. Thus the 
social and environmental impacts of CDM proj-
ects must be considered during project design. 
The AR CDM rules require that projects promote 
biodiversity protection, soil erosion control and 
improvements to the livelihoods of local people, 
especially the poor. The PDD must clearly re-
flect these requirements and may be subjected 
to social and environmental assessment in the 
validation and verification phases. Without clear 
guidance, meeting these requirements may be 
costly and time-consuming for project develop-
ers. Whether existing and proposed CDM proj-
ects will contribute to sustainable development 
will require further assessment, as projects have 
only now started implementation.
Time-consuming project-registration. The PDD 
with other relevant supporting documents must 
be approved by the host country before being sent 
for validation by the Designated Operational Entity 
(DOE). The domestic approval and DOE validation 
usually take several months. Experiences in China 
indicate that it may take two to three years to prepare 
an AR CDM project, including drafting PDD, domes-
tic approval and DOE validation, before submission 
to the EB for registration. Furthermore, there is a 
great deal of uncertainty with regard to registration 
time with and the risk of rejection by the EB.
2. Financing failures
The exclusion by the EU-ETS of forestry CERs 
and the absence of a KP compliance market in 
America are contributing to insufficient market 
demand and lower prices. The author estimates 
that the price of AR CDM credits may be 50% to 
80% lower than that of CERs from other sectors.
Upfront costs versus ex-post carbon revenues. 
At present, it is rare for buyers to provide upfront 
and tree-planting investments for the AR project. 
Mediocre internal rates of return (IRR), higher 
transaction costs and higher risks are unfavour-
able to project investments. CDM AR projects 
face difficulties in obtaining up-front funding 
for project preparation. Thus, developers have to 
bear investment risks in initiating projects. 
Narrow range of IRR. The rules governing AR 
CDM imply that the project IRR should not be 
too high or too low. Should the IRR be too high, 
it would be difficult to demonstrate project ad-
ditionality, while an IRR that is too low will not 
attract investors. With increasing global demand 
for timber in recent years, the competition for 
forest land has intensified. Under these circum-
stances, previously marginal forestland with 
lower IRR has increased in value, which creates 
completion with CDM AR project financing. Po-
tential investors and local forest landowners may 
be much more interested in channelling funds 
into more profitable forest projects than the 
CDM AR.
3. Lack of clear land tenure 
Establishing clear forest land tenure could ensure 
the delivery of CERs to buyers and benefit the rural 
poor. As forestry CDM projects have either a twen-
ty-year crediting period renewable twice or a fixed 
thirty-year crediting period, stable land tenure over 
decades is necessary to ensure buyers that CERs will 
be eventually delivered. Clear forest land tenure also 
ensures the equitable and effective distribution of 
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carbon revenues, which is also conducive to the par-
ticipation of local people, especially the rural poor. 
However, forest land tenure in many developing 
countries is not clearly defined or enforced. 
4.  Lack of incentives and clear rules for  
co-benefits
The pursuit of co-benefits may increase a proj-
ect’s attractiveness to buyers, albeit with in-
creased complexity in project design and imple-
mentation and higher transaction costs. To save 
costs, project developers tend to focus on CERs 
rather than co-benefits. For example, project de-
velopers may introduce exotic fast-growing tree 
species to achieve higher rates of carbon seques-
tration, rather than indigenous tree species with 
slower growth rates but higher bio-diversity val-
ue. The introduction of exotic tree species may 
pose threats for the bio-diversity protection of 
the whole project area. Secondly, the AR CDM 
rules require project developers to pursue both 
the carbon benefits and co-benefits, but there is 
no detailed technical guidance or guidelines for 
how to measure co-benefits. 
5. Insufficient capacity-building
Capacity-building of local people. Given the 
complexity of the AR CDM rules, local people 
and technicians should be trained to understand 
project concepts, implications and technical re-
quirements, as well as carbon markets. The lon-
ger term sustainability of the project depends on 
the greater involvement of local technicians and 
local people, which in turn can contribute to re-
duced transaction costs. It is crucial to improve 
the capacity of AR CDM project participants in 
developing countries. To date, insufficient atten-
tion has been paid to capacity-building. 
Information asymmetry. It is important to im-
prove the bargaining power of local people and 
safeguard their legitimate entitlement to benefit 
from the project. Because of their limited knowl-
edge about AR CDM rules and procedures, local 
people are at a disadvantage compared to proj-
ect developers and CER buyers and have less bar-
gaining power. Many important project-related 
decisions, including contracting and pricing, are 
decided by middlemen or local elites. 
In summary, CDM could theoretically be a win-
win option, but in practice AR CDM projects 
have produced discouraging results. The credits 
from the AR CDM project were initially limited 
to take up to 1% of the base year emissions of 
the Annex-I Parties of KP in the first commit-
ment period (2008-2012), but in practice the 
1% cap will not be reached. Lower CER prices, 
long-term investment requirements, the tempo-
rary nature of tCERs and lCERs, the complexity 
of rules, higher perceived risks and incomplete 
markets have all contributed to the discourag-
ing state of AR CDM.
C. The implications for REDD+ mechanisms 
Under the Bali Action Plan, the parties to the UN-
FCCC have agreed to promote policy approaches 
and incentives for reducing emissions from de-
forestation and forest degradation in developing 
Lower CER prices, long-term investment 
requirements, the temporary nature of 
tCERs and lCERs, the complexity of rules, 
higher perceived risks and incomplete 
markets have all contributed to the 
discouraging state of AR CDM.
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countries4. REDD+ includes reducing emissions 
from deforestation, reducing emissions from for-
est degradation, the conservation of forest carbon 
stocks, the sustainable management of forests 
and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
(REDD+). REDD+ actions could be implemented 
in three phases: (1) the development of national 
strategies or action plans, policies and measures 
and capacity-building; (2) the implementation of 
national policies, measures, strategies or action 
plans that could involve further capacity-build-
ing, technology development and transfer; and (3) 
results-based demonstration activities. 
China considers that, whatever policy approaches 
and positive incentives may be adopted, equal 
treatment should be given to reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation and to 
enhancing forest carbon stocks through conser-
vation, the sustainable management of forests and 
incremental changes of forest cover in developing 
countries.5 If the policy approaches and positive 
incentives are executed effectively, REDD+ ac-
tions can be expected to achieve up to 30% cost-
effective global mitigation potentials by 2020.
The ongoing negotiations over REDD+ focus 
on defining the policy approaches and positive 
incentives for REDD+ actions, namely, who will 
pay, how the payment will be made and who will 
share the payment. The most important aspects 
within the policy approaches and positive incen-
tives that have yet to be determined relate to the 
question of who will provide financial support. 
According to the relevant articles in the UN-
FCCC, it is the obligation of developed countries 
to bear the financial costs. The debates on how 
the payments will be made pertain to financial 
sources, while sharing the payment raises the 
question of how to distribute financial support 
to stakeholders in developing countries fairly 
and effectively. These issues are the most press-
ing concerns for developing countries.
A financing mechanism could be defined as an 
institutional arrangement that transfers finan-
cial resources between developed countries and 
developing countries. It must create economic 
incentives so that developing countries have 
more interest in protecting forests and the re-
sources to do so. Therefore, the successful im-
plementation of REDD+ actions depends on the 
effectiveness of the financial mechanism. In the 
ongoing negotiations, the parties have proposed 
various options for financing REDD+ actions. 
These proposals may be divided into market and 
non-market mechanisms.
Under this mechanism, private sectors in de-
veloped countries are permitted to buy REDD+ 
carbon offset credits enabling compliance with 
emission reduction commitments. REDD+ 
credits may be attractive because of their low-
er price, which would thus provide sustainable 
financing to developing countries. This could 
theoretically create a win-win situation for cli-
mate change mitigation upwards. China is of 
the view that a market mechanism is likely to 
focus more on how to mobilize private finan-
cial sources than on financial resource distri-
bution. Such a mechanism may face the follow-
ing challenges:
China considers that equal treatment 
should be given to reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest 
degradation and to enhancing forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries.
5 http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/en/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=17509
4 1.(b)(iii) of Bali Action Plan.
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Are developed countries avoiding domestic 
emission reduction responsibilities? Devel-
oping countries may fear that a market mecha-
nism might become a loophole for developed 
countries to avoid substantial emission reduc-
tions at home. A market mechanism consists of 
trade of emission rights and entitlements. Since 
emission entitlements are a valuable resource, 
developing countries may not wish to sell them. 
Every ton of forest carbon sequestered through 
REDD+ actions could allow another ton to be 
released by developed countries. Using carbon 
offsets from REDD+ actions for compliance 
purposes may reduce worldwide investment in 
clean technologies, allowing developed coun-
tries to delay their energy-related emission 
reductions. In the end, the market mechanism 
may allow developed countries to continue 
their business-as-usual development patterns, 
rather than achieving the goal of GHG emis-
sion reductions under the UNFCCC.
Are the emission reduction commitments of 
developed countries ambitious enough to 
boost credit demand? Deep cuts by developed 
countries are the precondition for creating mar-
ket demand. However, the aggregated pledges 
announced by developed countries are not am-
bitious. The delayed climate legislation in Amer-
ica is having negative impacts on international 
carbon markets. It appears difficult for America 
to commit to deeper  emission reduction targets 
over the longer term. Another factor unfavour-
able to a market mechanism is the EU-ETS, the 
largest emission-trading scheme in the world. 
The EU-ETS is likely to continue to exclude the 
use of cheap and non-permanent forest carbon 
credits in the foreseeable future.
Are the credits from REDD+ actions always 
less costly? The low cost of REDD+ credits may 
be a false assumption. Experiences with the first 
registered AR CDM projects in China indicate 
that the cost of generating forests credits may be 
higher. Costs depend on driving forces and op-
portunity costs, which vary by country or region, 
or even according to soil and climate conditions, 
land use, project size, market location, existing 
infrastructure etc. Because of large-scale affor-
estation and reforestation in past decades, the 
remaining eligible land is mainly concentrated 
in dry and semiarid areas in central and western 
China. To implement a REDD+ project in west-
ern China would require higher investments, 
even if the opportunity costs of REDD+ activi-
ties in these regions prove to be lower. The costs 
of carbon credits from forestry activities range 
from US $10 to $150/tC, or roughly US $3-40/
tCO
2
. Therefore, the credits from REDD+ activi-
ties are not always less costly.
Can market mechanisms generate lasting fi-
nancial flows to scale up REDD+ actions? 
Sustainable financial flows can only be expected 
from a stable carbon market, which is depen-
dent on the stable demand and supply of carbon 
credits. Carbon markets are to some extent in-
fluenced by consumer choices, macro-economic 
factors and weather conditions, such as wind and 
rainfall. The World Bank’s State and Trends of the 
Carbon Market 2010 underlines the fact that the 
recent global economic crisis also affected the 
demand and price of carbon, as well as the avail-
ability of investment capital. The same pattern 
holds true for the EU-ETS. The economic slow-
down has lead to emission reductions from Euro-
pean large-scale industries in the last two years. 
In many cases, actual annual emissions declined 
below the regulatory caps, which effectively re-
duced heavy industry’s demand for additional 
EU emission Allowances and Emission Reduc-
tion Units in 2009. The year 2009 also marked 
a major decline in new carbon project develop-
ment. The Carbon Markets & Investors Associa-
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tion estimated that new investments in carbon 
offset projects in developing countries fell by 
30-40% in 2009 and would continue to drop in 
2010. When REDD+ activities are implemented 
on a large scale, land-use competition may in-
tensify, increasing opportunity costs accord-
ingly. The increase in the cost of REDD+ credits, 
associated with the complexity of REDD+ rules, 
and issues of non-permanence are a disincen-
tive for carbon buyers and investors. Relying on 
a market mechanism to maintain sustainable fi-
nancial flows to scale up REDD+ activities may 
thus be unrealistic.
Can a market mechanism be applied to com-
pensate for the stabilization of baseline carbon 
stocks and while ensuring capacity-building? 
Forest conservation under REDD+ is intended 
to maintain forest carbon in existing forest, or 
baseline carbon stocks. Since forest conservation 
action does not cause changes in forest carbon 
stock, it is hard to apply a market mechanism to 
stimulate forest conservation actions. Another 
concern is the need for capacity-building, which 
is crucial for the successful implementation of 
REDD+ actions. Under a market mechanism, buy-
ers are less concerned with capacity-building. 
Can market mechanisms be favourable to small 
landowners and the poor? Small landowners and 
the poor lack the necessary technical and market-
ing skills to engage in carbon markets. Buyers may 
prefer to contact local elites, who work as brokers 
or intermediaries. In these situations, local elites 
control carbon revenues and benefit more from 
the AR CDM project than small landowners. A 
market mechanism is therefore not favourable to 
small landowners and the poor. 
Can a market mechanism improve local gov-
ernance? Good forest governance6 is a precon-
dition for the effective and efficient implemen-
tation of REDD+ actions. Market mechanisms 
may be effective in mobilizing finance within 
certain periods or at financial scales, but it is 
difficult for a market mechanism to change the 
socio-political context of REDD+ in develop-
ing countries. The effectiveness of a market 
mechanism depends on existing favourable 
socio-political governance structures. For-
ests are not just standing carbon stocks wait-
ing for economists to value them correctly so 
that they are not cut down: they are homes to 
hundreds of millions of people. Defending the 
rights of indigenous people and local commu-
nities is crucial to preserving forests, which 
requires the elimination of uncertain forest 
tenure, corruption and inadequate policing, 
the empowerment of indigenous people and 
local communities, and the establishment of 
an equal and fair benefit-sharing mechanism. 
A market mechanism cannot ensure the satis-
faction of these requirements in improving lo-
cal governance.
Are the complex technical rules hampering 
REDD+ actions? Under a market mechanism, 
especially in compliance markets, clear techni-
cal rules guiding REDD+ actions must be estab-
lished. No matter whether REDD+ actions are 
carried out at national or sub-national level, it 
is necessary to address issues of additionality, 
reference level, MRV requirements and leakage. 
The complexity of technical rules may be inevi-
table and may pose an even bigger challenge for 
developing countries.
6 Good forest governance could cover following aspects: being 
accountable at all levels; transparency and legitimacy towards one’s 
constituencies; equity and equitable sharing of forest revenues and 
costs; respect for all stakeholders and promotion of the public interest; 
justice, sanctions and fighting corruption; information, education and 
communication; decentralization of forest management and decision-
making; respect for the rights and traditions of local and indigenous 
people; law enforcement and other rules and regulations; and 
improving forest monitoring and control systems (source: Bodegom 
and Klaver 2007).
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2. Non-market mechanisms. Under this 
mechanism, an international multilateral pub-
lic fund under the UNFCCC may be created 
for results-based compensation of REDD+ ac-
tions. China believes that funding for REDD+ 
activities should be new, that is, additional 
to the Official Development Aid (ODA) of de-
veloped countries to developing countries as 
defined in the UN Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Such funding should consist of 
contributions by developed countries. Devel-
oped countries may raise these funds through 
various means, including increased fiscality, 
public and private donations, taxes on carbon-
intensive goods and services, auctions of na-
tional emissions trading allowances, reduced 
subsidies to fossil fuels and penalties or fines 
for non-compliance. The operational model 
for a non-market mechanism or fund mecha-
nism could be articulated as follows:
Applying for funding. A developing country 
government could voluntarily send a proposal 
to the executive board or entity managing the 
international multilateral public fund to ex-
press its willingness to undertake REDD+ ac-
tions. The proposal should follow the specific 
requirements regarding the format and con-
tents agreed by COP and outline the steps to 
the actions at the national level, including the 
creation of a national REDD+ action plan and 
strategy, a national reference level and a rough 
projection of reduced emissions or enhanced 
removal through implementing the proposed 
REDD+ actions. 
Action approval. A technical panel under the 
executive board or managing entity of the inter-
national multilateral public fund would assess 
the feasibility of the proposed REDD+ actions 
submitted by a developing country based on stan-
dards or criteria to be established under the COP. 
The panel would present its recommendations to 
the executive board or entity of the international 
multilateral public fund for final approval. 
Upfront funding provision. Upon approval of 
the proposed actions, the developing-country 
government should be provided with some up-
front funding for its initial activities under the 
proposal, such as capacity-building, establish-
ing a forest carbon monitoring system, attracting 
private investment to potential projects etc. 
Performance-based payment. After a certain 
period of time in the implementation phase, 
for example, five years, the developing country 
would claim finance from the fund for the re-
duced emissions or enhanced removal actually 
achieved. An international technical team ap-
proved by the executive board or entity of the 
international multilateral public fund would 
make an evaluation of the reduced emissions or 
enhanced removal actually achieved in the coun-
try by comparing the actual situation with the 
national reference level previously established. 
The difference would then be used as the basis 
for the compensation transfer from the interna-
tional multilateral public fund to a national fund 
in the developing country. 
Domestic distribution of funding. The national 
government could distribute the received inter-
national compensation to the local people, small 
landowners or the poor in line with the policy 
The non-market mechanism or fund approach 
is based on the concept of compensation 
transfer. China believes that funding for 
REDD+ activities should be additional to 
Official Development Aid (ODA).
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guidance to be created for carbon revenue dis-
tribution. The policy guidance could be estab-
lished through the broad participation of local 
people, small landowners and the poor.
The main disadvantage of the non-market 
mechanism resides in the fact that the fi-
nancial sources of the fund may be relatively 
limited from a long-term perspective. The ad-
vantage of a non-market mechanism is that it 
could avoid most of the controversial issues in-
herent in a market mechanism: the non-market 
mechanism generates credits for compliance 
purposes in developed countries and has less 
complex technical requirements. Many trans-
action costs that would occur under the mar-
ket mechanism could be avoided. The opera-
tional costs under the non-market mechanism 
may even be slightly lower. Government agen-
cies in developing countries could play a cen-
tral role in implementing REDD+ actions. A 
non-market mechanism could encourage gov-
ernments to establish a series of new policies 
to address forest-land governance issues. It 
may also encourage private-sector investment 
by providing incentives such as grants, tax re-
lief and subsidized loans, as well as supportive 
political and institutional environments. 
D. Conclusions
REDD+ actions are broadly perceived as cost-
effective and competitive mitigation options for 
developing countries to exploit in the next twen-
ty to thirty years. To maximize the mitigation po-
tential, REDD+ actions should not be limited to 
deforestation: all the actions within the scope of 
the current REDD+ should be equally treated. 
To stimulate REDD+ actions, a financial mecha-
nism must be established as quickly as possible. 
This mechanism should address financial re-
source mobilization and allocation or disburse-
ment. The successful implementation of REDD+ 
actions would rely on the financing scale and its 
fair, effective and efficient distribution. Gover-
nance issues such as clear and safe forest tenure 
or carbon revenue distribution policies should 
be seriously addressed before the establishment 
of any finance mechanism.
The current proposals for financial mechanisms 
cover both market and non-market mechanisms. 
The market mechanism may provide relatively 
sustainable financial flows for the REDD+ ac-
tions, but faces controversies regarding to the 
equal sharing of global emission entitlements 
between developed and developing countries. 
The generation of credits for compliance pur-
pose faces many complex technical barriers for 
local people in developing countries. Credit 
demand in a market mechanism is dependent 
on deep emission reduction commitments by 
developed countries. Current emission reduc-
tion pledges would not be able to create suf-
ficient demand for the credits from REDD+ 
actions. The non-market mechanism or fund 
approach is based on the concept of compen-
sation transfer. Although the mechanism could 
avoid most of the disadvantages inherent in the 
market mechanism, it would face the challenge 
of stimulating sufficient and sustainable finan-
cial flows. Both approaches require matching 
policies from developing-country governments, 
which are crucial to ensure fair and effective 
distribution of their funds. 
In conclusion, due to the complexity of forestry is-
sues and various forestry situations in developing 
countries, no single magic solution can be suffi-
cient for the effective protection of global forests. 
To maximize forestry mitigation potentials, cur-
rent international negotiations and national gov-
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ernments should adopt a portfolio of policies and 
incentives, including the integration of market 
and non-market mechanisms, to stimulate practi-
cal actions in developing countries.
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1.  a bit of history: forestry in climate
 negotiations 
1.1 The characteristics of forestry-related 
GHG emissions
Forestry and land-use projects have had 
a rocky ride in coursing through climate 
change negotiations. Although emissions 
from land-use change contribute to rough-
ly one fifth of the world’s human-induced 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, their im-
pact on carbon markets and carbon finance 
has been negligible. The main reasons for 
this are tied to the complexity of such proj-
ects: while it is fairly straightforward to 
quantify the amount of GHGs emitted from 
a manure pit or an industrial plant, seques-
tration and storage of carbon by ecosystems 
Key Concepts for Carbon Accounting 
of REDD+ Projects
REDD+ is seen as a tool with which to channel 
finance into the conservation of forests and its 
carbon stocks. While several REDD+ projects have 
been designed and implemented on a voluntary 
basis, no agreement has been reached as yet on 
the international level. This paper outlines the key 
concepts for implementing REDD projects and 
enabling carbon accounting, which is seen as a 
prerequisite for mobilizing finances in the carbon 
market. The main concepts are related to setting 
the baseline scenario and defining and quantifying 
project activities, leakage and project emissions, 
while taking biodiversity and socio-economic 
impacts into account. 
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such as forests pose particular problems, for 
two main reasons:
1) The temporal aspect: carbon stored in for-
est ecosystems is not necessarily fixed per-
manently. Ecosystem disturbances, such as 
fires, storms or insect plagues, may lead to 
the release of previously sequestered car-
bon. When it comes to carbon sink projects, 
i.e. those designed to protect a threatened 
rainforest, such a disturbance (including 
human intervention such as tree harvesting) 
needs to be accounted for. Hence, GHG 
emission removals can be released again.
2) The spatial aspect of forestry projects: un-
like most other climate-change projects, 
land-use and forestry projects cover large 
areas. Thus, other aspects of land use be-
yond carbon storage are also potentially 
affected by a carbon project, in particular: 
a. The impacts of a project on the ecosys-
tem and its biodiversity. Low-carbon eco-
systems do not imply low levels of biodi-
versity and vice versa. In particular, when 
it comes to fast-growing plantations, the 
spatial aspects with regard to biodiver-
sity have to be assessed with care.
b. The livelihoods of people living in the 
vicinity of the project or in the project 
area, given that most areas are under 
some kind of use, whether legally or 
without a clear legal position. 
These issues have lead to much discussion on 
whether and how to include forestry and land-
use projects in climate-change negotiations and 
ultimately in the carbon market in order to pro-
vide direct access to carbon finance for the pro-
tection and expansion of forests.
1.2 Experiences with forestry CDM project im-
plementation under the Kyoto Protocol
As part of follow-up negotiations to the Kyoto 
Protocol it was decided that, under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of UNFCCC, 
only afforestation and reforestation projects 
would be allowed under special rules:
1) Temporary credits: the credits generated from 
CDM forestry (AR) projects are of a temporary 
nature. Unlike regular CDM (or JI) projects, 
the credits expire after the end of the subse-
quent commitment period1 (in case of tCERs), 
which is expected to be roughly five years, or 
at the end of the project’s crediting period (in 
case on lCERs), which is usually twenty or thir-
ty years. Afterwards the credits have to be re-
placed. Therefore the real value of the credits 
is significantly lower than a permanent Certi-
fied Emission Reduction (CER), as all it can do 
is to defer the emission reduction obligation 
to a future point in time2.
 Further it leads to a commodity that is not 
easily interchangeable and tradable with 
regular CERs, as their needs to be certain 
Forestry and land-use projects have had 
a rocky ride in coursing through climate 
change negotiations.
1 The commitment period is a reference to the Kyoto Protocol (five-
year commitment period). The concept assumes that a successor to 
the Kyoto Protocol will also have defined commitment periods of, 
e.g., five years. 
2 Wallner, Klaus (2010): Klimaschutz durch Forstprojekte: eine 
ökonomische Bewertung temporärer Zertifikate im Rahmen des 
Kyoto-Protokolls. PhD thesis, Technical University Munich, Germany.
31
liquidity for a defined CER type or product 
to actually have a functioning market.
2) Complexity of methodologies: due to 
lengthy upfront discussions on whether 
and how to include forestry projects, forest-
ry methodologies prove to be significantly 
more complex than regular CDM method-
ologies, and it takes significantly more time 
for the first methodologies to be approved. 
For example, the first regular CDM method-
ology (AM0001) was approved in Septem-
ber 2003 and consisted of 10 pages with 8 
monitoring parameters, while the first AR 
methodology (AR-AM0001) was approved 
in December 2005 and consisted of 54 
pages with over 60 monitoring parameters. 
Subsequent AR methodologies published 
in 2006 (AR-AM0002 - AR-AM0005) were 
compendiums of around 100 pages with 
around 100 monitoring parameters. Writ-
ing a Project Design Document in the for-
estry field takes a long time and involves 
substantial costs. The first AR-CDM proj-
ect was registered in November 2006, the 
second and subsequent AR-CDM projects 
in 2009. Recently, consolidated AR-meth-
odologies were approved that significantly 
simplified the documentation of AR-CDM 
projects.
1.3 REDD: the rise of forestry in climate nego-
tiations beyond 2012
At the climate conference in Montreal in 2005, 
forestry and reduced emissions from deforesta-
tion and forest degradation (REDD) were again 
put on the political agenda for discussion at the 
international level. Countries started realizing 
that an effective agreement to combat climate 
change should not neglect the share of emissions 
resulting from land-use changes. The process was 
further aided by the fact that the topic of REDD 
had been brought forward by two developing 
countries, Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea. As 
a result, REDD is now one of the more advanced 
sectors in international climate-change negotia-
tions, and although uncertainties remain, agree-
ment is much closer than in other sectors. A key 
development in the course of the revived nego-
tiations on REDD has been the fact that more at-
tention is being given to the general conservation 
of forests and carbon stocks, that is, through sus-
tainable forest management and other forest re-
lated measures. It is for this reason that the ‘+’ has 
appeared after the REDD acronym ever since the 
climate change negotiations in Poland in 2008. 
As discussions on establishments of systems for 
carbon finance for REDD activities are ongoing, 
it might be worthwhile to take a look at some of 
the key issues to determine whether experience 
from existing forestry projects can provide useful 
insights into designing or updating a system for 
forestry and land-use projects such as REDD.
Much discussion has focused in the past regard-
ing the level at which REDD activities should be 
set up, national, sub-national, or a mixture of both, 
the so-called ‘nested approach’. The key concepts 
presented in this paper are mostly applicable to 
both national and sub-national approaches. 
2.  Carbon market for REDD activities: key 
concepts and their applications
2.1 What is needed to mobilize finances for 
REDD activities?
The simple answer is supply and demand. De-
mand for carbon credits from REDD would 
need to be generated by a (compliance) scheme 
Key Concepts for Carbon Accounting of REDD+ Projects
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that fully considered this type of action. This 
is the first and most crucial requirement. Sup-
ply through implementation of concrete REDD 
action and/or projects could come from devel-
opers or public entities (i.e. a country govern-
ment) offering such carbon credits. 
Carbon credits from REDD activities could be 
made available in accordance with the Eliasch Re-
view3. The most crucial and as yet still unfulfilled 
requirement is the existence of a demand-driven 
market. As long as the international community, 
on post-Kyoto or other bilateral or multilateral 
levels, does not come up with a framework that 
considers REDD, there will be no market-based 
financial flows into this field. 
The climate bills proposed in the US had initially 
foreseen a stronger role of carbon credits from 
forestry based projects. However, the latest drafts 
do not include this option any more. Thus, it is 
clear that carbon finance for REDD is still largely 
dependent on decisions taken in the internation-
al climate-change arena for the consideration of 
this project type. 
Another concept for channeling carbon financ-
es into REDD activities is to channel resources 
through a fund which then finances REDD for-
estry activities. Several bilateral funds for REDD 
activities have already been set up (e.g. by Aus-
tralia, Norway, USA), as well as multilateral funds 
(e.g. GEF, World Bank).
All approaches share the idea that a quantifi-
able/ measurable output in carbon is desirable 
and even necessary. In particular a market-based 
approach requires the generation of a commod-
ity that fulfills certain standards and is based 
upon agreed norms and criteria. A fund-based 
mechanism could also be designed in a way 
that it is output-driven (benefits would depend 
on the amount of carbon sequestered), which 
would, however, lead away from the idea of car-
bon finance and in the direction of regular de-
velopment aid.
2.2 Third-party assessment
The major task in mobilizing finances is an 
adequate determination of the emissions 
reductions and carbon credits, while fulfill-
ing certain criteria in relation to biodiversity 
and socio-economic impacts. However, the 
commodity that is generated is not tangible. 
Therefore key aspects in generating such a 
commodity are transparency and compliance 
with certain standards to ensure that the com-
modity is being generated according to equiv-
alent criteria. This is usually done through an 
independent assessment by a third party. 
A common concept regarding the quantifi-
cation of emissions reductions and genera-
tion of carbon credits is to take a two-step 
approach, both assessed through third-party 
certification. In a first step before project 
implementation (ex-ante), the expected emis-
sion reductions are estimated, and the con-
cept of the project is ‘validated’ against the 
criteria of the chosen standard. The actual 
carbon credits are only issued in a second 
step, once the materialized emission reduc-
tions (or removals) have been ‘verified’. 
2.3 Quantification of output in REDD projects
The maths behind the quantification is fairly 
simple in theory, involving a comparison of the 
3 The Eliasch Review models a potential supply of carbon credits from 
REDD activities of 3.5 GtCO2 per year in 2030.
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emissions of the ‘baseline scenario’ with those of 
the ‘project scenario’. What it comes down to is a 
determination of the following:
1) Emissions in the baseline scenario: in the case 
of REDD, the emissions are mainly based on 
area deforested and degraded, and how the 
emissions are generated (through burning, 
timber harvest, decay, etc.). Usually this is 
quantified based on historical deforestation 
data, i.e. for a defined region (if used for a 
project) or on the national reference level. 
2) Emissions in the project scenario: in 
the case of REDD projects, these are 
emissions that are still occurring in the 
project area, in spite of the project. 
 Also emissions that occur additionally due 
to project activities need to be considered 
(e.g. when a project activity is intensifying 
agriculture through the use of fertilizer, 
then additional GHG gases are emitted be-
cause of the fertilizer)   
3) Emissions through leakage: these are emis-
sions that occur in other places due to the 
displacement of activities. For example, when 
a REDD project protects the project area 
from the cutting of timber, the activity might 
be shifted to a neighboring area in the vicin-
ity, increasing emissions in this area; hence 
this effect has to be taken into account.
All these points appear straightforward, but 
complexity evolves in practice. The guidelines for 
the quantification of GHG emission reductions / 
removals are usually detailed in ‘methodologies’. 
Several methodologies exist for afforestation 
projects. As the CDM does not permit REDD to 
be taken into account, no REDD methodologies 
have been developed under the UN scheme. The 
first REDD methodologies have been established 
under other standards (e.g. VCS approved the 
first methodology in August 2010).
The key elements for quantification of car-
bon in forestry projects, and in particular in 
REDD projects are discussed in the following: 
Additionality and Baseline Scenario 
The term ‘additionality’ asks whether a proj-
ect activity is being conducted because of 
the incentive of carbon finance, or whether 
it would be conducted anyway in the absence 
of such finance. In the latter case the proj-
ect activity is considered to be the baseline 
scenario, hence the project is not additional. 
Carbon finance would not have an impact on 
GHG emission reductions – quite the con-
trary, generating carbon credits from non-ad-
ditional projects could encourage emissions 
to occur elsewhere (and be supposedly car-
bon-neutral even though no additional offset 
effects are taking place).
The baseline scenario is what would happen 
to the project area without the proposed proj-
ect activity. If the project activity is not ‘ad-
ditional’, then the baseline scenario and the 
project scenario are similar. In many land-use 
situations, carbon uptake is very likely to oc-
cur without any activity taking place. In the 
tropics and subtropics, once an area is taken 
out of production, spontaneous re-growth of 
forest vegetation is likely to occur. Even in 
The challenge is to a find a baseline 
model that is as complex as necessary 
but as simple as possible.
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countries with a high level of deforestation, 
many forested areas may be out of the reach 
of loggers, in which case the baseline would be 
equal to the project scenario4.  
In AR projects, the baseline scenario is of less 
importance, as usually it assumes carbon stock 
changes close to zero (or even declining). There-
fore all carbon sequestered by growing trees can 
be assumed to be carbon benefits attributable 
to the project (Figure 1). As the project sce-
nario corresponds to the actual situation on the 
ground, it can be (fairly) easily measured and the 
amount of carbon credits generated determined. 
Figure 1. Carbon benefits (GHG removals) attributable to 
an AR project (baseline vs. project scenario) 
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In the case of REDD, the baseline scenario as-
sumes a high carbon stock in the beginning and 
a continuous decline, while the project scenario 
assumes a steady state or slow decline in carbon 
stock in the project area (Figure 2). The decline of 
the project scenario depends on the actual suc-
cess of the implementation of the project activi-
ties in the REDD project. As, however, the baseline 
scenario is only hypothetical, it cannot be mea-
sured directly. Hence also the carbon credits gen-
erated cannot be measured directly, but depend 
mainly on how the baseline scenario is set up.
Figure 2.Carbon benefits (GHG emission reductions) attrib-
utable to a REDD project (baseline vs. project scenario)
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Different approaches for the determination of 
baseline scenarios are possible. A simple ap-
proach would be to extrapolate historical de-
forestation rates into the future. This approach 
would be difficult to apply to a project (sub-na-
tional) level, and it might neglect the complex-
ity and influence of different drivers of defor-
estation. Furthermore, a simple extrapolation is 
based on the premise that past behavior is rep-
resentative of future behaviour, which conflicts 
with forest development theories stating that 
forest cover recovers once a certain level of eco-
nomic development is reached in a country5. 
More complex approaches for baseline scenarios 
are all based on some type of modeling. The chal-
lenge is to a find a solution that is as complex as 
5 Costenbader, John (ed.) 2009. Legal Frameworks for REDD: Design and 
Implementation at the National Level. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland. xiv + 
200 pp.4 Dutschke, Michael (2010). Forestry, Risk and Climate Policy.
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necessary but as simple as possible. The genera-
tion of carbon credits must be transparent and 
traceable, for third-party verification as well as 
for transparency in the market. The more complex 
the models are, the better they might fit one par-
ticular situation, but they may become a black-box 
and difficult to understand for people other than 
the modeler himself. This makes any independent 
assessment time-consuming and cost-intensive. 
As transparency is one of the core criteria for gen-
erating carbon credits, this is a major hurdle for 
any REDD project. The method of calculation for 
REDD baseline scenarios is likely to be influenced 
by political considerations more than technical is-
sues. Host countries will be tempted to exaggerate 
baseline trends and thus set low targets in order 
to maximize the potential output of carbon credits.
Once the baseline has been defined and set for 
a REDD project, it needs to be readjusted at 
certain intervals (e.g. every five or ten years) to 
ensure that the assumptions are still valid. This 
means that the baseline has to be re-assessed af-
ter some time based on new information gath-
ered during the period. However, this might also 
be a challenge for many developing countries in 
which the relevant information required for re-
assessing the baseline is not updated frequently 
or is not systematically archived.
Project scenario
The project scenario represents the actual situ-
ation on the ground. Compared to the baseline 
scenario it can be measured relatively easily, as it 
is ‘just’ a forestry inventory representing the de-
termination of carbon stock. Of course, in prac-
tice this can also be difficult to implement on the 
ground. The project areas are often in areas that 
are difficult to access, and knowledge is needed 
regarding the ecosystem, plants and soils. In par-
ticular, in tropical countries where most REDD 
projects are expected to occur, reliable data for 
measuring and monitoring carbon stocks and 
changes in them is not always available. However, 
here existing AR projects and forestry research 
can provide some lessons on ex-ante calculations 
and ex-post monitoring. 
In the main a combination of remote sensing 
image analysis with ground-based sampling 
can be used to determine carbon stocks. In-
creasing numbers of studies help quantify the 
carbon sequestered in trees. Although there 
still is plenty of room for improvements to 
data, a foundation has been set.
Project emissions are related to activities of the 
project that are designed to reduce GHG emis-
sions. This can range from fossil-fuel emissions 
for driving vehicles for fire control to the use of 
fertilizer for increasing productivity on agricul-
tural area to prevent forests being cut for farm-
ing. The basic approach for quantifying carbon 
emissions has already been elaborated in exist-
ing climate-change projects (both AR and regu-
lar CDM projects, for example). Therefore several 
methodologies and tools are available to assist 
respective emission calculations.
Leakage
Leakage is the displacement of activities from the 
project area to other areas due to the implemen-
tation of the project activity. Practically all REDD 
projects involve pre-project activities, otherwise 
the area would not be exposed to deforestation 
or degradation. Similarly, most AR projects in-
volve pre-project activities in the project area, 
otherwise natural succession would recover the 
area sooner or later. Hence, the concept of leak-
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age is similar in AR and REDD activities: most 
areas are being utilized by people, either legally 
or without a clear legal status for land use. 
The challenge is to determine and quantify the 
utilization, in particular when it comes to activi-
ties without a clear legal status and/or seasonal 
activities. The only possible approach to quanti-
fying these activities is through communication 
with the stakeholders concerned. In the case of 
illegal or seasonal activities, such inquiries can 
pose difficulties in obtaining accurate data.
The basic information needed to determine the 
amount of leakage and its impact is as follows:
1) What kinds and extent of activities were 
being carried out in the project area before 
the project was implemented?
2) Where can these activities be carried out 
in future, or can alternatives be devised by 
the relevant stakeholders?
In particular, answering the second question 
can have far-reaching impacts, as it might imply 
a change in livelihood for the stakeholder. If the 
stakeholders are just displacing their activities 
to a different, adjacent area, there would be no 
net benefit. Therefore providing an alternative 
livelihood to people who had been involved in 
deforestation / forest degradation, or a different 
activity / income to entities involved in defores-
tation is at the core of a REDD project. 
A difference in leakage between AR and REDD 
projects relates to matters of scale. While AR 
projects range typically between 100 and 10,000 
ha, REDD activities usually have a scale of sev-
eral 10,000s of hectares. On a practical level this 
makes the determination of leakage more diffi-
cult in REDD projects. Furthermore, the poten-
tial impacts of extensive REDD projects for local 
communities can be more significant if a large, 
continuous area is set up for REDD, compared 
to multiple small-scale plantations set up for AR.
Leakage is of particular importance at the sub-
national (project) level. At the national level, 
leakage is considered to be less of an issue, 
as it could only occur internationally, which 
would then potentially change the balance in 
another country. 
Permanence
The discussion of permanence has surely been 
one of the key hurdles for forestry and land-
use projects to join the regular carbon market. 
The difficulty is obvious: trees sequester carbon 
when they grow, but they can emit it even faster 
when they burn or decay. Hence, carbon seques-
tered in trees, forests or other ecosystems is not 
necessarily permanently fixed.
For AR projects under CDM, countries have de-
cided to solve this issue by issuing ‘temporary 
credits’, which lose their validity after a certain 
time. Other (voluntary) carbon standards have 
decided rather to estimate the risk of the carbon 
sequestered being released again. The risk is cal-
culated in tons of carbon and deducted from the 
actual amount of carbon sequestered when issu-
ing carbon credits. This ‘risk buffer’ can gener-
ate a reserve to compensate for future losses in 
carbon stock.
The only possible approach to 
quantify utilization by local people is 
communication with the stakeholders 
concerned.
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The main benefit of a risk buffer approach is 
that permanent, fully eligible and tradable car-
bon credits can be generated. Carbon credits 
from forests can thus become part of a regular 
carbon market. No extra market for ‘land-use 
carbon credits’ is generated, since this might 
not have the necessary size to be fully function-
al as a market. 
The question of how to assure permanence for 
REDD is similar to the case of AR projects. Under 
voluntary standards like VCS, the risk buffer ap-
proach will be applied. 
Under the UN compliance scheme no decision 
has been made as yet. If it is included in the 
CDM, the concept of temporary credits is likely 
to be adopted as in AR projects. 
2.4 biodiversity and socio-economic impacts
Biodiversity
The impacts of AR and REDD projects on ecosys-
tems and biodiversity have similar assessments. 
Both project types have an impact on the project 
area over its spatial extent and thus influence the 
ecosystem. While some AR projects have been 
criticized by environmental NGOs for using ex-
otic, fast-growing species, REDD projects have 
faced less criticism for their impact on ecosys-
tems. This is mainly because they focus mainly 
on the conservation of the native forest ecosys-
tem and thus have a positive effect on ecosys-
tems per se.
Some voluntary standards like CCBA focus 
in particular on the biodiversity benefits of 
land-use projects. Additional monitoring is 
required under this standard for land-use 
projects.
Socioeconomic impacts
The socioeconomic impact of land-use proj-
ects is one of the most sensitive issues. Ex-
perience with AR projects has been positive, 
as in most projects local communities are in-
volved, and in forest plantations in particular, 
employment is generated for local people. In 
cases where local farmers actually own the 
plantations, additional income is generated 
in the project area.
However, REDD projects are more complex, 
mainly due to the greater possibilities of imple-
mentation. Protecting forest from all harvesting 
typically results in maintained or increased for-
est carbon stocks, but it also reduces the wood 
and land supply to meet other social needs. As 
such it is not necessarily of benefit to local com-
munities if ‘their’ forest is included in a REDD 
project. This depends on: 
1)  Who are the drivers of deforestation or for-
est degradation? and,
2) What kinds of activities are being imple-
mented to stop or decrease deforestation/
forest degradation? 
In simple words, if 1) the driver is a logging 
company from outside the project region, not 
offering jobs to local people, and 2) the proj-
ect activities involve local people, perhaps even 
offering employment, then the impact is likely 
to be positive. However, the opposite scenario 
can also be drawn. Hence, the key is the proper 
involvement and good understanding of lo-
cal communities, stakeholders and their liveli-
hoods when designing a REDD project. Their 
involvement is crucial, given that such projects 
focus on stopping ongoing or planned activities 
and providing different alternatives.
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3. The way forward
In past decades significant amounts of devel-
opment aid have been channeled to protecting 
forest cover, especially in tropical countries. 
Nevertheless, forest cover has been constantly 
decreasing in most tropical countries. Therefore 
one might wonder why carbon finance should 
now turn the tide and halt deforestation. After 
all, carbon finance is just a tool for channeling 
financial resources to (forest-rich) developing 
countries (and the actual amounts of resources 
available are not yet certain).
However, two new aspects link carbon finance to 
the halting of deforestation which had not been 
present before:
1) The linkage between climate change and 
REDD has been established and discussed 
at a high political level and attracts greater 
attention to deforestation than in the past. 
This can help in creating a momentum for 
implementing policies and practices for 
the protection of forests and sustainable 
forest and land-use management at the na-
tional and sub-national levels.
2) Significant amounts of financial resources 
have been promised, and they might be 
granted on the basis of results. If countries 
only receive benefits when presenting the 
successful implementation of REDD proj-
ects, more focus might be placed on the 
results, which implies a proper quantifica-
tion of carbon benefits. However, only with 
successful implementation of REDD activi-
ties and honest and transparent carbon ac-
counting will carbon finance be available 
in the medium and long term. 
The crux for the successful implementation of 
REDD projects will be to design projects that of-
fer stakeholders involved in deforestation or for-
est degradation an alternative for incomes and /
or livelihoods, whether small-scale farmers uti-
lizing the forests with unsustainable slash-and-
burn agriculture, or large companies cutting 
the forests for pulp wood or pasture land. In any 
case, alternative modes of sustainable employ-
ment have to be found together with these stake-
holders. Carbon finance can only contribute to 
the solution: the overall aim is the sustainable 
development of a country as such, a goal that will 
surely need time.
The concepts and lessons learned from AR-CDM 
and voluntary projects could help in designing 
an effective system for channeling carbon fi-
nance into REDD actions which would consti-
tute a contribution to the development of these 
countries and the protection of their forest cov-
er. But this requires the international communi-
ty to set the stage and create a more substantial 
market for REDD action through corresponding 
climate treaties. 
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i. introduction 
Although many of the ongoing international nego-
tiations surrounding REDD+ focus on implemen-
tation at a national scale, in reality policies will be 
implemented at a subnational scale. The efficiency 
of markets means that an important role exists for 
projects. Various proposals exist for how subnational 
activities would work, and these span the range from 
a freestanding CDM-like system with projects that 
register directly with the international market to 
national carbon markets with national registration 
(Meridian Institute 2009; O’Sullivan et al. 2010). 
Serious attention was first given to the possible in-
clusion of REDD as a mitigation mechanism in the 
Conference of Parties meeting in 2005, yet project 
activities started almost a decade before this. For 
example, under the US Initiative for Joint Imple-
mentation (USIJI3), many AFOLU projects were reg-
Methodological Barriers to the  
Development of REDD+ Carbon Markets
REDD+ projects have played a limited role in the 
voluntary carbon market. This has not been for 
lack of interest by investors, but rather the result 
of the slow process by which methodologies are 
being developed and approved for the monitoring, 
reporting, and verification of offsets. Differences 
in the methodology process among different 
registries and standards have an impact on the 
quality and consistency of methodologies and 
ultimately the market’s confidence in the quality 
of offsets. Insights gained since the initiation of 
carbon markets in the AFOLU2 sector underlie 
our suggestion for an improved approach that 
is designed to produce consistent, transparent 
methodologies with high scientific and atmospheric 
integrity, rapid speed of approval, and low costs. 
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istered in the 1990s. Since then, many REDD and 
AFOLU-type projects have undergone development 
(TNC, CI and WCS 2010). It is important to build 
on these project experiences and identify existing 
challenges and solutions to move policy forward 
and increase investment in carbon markets. 
Existing experience with AFOLU projects indi-
cates that the voluntary carbon market can be 
used to stimulate investment from the private 
sector. According to Ecosystem Marketplace 
and Bloomberg New Energy Finance (Ham-
ilton et al. 2010), of the 50 million tCO
2
 of 
over-the-counter transactions in 2009, 20% 
were for REDD+ activities, accounting for an 
estimated value of up to US$60 million. Almost 
none of these offsets would be considered 
verified emission reductions, as they were not 
developed, registered and verified relative to 
an internationally recognized standard. How-
ever, for the AFOLU sector to play a significant 
role in reducing global GHG levels, billions 
of dollars a year of transactions are needed 
(O’Sullivan et al. 2010). This will require great-
er incentives for the private sector to generate 
the necessary finance by investing in REDD+ 
activities, and the voluntary market is a good 
place to start. 
The slow pace of verified AFOLU project credits 
in the voluntary markets has resulted primarily 
from the small number of methodologies avail-
able for the quantification, monitoring, report-
ing, and verification of carbon offsets that have 
been approved under an internationally recog-
nized standard. In this paper, we describe the 
current status of methodology development 
for the major existing registries and standards; 
present the process by which methodologies are 
developed, revised and approved; discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of these revision 
and approval processes; and highlight some key 
challenges that have hindered methodology de-
velopment and the approval process. Given that 
the potential market for carbon projects in the 
AFOLU sector, and REDD+ in particular, is in its 
infancy, it is an appropriate time to learn from 
past experiences to ensure that past mistakes 
are not repeated. Accordingly we conclude with 
a proposed approach for methodology develop-
ment that would reduce costs while maximizing 
integrity and fostering markets.
ii.  Methodology development in the aFoLU 
sector
2.1 The role of methodologies in the carbon 
market
In the carbon market, offset transactions are re-
corded a registry where carbon offsets can be 
bought, sold or retired. Some registries establish 
their own set of standards [e.g., the American 
Carbon Registry (ACR) or the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX)] whereas other standards allow 
for the use of multiple registries [e.g., Voluntary 
Carbon Standard (VCS)]. All carbon projects, 
regardless of how they are registered and trans-
acted, follow a particular standard. 
A standard details the requirements, rules and 
specifications for how reductions in emissions 
or enhancement of removals from carbon proj-
ects are to be quantified, monitored, reported 
The slow pace of verified AFOLU project 
credits in the voluntary markets has 
resulted primarily from the small number 
of methodologies available.
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and verified and is the rulebook to be followed 
by methodology developers when developing 
new methodologies. Standards ensure that the 
carbon offsets generated by a project are scien-
tifically credible and robust, have a real impact 
on the atmosphere and are fungible. Method-
ologies are developed and validated to meet the 
requirements of a given standard for a given 
project type. A methodology delineates the steps 
a project developer must follow to demonstrate 
additionality and the baseline scenario, and de-
scribes which GHG sources, sinks, and reservoirs 
will be included and how they will be measured 
and monitored to calculate net GHG emission 
reductions. Some offset systems, which do not 
allow independent methodology development, 
combine standards and methodologies into 
single documents, which are sometimes termed 
protocols [e.g., Climate Action Reserve (CAR) or 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Inventory (RGGI)].
2.2 What is the current status of methodology 
development?
We reviewed nine registries/standards to assess 
the status of methodology development for the 
AFOLU sector. These registries or standards 
cover the majority of AFOLU projects that have 
been or will be registered for recording and 
selling offsets (Table 1). Three register regula-
tory or compliance grade offsets, six register 
voluntary offsets, and seven currently have reg-
istered AFOLU projects.
Table 1. Summary of main registries and standards available for AFOLU project development reviewed here
Project
Locations
Active 
Projects Website
American Carbon 
Registry-ACR 
http://americancarbonregistry.org  
 
 
Clean Development 
Mechanism - CDM 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html 
 
Climate Action Reserve-
CAR 
http://www.climateactionreserve.org  
Chicago Climate 
Exchange-CCX 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com  
New South Wales 
Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Scheme- NSW  
http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au  
North American Forest 
Carbon Standard-
NAFCS 
http://forestcarbonstandards.net   
Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative-RGGI  
http://www.rggi.org/home 
 
Voluntary Carbon 
Standard-VCS 
http://v-c-s.org  
Alberta Emissions Offset 
Registry-Alberta 
Worldwide 
countries)
Worldwide 
(developing 
US 
Worldwide 
New South 
Wales, 
Australia
US 
Northeast 
US
Worldwide 
Alberta, 
Canada 
Regulatory
/Voluntary
Voluntary 
Regulatory 
Voluntary 
Voluntary 
Regulatory 
Voluntary 
Regulatory 
Voluntary 
Regulatory 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes http://carbonoffsetsolutions.climatech
angecentral.com/offset-registry 
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Across the nine standards or registries we evalu-
ated, there are 164 registered projects as of Sep-
tember 2010, 83 percent of which are registered 
under CCX and the Alberta Emissions Offset 
Registry (Table 2). The overwhelming majority 
(76%) of the projects under these two standards 
are for carbon sequestration through changes in 
soil carbon management. 
The largest number of methodologies exists un-
der the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, 
17 as of September 2010), 16 of which are, of 
course, for afforestation/reforestation projects 
(one is an agricultural methodology for reducing 
fertilizer use on legumes). As a result, if interna-
tional discussions agreed to clarify ‘enhance-
ment of carbon stocks’ under REDD+ to include 
the forestation of lands that are not currently 
forested, as Brown and Pearson propose (2009), 
then a suite of methodologies will be available 
already for some REDD+ activities. 
Apart from the CDM, relatively few methodolo-
gies exist under the other standards and regis-
tries we considered (Table 2). For REDD+ ac-
tivities, the VCS and ACR could potentially have 
many methodologies available in the near future. 
For example, under the VCS two methodologies 
have been approved and thirteen are currently 
under review following the release of their AFO-
LU standards in 20084. The ACR’s Forest Project 
Standard was released in 2009; one methodol-
ogy has been approved5 and two AFOLU method-
ologies are currently under review.
Table 2. Comparison of AFOLU standards with respect to the date of establishment of the AFOLU standard, current number of 
methodologies and projects (in September 2010), and year of approval of first methodology and first project
ACR 
Alberta 
CDM 
CAR* 
CCX 
NSW  
NAFSC 
 
RGGI   
VCS 
Year AFOLU 
Category 
Established
2009 
2007 
2004 
2005 
2003 
2003 
2010 
2006 
2008 
Current 
Number of
Methodologies
1 (2 in review)  
4 
17 
2 
3 
1 
0 
1 
2 (13 in review)
 
Year of 
First
Metodology
2010 
2007 
2005 
2005 
2003 
2003 
2006 
2010 
 
1 
36 
16 
3 
100 
7 
0 
0 
1 
Current 
Number of
Projects
2010 
2007 
2006 
2007 
2003 
2003 
2009 
Year of 
First
Project
The North America Forest Carbon Standard 
(NAFCS) has not yet released its standard or 
methodology. Both market conditions and the 
current status of the regional emissions cap 
have prevented the registration of any projects 
*Including CAR’s predecessor organization CCAR (California Climate Action Registry)
4 The two approved methodologies are i) preventing planned 
deforestation on undrained tropical peat swamp forests in southeast 
Asia, and ii) improving forest management related to rotation length.
5 Reducing emissions through improved forest management.
under RGGI, even though the model rule was 
released in 2006 (Table 2).
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iii. how are methodologies developed and 
subsequently approved and revised?
Different registries and standards have ad-
opted various approaches to the development, 
approval and revision of methodologies (Table 
3). These differences can have large impacts 
on the quality and consistency of methodolo-
gies and ultimately on the market’s confidence 
in the quality of the carbon offsets generated 
by projects through the application of these 
methodologies. 
ACR Alberta  CAR CDM CCX NSW NAFCS RGGI  VCS 
 
User Developed 
Commissioned/Internal Writing 
Committee Writing 
 Public Comment
Published Expert Review 
Auditor Review 
Independent Board  
√ √ √
√ √√
√ √
√
√
√ √ √ √
√ √
√
√
√
√
3.1 Methodology development
Registries and standards can be divided into 
three categories with regard to methodology 
development:
1.  Developed and submitted for approval by 
users: The CDM, VCS and ACR operate a 
system whereby anyone can develop a new 
methodology and submit it for approval.
2.  Developed by an appointed committee: 
 A second approach is to appoint a com-
mittee to design methodologies in specific 
sectors. Such committees will typically 
(and overtly) attempt to balance constitu-
ent groups such as the forest industry and 
conservation organizations. This approach 
was taken by the CAR and NAFCS.
3.  Developed internally: Alberta, CCX, New 
South Wales (NSW), and RGGI develop 
Table 3. Summary of the methodology writing and approval steps in each of the registries/standards considered
methodologies internally. Although anyone 
can submit a methodology to the ACR, the 
ACR also develops methodologies internally. 
3.2 Methodology approval
The approval process is divided into four classes:
1. Independent management board approval: 
The CDM decided to develop a ‘Working Group’, 
the Afforestation and Reforestation Working Group 
(ARWG), to oversee afforestation and reforestation 
issues. The group is open for application from ex-
perts who are selected on the basis of their exper-
tise and experience. Members of the working group 
are compensated by the UNFCCC secretariat. The 
nine-member ARWG commissions reviews of each 
submitted methodology from a pool of experts and, 
from the reviews, determines which aspects must 
be addressed by the submitters of the methodol-
ogy. The opportunity also exists for public com-
Methodological Barriers to the Development of REDD+ Carbon Markets
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ment. Changes are then made by the submitter, 
and final changes to the methodology are made by 
the ARWG itself. Methodologies recommended by 
the ARWG are subject to final approval by the CDM 
Executive Board (CDM EB). 
2. Auditor approval: The VCS has adopted the 
approach of passing the responsibilities for 
methodology approval to VCS-approved valida-
tion or verification organizations, referred to 
here as auditor organizations. Any new method-
ology must be fully approved by two approved or-
ganizations relative to the VCS standards.
3. Committee approval: The CAR and NAFCS 
both develop methodologies within appointed 
(unpaid) committees, and these are approved 
through consensus and/or majority opinion.
4. Expert reviewer approval: The ACR uses an ex-
ternal scientific peer-review process for method-
ology review and approval in combination with 
public comment. The scientific peer reviewers 
are selected by ACR from a pool of international 
subject-matter experts.
5. Internal approval: All other registries or stan-
dards have what we would term an internal ap-
proval process. This category covers a range of 
degrees of transparency and may or may not have 
a period for stakeholder or public comment. 
3.3 Methodology revision
The standards upon which methodologies are 
based evolve, as does the science of monitoring 
changes in carbon stocks. Furthermore, errors, 
inconsistencies or improvements can be discov-
ered after initial approval. Therefore, a process 
is needed for making and approving revisions, 
although the exact steps vary by registry or stan-
dard. One of three general approaches is used 
for revising methodologies: 
1. Independent management board: The CDM’s 
ARWG makes changes continuously to existing 
methodologies and has also consolidated exist-
ing methodologies where significant overlaps 
exist. Methodology revisions and consolidated 
methodology recommendations by the ARWG 
are subject to final approval by the CDM EB. 
2. Users: The VCS relies on methodology devel-
opers to update methodologies. Methodologies 
are removed from the approved list when they no 
longer comply with the latest standard. The de-
veloper of the methodology is therefore respon-
sible in perpetuity for keeping the methodology 
up to date and assumes the accompanying costs 
in terms of validation or verification and approv-
al. Users who were not the original developers 
are allowed to submit methodology revisions to 
the CDM, VCS and ACR, which then require a 
version of the original approval process.
3. Internal process: The majority of systems rely 
on an internal process for revision whereby the 
staff of the registry or standard make any nec-
essary changes, although some systems also 
require the same public consultation and peer 
review process as new methodologies (e.g. ACR).
iv.  what are the advantages and disadvantages 
of the various approaches to methodology 
development and approval?
4.1 Internal processes
Where development of methodologies is internal, 
the costs are met through internal funds which, 
although beneficial to the user, limits the diversity 
of methodologies. For example, RGGI has a single 
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model rule. CCX has a single set of requirements 
for each project type (afforestation, forest man-
agement, avoided deforestation). In contrast, at 
the time of writing the CDM has approved four-
teen large-scale and seven small-scale methodolo-
gies for afforestation/reforestation. 
The strength of an internal process for methodol-
ogy development is that consistency is maintained 
with respect to both quality and agreement with 
current requirements. Methodologies are also 
likely to be written in a generic format, potentially 
allowing them to be applicable to a large number 
of projects. However, an internal process immedi-
ately opens up questions of transparency. Critics 
will contend that registries in a competitive mar-
ketplace will seek to design methodologies that 
will appeal to project developers (potentially at the 
expense of atmospheric integrity) that would ulti-
mately lead to a higher number of registered proj-
ects and a higher income from associated fees.
4.2 Committees
In theory, committee processes bring in the inputs 
of a diverse set of stakeholders and achieve con-
sensus across these diverse viewpoints. However, 
the reality is that to date committees have been 
unpaid. Thus those committee members who have 
much to gain or lose are more likely to devote time 
and efforts on the methodology approval activities. 
A balanced initial committee may therefore not to 
a fully balanced methodology approval. This is ex-
emplified by CAR, which released version 3.0 of its 
Forest Protocol from its committee in September 
2009 and had to release a new version developed 
internally less than a year later, partly in response 
to criticisms of the lack of atmospheric integrity. 
Additional downsides to the committee approach 
arise from the associated requirements of time 
and money. Scheduling groups of twenty or more 
unpaid individuals makes progress slow, and 
attempts to achieve consensus across such (di-
verse) groups makes matters worse. In practice, 
the registry or standard plays a significant role 
in terms of scheduling, gathering and process-
ing inputs and in moving the process forward. 
Ultimately the committee process works out to 
be significantly expensive even with unpaid com-
mittee members.
4.3 User methodology development
Since all the costs are the responsibility of the 
user, user-developed methodologies are often 
developed for a specific project that is currently 
under development. Thus such methodologies 
may lack conditions allowing for widespread ap-
plicability to other projects. This will limit their 
use by other projects and/or require multiple 
methodology revisions by new users.
4.4 Auditor approval processes
The auditor-focused process of the VCS has its 
advantages. Costs are pushed from the regis-
try or standard on to methodology developers, 
and the integrity and liability mindset of audi-
tor organizations assists in maintaining a high 
quality of methodologies. A very real downside 
for methodology developers is the associated 
costs. Auditor fees alone can be in excess of 
US$50,000, and the process can take up to 
two years. The VCS AFOLU standards were pub-
The strength of an internal process for 
methodology development is that consistency 
is maintained. However, an internal process 
opens up questions of transparency.
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lished in November 2008, but, as described 
above, only two AFOLU methodologies had 
been approved by September 2010. 
These costs in the time and money involved in 
approving methodologies results from the exact-
ing requirements of the auditing organizations. 
Each organization typically has multiple review-
ers with different levels of expertise and perspec-
tives who require close adherence to the stan-
dard and high precision in terms of language 
and justification for selected approaches. How-
ever, based on our collective experience, there 
is considerable opportunity for variation among 
auditors with respect to levels of scientific and 
technical expertise. This disparity leads to in-
consistencies in the number and types of correc-
tive action requests that an auditor may require 
before approval and thus to inconsistencies in 
the quality of final approved methodologies. 
Some auditors place particular emphasis on the 
scientific and technical aspects of the methodol-
ogy, while others minimize their review of these 
aspects and focus mainly on adherence to the 
standard in question, as well as inconsistencies 
and typographical errors. 
There are obvious advantages and disadvantag-
es for a methodology developer in choosing an 
auditor with extensive technical expertise. On 
one hand, a methodology that is subjected to 
additional scientific and technical scrutiny by 
the auditor will be improved as a result of the 
validation process, but the approval may come 
only after several rounds of reviews. This ulti-
mately slows down the overall process. On the 
other hand, methodologies that are subjected to 
less rigorous review from a technical standpoint 
may be approved quickly, but any conceptual er-
rors that slip through will ultimately limit their 
credibility and applicability to AFOLU projects. 
The use of methodologies that are inconsistent 
in quality could lead to lower confidence from 
investors in the quality of the offsets generated 
by projects in the voluntary sector. 
The final disadvantage of the auditor process 
is in the long-term status of methodologies. As 
the VCS standard evolves (e.g. it was updated in 
May 2010), previously approved methodologies 
become invalid (although grandfathered in for 
some fixed time). The VCS then would require 
the methodology developer to meet the costs of 
updating the methodology and potentially put-
ting it through a new double auditor review. In 
recognition of the high costs foisted on develop-
ers of methodologies, the VCS is designing a sys-
tem whereby projects that use existing approved 
methodologies will pay a royalty to the initial de-
velopers for the right to use the said methodolo-
gies. However, in some circumstances the initial 
methodology developer may lack the resources 
or incentive to update the methodology, poten-
tially resulting in select methodologies being 
permanently removed.
 
4.5 Expert peer review
The scientific peer-review process as used by ACR 
for methodology approval relies on recognized 
experts in the relevant field and is conducted 
blindly so that peer reviewers can make method-
ological decisions without influence from meth-
odology developers. The costs of methodology 
development are still the responsibility of the 
user, but this approval process generally results 
in low costs to implement ($30,000 or less) and 
Auditor fees alone can be in excess of 
US$50,000, and the process can take 
up to two years.
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a short time from methodology submission to 
approval (3-6 months) compared to an auditor-
based approach. However, peer reviewers are se-
lected by the registry, which opens up questions 
about impartiality, and the group of peer experts 
may include reviewers with a strong knowledge 
of the specific scientific field (e.g. soil carbon 
cycling) but less understanding of carbon proj-
ects and carbon markets. In addition, the entire 
process consists of just two to four individuals, 
with a single lead reviewer who has ultimate con-
trol over the process. Although the peer-review 
process is also used in other systems (notably by 
the CDM's ARWG and by auditors for VCS meth-
odologies), it is generally part of a larger, more 
complex process that contains additional steps 
in approval. 
4.6 Independent managing board
In our view, the approach of the independent 
board that has been used by the CDM is a 
balanced approach for the development and 
approval of methodologies. The independent 
expert board maintains integrity and trans-
parency and can ensure that methodologies 
meet a consistent standard and immediate-
ly meet the latest decisions and changes in 
standards. Additionally, the costs of meth-
odology approval are met by the CDM itself, 
substantially reducing financial outlay for 
the methodology developer user. For an in-
dependent standard or registry to mimic this 
approach, these costs would have to be met by 
the methodology developer unless financial 
turnover is as high as the CDM achieves. The 
independent board approach has the added 
advantage of continuously being able to de-
sign tools and methodological elements to 
facilitate methodology development and the 
subsequent project processes. 
The disadvantage of the independent board 
was felt in the earliest years of the CDM when 
the ARWG acted as a significant bottleneck, 
with eighteen new methodologies being sub-
mitted to it before the first was approved. This 
early bottleneck no longer exists due to in-
creases in ARWG efficiency, but probably more 
significantly to decreases in methodology sub-
mission rates. 
v. Methodological challenges
The development and subsequent approval of 
methodologies for AFOLU projects, particu-
larly for REDD activities, has been slow, yet 
this is not linked solely to the weaknesses of 
the systems and processes that are in place 
among the various standards and registries. 
Below, we discuss three challenges that have 
hindered the process of methodology devel-
opment and approval.
Challenge #1: A changing goalpost
Perhaps the biggest challenge for AFOLU car-
bon projects in the voluntary sector has been 
the rapid and constant evolution of standards 
and methodologies to which projects are ex-
pected to adhere. Change is inevitable, but the 
speed at which the voluntary AFOLU sector has 
evolved has made it difficult for a methodology 
to be developed and approved quickly. Unlike 
the CDM in the regulatory sector, there has 
been no clear ‘leader’ in terms of AFOLU proj-
ect development in the voluntary sector. Each 
standard or registry has its own specific set of 
requirements and procedures for methodology 
development and approval, which continue to 
evolve as they are tested under practical cir-
cumstances. 
Methodological Barriers to the Development of REDD+ Carbon Markets
50
For example:
- The VCS released its AFOLU Standards in 
November 2008, updated them in May 2010 
and will update them again in early 2011;
- The American Carbon Registry (ACR) re-
leased its Forest Carbon Project Standard 
Version 1 in March 2009 and Version 2 in 
June 2010;
- The CAR has updated its Forest Project 
Protocol as follows: Version 1 in June 2005, 
Version 2.1 in September 2007, Version 3.0 
in September 2009, Version 3.1 in October 
2009 and Version 3.2 in August 2010. 
This ‘changing goalpost’ mentality – i.e., method-
ologies are constantly revised to adhere to ever-
changing standards, and projects are constantly 
revised to adhere to ever-changing methodologies 
– have made the process difficult and time-con-
suming. Furthermore, since the methodology 
process has been slow, AFOLU projects already 
underway have often use currently approved or 
unapproved draft versions of methodologies to 
collect the data and perform the calculations nec-
essary for project validation and verification. As 
methodologies change, there are potentially large 
consequences for projects that are applying the 
methodology. Project developers must then de-
cide whether to alter the project implementation 
or submit a methodology revision, thus increasing 
costs and time before the project can be validated. 
Changes may be as simple as collecting additional 
project data, but in more extreme cases method-
ological changes can significantly lower the num-
ber of expected credits or prevent the project from 
using the methodology altogether. Standards and 
registries partially mitigate the ‘changing goalpost’ 
problem by allowing projects developed under a 
currently approved standard or methodology to 
continue using that version until some specified 
deadline for validation or registration.
Challenge #2: Limited bench strength
Another challenge that has limited the devel-
opment and approval of methodologies to date 
has been the limited number of experts in the 
AFOLU sector. The majority of methodologies 
are developed by the same people who have been 
members of the CDM ARWG, authors or review-
ers for the VCS and ACR standards, and who 
have sat on committees for CAR, the NAFCS, etc. 
The same people are often the experts consulted 
when methodologies are being reviewed for ap-
proval. This strain on human capacity has result-
ed in a bottleneck with respect to the number of 
methodologies that can be written and approved 
at any given time. Also, a handful of experts can 
have only a finite number of practical experi-
ences on which to base their thinking, which 
could lead to ‘tunnel vision’ when developing 
new methodologies. Experts in the science of 
agriculture and forestry certainly exist, but very 
few have jumped the divide between academic 
research and applied science in the context of 
carbon project development. 
 
Challenge #3: Methodology applicability
The fact that methodologies are often developed 
by project developers means that they are fre-
quently developed with a specific set of project cir-
cumstances in mind. This is often reflected in the 
‘applicability conditions’ listed at the beginning of 
a methodology, i.e., ‘this methodology is applicable 
only under the following circumstances’, followed 
by a laundry list of exclusionary and/or inclusion-
ary conditions. One potential consequence of this 
approach is that, by the time a methodology has 
been approved and is being used for the project for 
which it was developed, it may be so specific to the 
project that its applicability to other projects has 
become severely limited. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, methodolo-
gies that are developed without specific projects 
in mind run the risk of getting through the ap-
proval process without being subjected at all to 
‘real-world’ testing. Project developers hoping 
to apply a methodology after it is approved may 
discover that it is not feasible, practical, or cost-
effective to implement, despite the fact that it is 
technically sound. Methodologies must therefore 
strike the right balance between scientific in-
tegrity, practicality and cost-effectiveness. Along 
these lines, both the CDM and voluntary schemes 
have moved away from narrow, project-specific 
methodologies and towards the development of 
broader ‘tools’ and ‘modules’ that can be used 
by a range of projects to fulfill certain method-
ological requirements. For example, the CDM has 
fifteen ‘tools’ that can be incorporated into vari-
ous sections of a methodology and thus reduce 
the effort involved in developing and approving 
a new methodology. Another example is seen in 
the current REDD modules under development 
by AD Partners:6 depending on a project’s specific 
circumstances, different modules are chosen and 
combined in unique ways to develop a customized 
methodology that suits the needs of the project.
vi.  an approach that will foster market  
development
Many lessons and insights have been gained since 
the initiation of the market for carbon offsets in the 
AFOLU sector. Building on these lessons and in-
sights, here we present an improved approach, sum-
marized in Figure 1, which is designed to allow for:
- Consistent, transparent methodologies with 
high scientific and atmospheric integrity; 
- Increased speed of the approval process; and 
- Reduced costs. 
Figure 1. Proposed design for a methodology approval process that would maximize integrity and cost efficiency
 
Developer - creates methodology
Independent Board - proposes list of 2 to 3 auditors
Developer - contracts with an auditor selected from list
Auditor - reviews methodology
Developer - edits methodology based on review
Auditor Approval
Public Comment
Developer - prepares responses to publici comments
Independent board - reviews methodology
Independent board - commission expert reviews
Developer - edits based on reviews
Independent Board Approval
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At the center of our proposed approach is an 
independent board, appointed and paid by the 
registry or standard, to ensure methodologi-
cal efficiency and integrity. Such a board would 
maintain consistency both among methodolo-
gies and with the standard, and would ensure 
conservatism with regard to atmospheric impact. 
The board should be appointed based on exper-
tise, and should be paid to ensure that the best 
candidates apply and that the work undertaken 
can be completed in a timely manner. To limit 
costs, the board could be comprised of no more 
than three to four people. We suggest overlap-
ping three-year terms both to ensure continuity 
and to bring in fresh ideas and energy. To display 
integrity and transparency, the standard/registry 
should post the CVs of board members and allow 
open applications for new board members.
Our proposed system promotes the development 
of methodologies by users to allow for maximum 
stakeholder input and diversity in the methodol-
ogies produced. After the methodology has been 
developed, the approval process would involve 
(in the following order):
1. Review by an auditor 
2. Public comment
3. Review and approval by the independent 
board
The thoroughness and integrity of auditor or-
ganizations has brought great value to method-
ologies reviewed under the VCS. As discussed 
in Section 4.3 above, its weakness lies in vari-
ability among auditors and the costs of the 
double-approval review process. To ameliorate 
these weaknesses, we propose a single-auditor 
review process with an additional role for the 
independent board to evaluate the quality of 
auditor reviews and maintain a list of favored 
auditors. One potential approach could be that 
the independent board permits the methodolo-
gy developer to choose from among two or three 
auditors, and the developer would contract di-
rectly with one auditor. A comparable approach 
exists under the CDM, whereby expert review-
ers are given a score by the ARWG of from 1 
to 10 for each review undertaken. Subsequent 
reviews are assigned to the highest-rated avail-
able reviewers. 
The independent board should assess the au-
ditor’s review with respect to agreement with 
the standard, reasonableness of calculation ap-
proaches and atmospheric integrity with future 
application of the methodology. Assessments 
should consider not only conservativeness but 
also breadth of applicability and the ‘project-
proponent friendliness’ of methodologies. The 
developer of the methodology would then make 
changes based on the auditor’s requirements.
The VCS requires that one of the auditors use an 
expert from a list maintained by the VCS itself. 
The reality of the approval process to date has 
been that auditors hire multiple expert review-
ers, regardless of this VCS requirement. The in-
dependent board’s assessment of auditors would 
further underline this integral quality in the 
audit process and thus remove any need for ‘ap-
proved experts’.
After auditor approval, we propose that the next 
step should be to set aside a period for public 
comment on the methodology. Public comment 
allows potential future users to raise issues with 
regard to the applicability of the methodology. 
The developer should prepare responses for the 
independent board on the public comments re-
ceived. Since under existing approval process-
es (e.g. ACR, CDM, or VCS ) public comments 
come at the very beginning of the approval pro-
cess, interested parties are typically comment-
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ing on a version of the methodology that bears 
little resemblance to the final version. Moving 
the public comment period after the audi-
tor approval process should reduce the overall 
number of public comments that a methodol-
ogy developer will need to address, thus reduc-
ing time and cost.
The final step in the approval process would lie 
with the independent board. The board would 
either review the methodology and decide to ap-
prove it or request additional changes prior to 
approval. The board should have the freedom to 
commission expert review of specific technical 
facets which members do not feel fully qualified 
to evaluate themselves. To help cover the costs 
of the board’s review, methodology developers 
would pay a direct fee to the registry or standard 
for the process.
Subsequent methodology revisions, methodol-
ogy consolidation and methodology withdraw-
als would lie with the board (as under the CDM). 
The registry or standard could provide support 
for the board to undertake specific directed 
activities such as editing and formatting. Users 
and developers would also be able to request 
or propose revisions that would subsequently 
pass through the board. Much of the work of the 
board could be conducted using teleconferenc-
es. However, an in-person meeting a couple of 
times a year to discuss progress in methodology 
and to prepare tools and guidance for developers 
would have great value.
The approach of the CDM that includes reli-
ance on the independent board has much merit 
but requires significant resources to maintain a 
nine-member board. We suggest that an auditor 
can fill some of this role. The VCS uses auditors 
in methodology approval, but the requirement 
for two auditors increases time and cost, and 
without an overseeing board there is no guaran-
tee of consistent quality.
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Table 4. Summary of the cost, time and perception of quality/integrity between the proposed approach and the ACR, CAR, CDM 
and VCS. 
Note: 
 
 = high;   = low;       = intermediate.  
 
Writing 
Methodology 
Approving  
Methodology 
Total 
Methodology 
Writing and 
Approval Process 
Perception of 
Quality / 
Integrity 
COST TIME  COST TIME  COST TIME  
 Proposed 
Approach 
↓ ↓ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↑ 
ACR ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↔ 
CAR ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↔ 
CDM ↓ ↓ ↓ ↔ ↓ ↔ ↑ 
VCS ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↔  
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We believe that the approach presented here will 
allow for a balance between transparency and 
a high level of integrity, as well as between the 
speed and cost of development (Table 4). In this 
way, approved high-quality methodologies would 
be available for use by the wider community, 
leading ultimately to the implementation of a 
higher number of registered forest-based carbon 
projects and an increase in private investment in 
these mitigation activities.
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1. introduction
REDD+ is a process that implies the design of low 
emissions development strategies and the adoption 
of a new land-use paradigm, all of which costs mon-
ey and draws on a country’s resources. Before mov-
ing to full-scale REDD+ implementation, countries 
need to go through a process of policy design, con-
sensus building, testing and evaluation. Government 
ownership of the process and commitment from key 
actors in a country are essential prerequisites for 
successful REDD+ implementation. Varied and flex-
ible financial instruments that produce adequate, 
predictable, and sustainable resources are required 
to support such a process. The different financial in-
struments of a REDD+ mechanism may correspond 
to different phases, which could include:
•	 A	support	mechanism	that	allows	countries	
to access immediate funding for national 
REDD+ strategy development (REDD+ 
readiness funding).
•	 A	fund-based	mechanism	that	allows	countries	
to access funding based on agreed criteria. 
Emission reductions from tropical deforestation are 
central to cost-effective GHG mitigation to keep 
global temperature from increasing beyond 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels. Reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), 
conservation and the enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks (together: REDD+) promises to lower the cost 
and increase the potential of international mitigation 
efforts. While being comparatively cost-efficient, 
the resources needed to reduce deforestation 
are significant. Estimates to halve emissions from 
deforestation range from USD15-33bn per year. It is 
unlikely that public sources alone will mobilize such 
level of finance. Linking REDD+ to carbon markets 
is one way to mobilize additional finance for policies 
and programs that reduce deforestation. However, 
carbon markets carry market, environmental and 
social risks that make a careful design and supervision 
of market-based REDD+ finance necessary. Solutions 
to manage REDD+ markets involve the management 
of supply and demand of credits. Environmental and 
social benefits of REDD+ need to be guaranteed 
through safeguards, participatory approaches and 
transparency that support legitimate and sustainable 
REDD+ policies.
Charlotte Streck1 
Climate Focus
Financing REDD+ and the Role of 
Carbon Markets
abstract
1 The author would like to thank Eszter Szocs for her research assistance 
in preparing this article. 
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•	 A	mechanism	that	rewards	performance	on	
the basis of forest emissions and removals 
against agreed reference levels in accor-
dance with the CO
2
 equivalence metrics 
(Angelsen et al., 2009). 
While the first two phases would be funded by public 
funds, the third phase could be open to market-based 
funding, provided that emission reductions are con-
verted into tradable carbon credits. This article re-
views the opportunities and risks associated with mo-
bilizing finances for REDD+ through international 
carbon markets. After describing the financial needs 
for significantly reducing emissions from deforesta-
tion, the paper will summarize the potential of carbon 
markets to contribute to these needs. This paper will 
summarise the issues that need to be taken into con-
sideration in the design of a market-based REDD+ 
mechanism to avoid perverse outcomes and ensure 
an effective REDD+ incentive system.
2. REDD+ financing needs and fund sources
The success of any REDD+ mechanism will have to 
be measured against its capacity to reduce emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation. The core 
of any REDD+ strategy is thus the proposed policies 
and measures to protect threatened forest and neu-
tralize any drivers of deforestation and forest deg-
radation. The costs of the implementation of such 
policies determine the financial needs of a REDD+ 
mechanism, that is, the amount of funding that has 
to be made available to cover the various costs for 
achieving certain level of emission reductions.
2.1 REDD+ costs
REDD+ programme costs will vary in nature, and 
amounts will differ significantly between coun-
tries and activities. Ongoing REDD+ costs fall 
into two categories: preparation costs and imple-
mentation costs (Table 1). 
REDD+ readiness costs include the development of 
REDD+ strategies, an implementation framework, 
and a system to monitor, report and verify (MRV) 
the implementation of REDD+ programs. REDD+ 
implementation costs are the costs of implement-
ing policies and measures inside and outside the 
forest sector. Examples include forest monitoring, 
tenure reform, law enforcement, taxation of forest-
land, restrictions on road building and agricultural 
zoning. Implementation costs include opportunity 
costs that arise from foregone profits from defor-
estation or the costs of adopting more sustainable 
forest use. These costs vary across space and time: 
opportunity costs are higher where markets are 
accessible and when expanding forest protection 
(e.g. REDD+) increases agricultural intensification. 
Nevertheless, low opportunity costs do not neces-
sarily imply cheap REDD+ activities, since such 
activities are often found in areas with the greatest 
challenges in forest policy implementation, admin-
istration and monitoring (Eliasch, 2008).
The opportunity costs of REDD are projected to be 
USD 20-30bn/year, although estimates vary widely 
as they rely on complex models and changing com-
modity prices which affect the value of different land 
uses. The UNFCCC estimates developing countries’ 
opportunity costs at USD12.2bn for REDD and the 
investment needs for sustainable forest management 
at 8.2bn annually (Eliasch, 2008). To achieve a 50% 
reduction in deforestation, the 2008 Eliasch review 
estimates USD 17-33 bn/year in REDD costs by 2030; 
the European Union estimates 15-25 bn/year. Figures 
are even less predictable once the program cost of 
policies and measures, governance and legislative re-
forms, transaction costs and the effectiveness of poli-
cies are taken into account. Yet it is clear that current 
expenditures in the forestry sector are inadequate. 
Reducing deforestation globally depends on new in-
61
 
 Costs 
 
 
 
 
Description  
REDD preparation costs REDD Implementation Costs 
Readiness and 
Upfront Costs 
Ongoing capacity 
building and 
institutional 
strengthening 
costs 
Policy and Measures Payment for Ecosystem 
Services, subsidies, direct 
REDD+ payments 
 Objectives Enabling 
participation in 
REDD +, 
appraising policy 
options, 
establishing 
strategy and 
consensus  
Maintaining the 
ability to 
successfully 
implement 
REDD + activities  
Reduction of emissions, 
improvement in forest 
governance and forest 
management  
Compensate for the 
opportunity costs of 
REDD+  
Features No or little direct effect on land use 
emissions  
Effect on emissions less 
direct and with delay, 
initial funding can have 
leveraging role  
Performance -based 
payments, most likely 
voluntary, nationally or 
sub-nationally 
administered  
Funding 
needs 
Upfront funding  
Most likely non-market finance  
Upfront funding  
Potential mix of 
performance -based and 
fund -based funding  
Lends itself to 
performance -based 
financing  
 
vestment measured in the billions of dollars or Euros, 
yet between 2000-2005 global official development 
assistance (ODA) to the forestry sector amounted to 
less than EUR600 million per year (Simula, 2008). 
The real net costs of REDD+ include opportunity 
costs as well as REDD+ readiness and other imple-
mentation costs. REDD+ is commonly presented as 
a cost-efficient mitigation strategy. Numerous analy-
ses of REDD+ opportunity costs need to be supple-
mented by opportunity cost analyses of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission reduction in all other sectors 
where it can take place, and importantly include a 
close analysis of the specific additional actual costs of 
successfully implementing the activities, policies and 
institutions to carry out the deforestation reduction. 
Table 1. Summary of REDD+ needs
2.2 Sources of REDD+ finance
Funds for a REDD+ mechanism would have to be 
made available by governments voluntarily or be 
raised via international mechanisms. Internation-
al mechanisms include fee-based, market-linked 
and market-based mechanisms. International 
funding would complement domestic funding. 
Developing countries are expected to share the 
cost burden associated with national REDD+ 
strategy development and implementation, in 
accordance with their respective capacities, and 
many have already been doing so2.  There are two 
broad categories of financing mechanisms: 
•	 Public	sources:	these	are	provided	through	
domestic public finance or ODA;
Financing REDD+ and the Role of Carbon Markets
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•	 Private	sector	and	carbon	market	finance:	these	
are either financed domestically through the 
private sector or internationally through foreign 
direct investments (FDI), non-profit finance or 
finance through carbon markets, both regula-
tory and voluntary (see also Table 2).
 
PUBLIC FINANCE 
Type Description 
Traditional ODA 
for forestry 
• Increasing; rose 47.6% since 2000 and totalled almost USD 2 billion in 
2005- 07 ;  
• Provides grants, concessionary loans, shorter-term financing for specific 
projects and longer-term programme financing or budget support;   
• Also interested in co-benefits related to poverty reduction, biodiversity 
conservation and improved governance.  
New ODA for 
REDD+ 
•
 
Recent emergence of new REDD + -related finances that draw all or part 
of their revenues from international public finance sources;
  
• Since COP 15 of the UNFCC C, additional funds of 4bn USD have been 
pledged as fast-track REDD+ finance.
 
Domestic  Limited domestic public financing for forestry from taxes and royalties; 
typically used for subsidies and other incentives;  sponsoring of environmental 
services in forests. 
  Existing carbon 
market 
sTwo components: voluntary and compliant (current compliance market
excludes REDD+)  
 
com
Future carbon 
markets 
Regional and domestic markets may also consider using REDD + credits for 
pliance.
  
 
Foreign direct 
investment -
Flows to forest sector have increased by 29% from USD 400 million in 2000-02 
to USD 516 million in 2005 07 (World Bank, 2008)
. 
Domestic  Public-private partnerships or microcredit schemes ;  
 Unlikely to be significant, especially in least developed countries, due to low 
level of resources, lack of expertise and difficulty raising finance from risk -
averse domestic banks.  
Non-profit and 
philanthropic 
 Represents growing proportion of international private finance; typically  
small, narrowly targeted grants that may not have wide REDD+ applicability;  
non-profits are interested in REDD+ and may be less risk-averse than profit -
making enterprises.  
 
PRIVATE SECTOR AND CARBON MARKET FINANCE 
3 Annex I government purchase of REDD credits as offsets on carbon markets is included in the private sector finance, as the carbon market is principally 
considered an approach for attracting private investment, and it is difficult to estimate share of government purchase of credits on the carbon market.
Table 2. Existing and potential finance sources for REDD+ 
Source: Adapted from Dutschke et al. (2008) Hamilton et al., 2010.
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The private sector and FDI does not traditionally 
have a strong presence in forest resource manage-
ment in developing countries. The forest sector 
is characterized by (i) domestic investments; (ii) 
variable levels of FDI; (iii) insufficient and inad-
equate regulation that depresses incentives for in-
vesting; and (iv) inadequate incentives to improve 
management practices. This is compounded by 
insufficient public investment in forest conserva-
tion and natural forests. These challenges are not 
insurmountable in a REDD+ mechanism: REDD+ 
should be designed to provide a strong financial 
incentive to improve forest governance and man-
agement and stimulate FDI and other investment 
in the forest sector in developing countries. 
In the last few years, some new international public 
fund for REDD+ has emerged, including facilities 
that seek to leverage private-sector finance such as 
the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facil-
ity, the Climate Investment Funds (Forest Invest-
ment Program) or the UN-REDD programme and 
sources aimed at building public-sector capacity, 
such as the Congo Basin Forest Fund.
The future of the carbon market for the main 
avenues of REDD+ under discussion includes: 
1) integrating REDD+ into a global compliance 
carbon market; 2) allocating auction proceeds; 
and 3) allocating revenues from other fees, 
fines and taxes. 
Foreign direct investment may constitute an 
important source, but it is unevenly concen-
trated in low-risk countries with profitable for-
est industries. 
3. Carbon markets and REDD+
It is unlikely that public funds can provide 
the level of funding required to halt defores-
tation. Tapping into private capital is there-
fore a necessary condition to bring REDD+ 
finance to an adequate level. A REDD+ mech-
anism could foresee the conversion of emis-
sions reductions from REDD+ actions into 
carbon credits that can then be sold to in-
dustries or countries for compliance. Such an 
approach is generally associated with market-
based REDD+ finance. 
3.1 Forest carbon markets
The voluntary market has enjoyed significant growth 
over the past couple of years and is likely to grow 
even further in the future, despite uncertainties re-
garding the impact of a post-2012 REDD+ scheme. 
But voluntary offsets remain a niche for corporate 
social responsibility and environmentally aware 
consumers. Prices are generally lower than in com-
pliance carbon markets. Combined with insufficient 
liquidity, the amounts traded are not sufficient to 
stimulate any larger investments in the land-use sec-
tor. At least 387 million tons of carbon credits were 
transacted in the voluntary market in 2009, a tiny 
fraction of the 143,897 million tons traded in regu-
lated markets (Hamilton et al., 2010). While volun-
tary carbon markets can be used as a testing ground 
for ideas and methodologies, they cannot mobilise 
the funding needed to support REDD+.
The ultimate financial volume generated through 
tradable REDD+ credits is a function, inter alia, of 
the depth of emission reduction commitments from 
industrialized countries, the fungibility of REDD+ 
credits on the carbon markets, and the details of the 
REDD+ rules and governance. Depending on the 
architecture of the eventual REDD+ mechanism, 
compliance grade REDD+ credits could be acquired 
by countries or, if fungibility is guaranteed, by pri-
vate entities for compliance with national emissions 
targets. Demand established by industrialized coun-
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64
tries and private entities will determine the viability, 
scope and size of regulated carbon markets, while 
the voluntary market is likely to retreat to the niches 
not occupied by the regulated market.
3.2 Emerging REDD+ market mechanism design
When designing a market-based international 
REDD+ mechanism, two basic options exist: 
greenhouse gas emission reductions could be 
measured against an agreed reference scenario, 
and REDD+ credits could be issued ex-post af-
ter the environmental benefits have accrued 
and been measured and verified. Alternatively 
REDD+ credits could be issued ex-ante based on 
an agreed reference level of emissions. A country 
could sell REDD+ credits to raise funds or allo-
cate units to sub-national actors. The country 
would, however, have to ensure that the amount 
of units it sells should not exceed its real reduc-
tions. At the end of the crediting period the 
country would have to make sure that its emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation 
should at least reach the REDD+ credits it has 
obtained on ex-ante. 
Where REDD+ credits are allocated upfront, 
they would resemble the Kyoto Protocol’s As-
signed Amount Units (AAUs); where they would 
be allocated against reference scenarios ex-post, 
they would be generated like the Certified Emis-
sion Reductions of the CDM. While most pro-
posals suggest an ex-post crediting for REDD+, 
the national scale of REDD+ would imply that 
the link to the compliance market would be led 
by government-to-government transactions, in 
the spirit of Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol 
(emissions trading), with the Annex I Party’s 
role limited to purchasing REDD+ credits. Non-
Annex I Party governments may also decide to 
devolve incentives to domestic REDD+ actors, 
either with cash payments for environment ser-
vices, or through a mechanism similar to Joint 
Implementation whereby the government ap-
proves projects that cause demonstrable im-
provements in the national greenhouse gas in-
ventory of the forest sector. Non-Annex I Party 
governments may also choose to deliver REDD+ 
credits to foreign partners through green in-
vestment schemes, as several eastern European 
countries have envisaged to sell their surplus 
Assigned Amount Units in the first commitment 
period of Kyoto Protocol. 
4. Risks and their mitigation through proper 
REDD+ market mechanism design and 
implementation
Linking a REDD+ mechanism to private sector-
driven carbon markets holds the potential to 
create market incentives for investments in 
REDD+ actions and align the interests of many 
private-sector entities, NGOs and local ac-
tors to reduce deforestation. However, raising 
funds via carbon markets for REDD+ action 
also entails environmental, social and econom-
ic risks. Most of these risks can be mitigated 
through a robust design of the mechanism, 
market regulation and supervision, and com-
pliance checks and enforcement of provisions 
in the implementation of REDD+ mitigation 
actions, projects and programs. The following 
section lists the main issues that need to be 
considered in developing and implementing a 
REDD+ mechanism.
It is unlikely that public funds can 
provide the level of funding required to 
halt deforestation.
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4.1 Demand and supply uncertainties
A REDD+ market mechanism faces the dilemma 
that participant REDD+ countries will have to 
sell REDD+ credits to cover their costs, while 
potential buying countries have a wide array of 
choices regarding how they meet their emission 
reduction commitments. Demand is therefore 
hard to gauge. The supply of REDD+ credits is 
also uncertain and difficult to assess precisely. 
Estimates of mitigation potential from REDD4 
range from 2.6 GtCO
2
e per year by 2030 (Eli-
asch, 2008) to 3.3 GtCO
2
e per year by 2030 
(Vattenfall, 2007), to 3.5 GtCO
2
e by 2050 (Stern, 
2007). However, the mitigation potential is not 
synonymous with the generation of tradable 
REDD+ credits. 
The theoretically low abatement cost for REDD+ 
(McKinsley, 2009) has triggered concerns that 
opening REDD+ to carbon markets would lead to 
a flood of credits, thus disincentivizing emission 
reductions in other sectors, a concern shared by 
a number of NGOs (Livengood et al., 2009). For 
this reason, the EU Commission favours a fund-
based compensation model over a market for 
REDD credits (EU Commission, 2008). However, 
the generation of REDD credits is not linear to 
its abatement costs. A rapid build-up in the sup-
ply of REDD credits is limited by (i) the ability of 
developing countries to meet the criteria to par-
ticipate in an international market mechanism; 
and (ii) the challenge of implementing the right 
policies and actions to reduce deforestation and 
forest degradation. It further depends on the 
way how reference levels are set. 
If demand is set too low or is uncertain, this may 
negatively affect supply, but it also opens up 
the risk of market flooding. If demand is set too 
high, any problems with supply will drive car-
bon prices to unacceptably high levels. These 
uncertainties surrounding the supply and de-
mand of REDD+ credits produce a number of 
potential risks, including market flooding, price 
volatility, and the timing of unit issuance. A 
number of solutions to address the above sup-
ply and demand risks have been proposed. A 
selection of these proposals is summarized and 
analysed below. Each of these possible solu-
tions has advantages and limitations, and many 
of these can work together. The most appropri-
ate response to market risks may therefore con-
sist of a collection of solutions:
•	 More ambitious emission reduction com-
mitments. A condition for the creation of 
tradable, compliance-grade REDD+ cred-
its is the tightening of quantified emission 
reduction/limitation obligations. More 
ambitious commitments would increase 
demand for REDD+ credits and create the 
necessary incentives for further reductions 
in deforestation. They would, however, lead 
to price spikes and increased costs of com-
pliance (and potentially a failure to comply 
with stricter caps) if the projected REDD+ 
credits are not in fact generated. 
•	 Controlling overall supply. An amount of 
AAUs equivalent to the expected number of 
REDD+ credits to be generated over a given 
commitment period could be put into an 
escrow account within a registry account 
managed by the UNFCCC registry admin-
istrator. One AAU would be cancelled for 
each REDD+ credit issued. If the account 
holds more AAUs than REDD+ credits is-
sued, excess AAUs would be released into 
the market. They could either be sold or 
assigned to Annex I parties according to 
their percentage in the overall amount of 
4 As there are no studies that estimate the full REDD+ potential, the 
following numbers relate to REDD estimates only.
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AAUs. If more REDD+ credits are generated 
than AAUs held in the reserve account, the 
REDD+ credits could be banked for future 
periods and taken into account in the con-
text of new rounds of negotiations. This 
solution ensures that the overall cap on 
emissions is not affected. It also controls 
the total supply of credits available. This 
solution would require fungibility between 
AAUs and REDD+ credits to avoid market 
distortion.
•	 Ensuring demand. Demand for REDD+ 
credits can be guaranteed by purchase 
commitments. Countries could make 
binding commitments to meet a certain 
percentage of their emission reduction 
commitments with REDD+ credits. Such 
commitments could be split into two com-
ponents, the first being an absolute com-
mitment independent of REDD+ and the 
second being specific to REDD+. If REDD+ 
credits are not generated, the commitment 
could either be reduced to equal the num-
ber of REDD+ credits generated, or rolled 
into a second commitment period. Open-
ing private carbon markets for REDD+ is 
another means to ensure demand. Other 
than sovereign buyers that are exposed to 
a wide number of political constraints, pri-
vate market players are likely to embrace 
cost-efficient offset opportunities. 
•	 Cap imports of REDD+credits. Limita-
tions on the number of REDD+ credits eli-
gible for compliance can be used to stem 
a flood of REDD+ credits. This cap could 
be imposed both within the international 
rules and within any domestic emissions 
trading scheme. Limitations on the use 
of offsets apply to the EU emission trad-
ing scheme and other domestic and sub-
national emission trading schemes. These 
limitations control the use of imported 
units and help maintain overall market 
prices within the regulated system. Caps 
may shield the depression of market prices, 
as they reduce demand for REDD+ credits. 
At the same time, they remove the incen-
tive to engage in further REDD+ actions. 
Caps may therefore depress the price of 
REDD+ credits compared to other units 
and reduce further the amount of funding 
going into reducing emissions from defor-
estation. 
•	 Issuance during commitment periods. 
The problem of a sudden spike in supply 
associated with ex-post crediting at the na-
tional level can be mitigated by the con-
tinuous issuance of REDD+ credits during 
commitment periods. REDD+ credits could 
be issued to authorized and approved sub-
national activities that have generated cer-
tified emission reductions or removals. The 
continuous issuance of REDD+ Credits 
(via an international body or the partici-
pant REDD country) would release credits 
continuously and in quantities that are un-
likely to generate sudden shocks. REDD+ 
credits released on the account of a par-
ticipating REDD+ country would have to 
be deducted from the overall balance of 
REDD+ credits issued for that country at 
the end of the commitment period.
•	 Price floors and ceilings. A floor price for 
REDD+ credits could be agreed between 
the Parties to ensure that sufficient funding 
is available to support REDD+ initiatives. 
A price ceiling could limit the exposure of 
potential buyers to carbon price volatility. 
The price floor/ceiling could be enforced 
via the commitment to purchase or sell 
REDD+ credits when there is oversupply/
undersupply. Price floors and ceilings re-
duce market risk for participant REDD+ 
countries and potential buying countries 
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respectively. However, the cost of enforc-
ing a fixed floor price for REDD+ credits 
will be unclear at the time it is agreed. This 
could be addressed through complement-
ing a floor price with a cap on the total 
amount of funding spent on maintaining 
the floor, and/or capping the total number 
of REDD+ credits allowed in the market. 
4.2 Social and environmental concerns 
Concerns exist in relation to private-sector en-
gagement in REDD+ where the quest for financial 
returns is allowed to compromise environmental 
integrity. The concerns that private-sector finance 
will endanger the environmental goals of REDD+ 
projects have to be managed through careful de-
sign and regular review of the process. 
Social risks. Civil society and indigenous peoples’ 
organisations point out that there are still risks that 
are ill-conceived and that investor-driven REDD+ 
projects could harm communities and generate 
perverse outcomes. There is a danger of customary 
rights being violated in the interests of inward in-
vestment and of abusive contracts and land specula-
tion acting to the detriment of community interests. 
Thus without clear tenure and use rights, sustain-
able forest management will be impossible, and car-
bon finance may increase social conflict (Eliasch, 
2008). In addition, rushed projects and REDD+ 
initiatives often fail to properly consult and obtain 
consent from affected forest communities (Griffiths 
et al., 2009). Problems with weak governance and 
corruption in the forest sector in developing coun-
tries and widespread unjust treatment and exploi-
tation of forest communities by government forest-
departments aggravate the problem.
Well-designed REDD+ markets can help mitigate 
the identified risks by allowing the bottom-up 
development of projects and programs by forest 
communities, indigenous peoples and other ru-
ral communities. Rather than being dependent 
on payments from failing and unreliable gov-
ernments, REDD+ may allow local stakehold-
ers to directly access finance that supports the 
stewardship of forest resources. To empower lo-
cal stakeholders, the latter need to participate 
in forest policies and have the right to develop 
and administer REDD+ programs. A rights-
based approach would enable local communities 
to strengthen their standing vis-à-vis govern-
ment authorities. It is therefore essential that a 
REDD+ mechanism is supported by governance 
reforms that clarify land title and establish ro-
bust tenure systems. Strong safeguards for an 
international REDD+ mechanism would further 
have to ensure transparency, full consultation 
and the fair implementation of REDD+ action by 
national and international actors.
Environmental risks. A badly designed 
REDD+ mechanism could create incentives to 
replace primary forest and other biodiversity-
rich ecosystems with plantations of second-
ary forest that were rich in carbon but poor in 
species. In addition, a REDD+ mechanism that 
emphasizes reducing deforestation rates will 
lead governments and market forces to focus 
on areas of threatened forest that are cheap-
est to protect. Tropical moist forest hotspots 
retain only ~10% of their original forest (Mey-
A rights based approach would enable local 
communities to strengthen their standing vis-à-
vis government authorities. A REDD+ mechanism 
must be supported by governance reforms that 
clarify land title and tenure systems.
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ers et al., 2000) and have high rates of human 
population growth (Cincotta et al., 2000). 
Protection costs will be much higher than for 
forest elsewhere, such as the Amazon, where at 
present ~85% of the forest remains (Grainger 
et al., 2009). Developing countries with lim-
ited human and financial resources may fo-
cus on protecting carbon-rich forests to meet 
their REDD+ targets, even if this undermines 
other ecosystem services and social welfare 
(Grainger et al., 2009). Finally, the promotion 
of biofuels could deal a serious blow to REDD+ 
by creating incentives to clear tropical forests 
to establish biofuel plantations.
In order to achieve protection of tropical forests and 
their biodiversity while reducing GHG emissions, 
countries need to adopt policies that promote the 
integrated management of carbon and biodiver-
sity. Eventually a system that foresees simultaneous 
payments for carbon storage and biodiversity pro-
tection may create an appropriate incentive system 
for sustainable, integrated land management. Be-
fore such system is in place, parties to the UNFCCC 
should adopt safeguards that make the biodiversity 
impact of REDD+ policies and programs a part of 
required environmental impact assessments. While 
carbon markets are blind towards the biodiversity 
benefits of REDD+ investments (or the biodiver-
sity value of REDD+ credits), national and inter-
national safeguards can determine the eligibility 
of investments, policies, programs and projects for 
generating REDD+ credits.
In sum, the promotion of participatory approaches 
and pro-poor policies, improvements to the adap-
tation capacity of forests to climate changes, main-
tenance of species migration routes, and the avoid-
ance of self-enforcing negative impacts of climate 
change will have to become integral elements of 
REDD+ implementation. International safeguards 
that are mandatory for UNFCCC parties can extend 
to private investors, either where REDD+ Credits 
are issued internationally or where countries have 
integrated relevant safeguards into national laws. A 
balance will need to be trodden between certainty 
for investors and certainty of the environmental 
outcomes. Eligibility criteria can exclude high-risk 
and unsustainable projects, programs and other 
activities; ongoing requirements can ensure the 
long-term sustainability of REDD+ activities.
5. Concluding remarks
Carbon markets have significant potential to raise 
finance for REDD+ action. Private sector (for-profit 
and non-for-profit) initiatives are essential to mo-
bilize the required amount of finance and the cre-
ation of incentives for all levels of society is the key 
to a robust REDD+ mechanism. However, carbon 
markets are no panacea for REDD+. The availabil-
ity of finance depends on ambitious emission re-
duction targets and sustained demand for REDD+ 
credits. Carefully regulated and supervised markets 
need to have arrangements in place to avoid mar-
ket flooding and high price volatility. Safeguards 
and compliance checks at the implementation 
level need to ensure the adherence to social and 
environmental safeguards that guarantees that the 
social benefits of REDD+ reach local stakeholders 
and that biodiversity is protected. It is also beyond 
question that public finance has to compliment 
REDD+ markets and support broader governance 
and regulatory reform in developing countries.
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i. introduction
Policy discussions surrounding Reduced Emis-
sions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion (REDD) have focused primarily on national 
accounting and on crediting the frameworks and 
national policy reforms that are required to ad-
dress deforestation from the top down. At the 
same time, various on-the-ground efforts are be-
ing implemented in dozens of countries, demon-
strating how REDD+ activities can develop work-
able solutions to address the underlying causes 
of deforestation and forest degradation, lever-
age private-sector capital, engage local actors, 
and spur action quickly. These top-down and 
bottom-up activities must at some point meet in 
the middle in order to ensure effective REDD+ 
implementation, including sufficient investment 
to fund the vast number of interventions that will 
be necessary to achieve our REDD+ objectives.
Naomi Swickard
Voluntary Carbon Standard Association (VCSA)
Kim Carnahan
International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA) 
Integrating Project and National REDD+: 
The Importance of the Private Sector
Despite the emphasis on moving to scale and 
focusing on national-scale accounting and 
crediting for REDD+, there remains a critical need 
to maintain private-sector investment in project 
activities and supporting mechanisms. This is 
needed to ensure adequate financing, as well as the 
ongoing effectiveness of programs, including real 
emissions reductions, and the protection of forest 
resources. The integration of project-level activities 
in sub-national and national frameworks—not 
only at ‘start up’, but also in ongoing REDD+ 
activities—will help maintain private-sector 
investment and ensure viable, sustainable emissions 
reductions and removals over the long-term.
abstract
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The private sector1 is a key actor in virtually all on-
the-ground REDD+ activities, and it offers much 
more than just interim financing or pilot activi-
ties. This paper will argue that on-going private-
sector engagement is absolutely essential, not only 
to finance REDD+ programs over the long-term, as 
is well established, but also to support and under-
take activities that effectively address the drivers of 
deforestation on the ground. Regardless of the ul-
timate legal status of REDD+ ‘projects’, bottom-up, 
project-level activities will logically be required to 
address the drivers of deforestation and degrada-
tion effectively because the economic drivers for 
deforestation can only be clearly identified and ad-
dressed on the ground. And importantly, bottom-up 
project activities will have to work in conjunction 
with top-down policy changes as countries move to-
wards national-scale activities and frameworks. 
The way forward for capturing the benefits of on-
the-ground activities is clearly to ensure a pathway 
for existing private-sector REDD+ projects to scale 
up and ‘dock into’ emerging national frameworks. 
Ensuring such a pathway for private-sector and civil 
society-led projects will ensure that the most experi-
enced and effective practitioners are not pushed out 
of the REDD+ effort just as activities are ramping 
up. It will also give private-sector investors a port at 
which to dock into the REDD+ effort by providing 
the opportunity to invest capital at the project level, 
and to do so with acceptable levels of risk. Drawing 
in private investment is critical for a host of reasons 
that will be described in detail in this paper.
The first and most obvious reason that private-
sector involvement is needed is that Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and other types 
of government-led climate fund will not be suf-
ficient to cover the scale of financing needed for 
effective REDD+ implementation. ODA is notori-
ously fickle, which means there is a high risk that 
funding will run out when, eventually, the world’s 
attention shifts to other issues. Indeed, even with 
proceeds from the sale of GHG credits, interna-
tional support at the level pledged today will not 
be sufficient to fund ongoing REDD+ implemen-
tation sustainably at the national level. 
We argue that, ultimately, the most effective frame-
works for REDD+ implementation will integrate 
project-level activities into sub-national and na-
tional accounting and crediting frameworks, al-
lowing for direct private-sector financing and en-
gagement. Indeed, we further argue that, in order 
to sustain REDD+ activities in the longer term, 
we must ensure from the outset that national and 
international policies are designed in ways that 
maintain private-sector involvement. And even at 
this early stage, it is clear that such policies will be 
most effective where bottom-up activities are rec-
ognized and accounted for in integrated REDD+ 
frameworks. 
ii. bottom-up activities and Private invest-
ment Needed
2.1 Finance Needs: The Insufficiency of Public 
Funding 
It is widely accepted that private-sector financ-
ing is required for forest protection because it is 
ODA is notoriously fickle, which means 
there is a high risk that funding will run 
out when the world’s attention shifts to 
other issues. 
1 For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘private sector’ is used to refer 
not only to profit-driven investors, but to the large variety of actors 
engaged in the development of bottom-up project-level activities 
(including NGOs and other civil-society actors), as well as those that 
may provide services to the market such as insurance providers.
73
clear that public sources of finance are now, and 
are likely to remain, insufficient. This remains 
true even if countries substantially augment cur-
rent pledges. The Eliasch Review (2008) report, 
Financing Global Forests, states that approxi-
mately $18-26 billion a year will be required by 
2020 to finance a 50% reduction in deforesta-
tion. Other estimates have come up with similar 
figures, in the range of US$12-35 billion per year 
(Meridian Institute, 2009; Boucher, 2008; Euro-
pean Commission, 2008; Busch et al., 2009). 
Developed country governments pledged ap-
proximately US$ 4-5 billion per year from 2010-
2012 to REDD+ efforts before and after last 
year’s Copenhagen climate conference, although 
the final tally is difficult to verify given the frag-
mented and non-uniform nature of public an-
nouncements2. This amount is several times what 
has previously been pledged to REDD+ efforts, 
and yet it is still barely a third of the lowest esti-
mates of need.
Compounding the problem, the unreliable, 
volatile and highly cyclical nature of official 
aid is well documented3. Aid rises and falls 
with economic conditions and political devel-
opments and is sensitive to the reality as well 
as the perception of global financial stability. 
Practical mechanisms to enforce the fulfill-
ment of previous commitments effectively sim-
ply do not exist.
The ‘finance problem’ could not be more acute. 
Even when combining all pledged public funds 
with the maximum potential of the carbon mar-
ket, additional public or private funds will be 
needed. The UK Office of Climate Change’s 
Global Carbon Finance (GLOCAF) model, using 
the 2020 IIASA marginal abatement cost curve 
(MACC) commissioned for the Eliasch Review, 
predicted that the carbon markets could gener-
ate $7 billion in 2020. Combining that projec-
tion with current government pledges barely 
approaches the very lowest estimates of needs. 
While a discussion of possible avenues for ob-
taining additional funding is beyond the scope 
of this paper, historical precedent indicates that 
governments are highly unlikely to fill this fund-
ing gap themselves. As such, the private sector is 
the most likely source of any increase in funding 
for REDD+. This likelihood adds to the argument 
for private-sector involvement in REDD+ efforts, 
both initially and over the longer term.
2.2. Beyond Financing Needs: Public and 
Private Roles in REDD+ Efforts 
Even if government financing were unlimited, 
throwing money at governments to create protect-
ed areas is, at best, marginally effective. Experience 
in forest protection over the past twenty years has 
shown that more complex strategies for manage-
ment and incentives to protect forests are neces-
sary4. When it comes to REDD efforts, a top-down 
approach will help create an enabling environment 
and catalyze further efforts, but it will not be suf-
ficient to address fully the drivers of deforestation 
or offer alternative livelihoods in order to maintain 
forest protection over the longer term.
2 For more on finance commitment and needs, see Synthesis Report: 
REDD+ Financing and Activities Survey. 27 May 2010, http://
www.regjeringen.no/upload/MD/sub/oslocfc2010/dokumenter/
REDDpluss_surveySynthesisReport_final_100528.pdf.
3 The search for alternative ways of mobilizing capital for development 
and sustainability-related endeavors in developing countries extends 
far beyond REDD+ efforts. The unreliability of official aid has led many 
developing countries, for example, to shift toward capital-aggregating 
mechanisms such as sovereign wealth funds. 
4 See, for example, ‘Squandering Paradise: The Importance and 
Vulnerability of the World’s Protected Areas,’ C. Carey, N. Dudley, and S. 
Stolton, May 2000, http://assets.panda.org/downloads/squandering_
paradise.pdf; ‘‘Conversion of Paper Parks to Effective Management: 
Developing a Target: Report to the WWF-World Bank Alliance from the 
IUCN/WWF Forest Innovation Project,’ N. Dudley, and S. Stolton, 2000; 
‘Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Assessment for Central 
Africa: IUCN/WWF Forest Innovations Project’, E. Hakizumwami, 2000.
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Experiences with a wide variety of types of of-
ficial government aid—whether for protected 
forest areas, health services, economic develop-
ment, or other reasons—resonate with these les-
sons. Many scholars of economic development 
in particular argue that government aid should 
be used largely as a catalyst to help generate 
other sources of finance or develop the capac-
ity to manage those sources, rather than to fund 
the primary development activity (Pronk et al., 
2004). When it comes to REDD, the ‘primary’ 
activities are the immense efforts needed to ad-
dress the specific drivers of deforestation in any 
given area. Private-sector practitioners working 
in the voluntary carbon market have been engag-
ing in such bottom-up, primary efforts in recent 
years, developing the methods and creating the 
capacity needed to address deforestation drivers 
successfully through REDD+ projects.
At its highest level, a comprehensive REDD+ 
framework that provided for bottom-up and top-
down activities in the ways outlined in this paper 
would resemble contemporary public–private 
partnerships. Such partnerships were born from 
the twin problems of insufficient funds and the 
lack of expertise and implementation capacity on 
the part of the public sector. Engaging in them 
implies a common understanding of shared goals 
and a willingness to redistribute responsibilities 
for the most efficient achievement of those goals, 
with the intention of harnessing the expertise of 
each partner. Given the extremely constrained 
availability of finance, capacity and expertise 
for REDD+ efforts, it is not just beneficial but 
imperative that the REDD+ policy framework be 
designed to allow each partner—the public and 
private sectors—to do what they do best. 
A simple breakdown of REDD+ costs, as used in 
several studies, shows that there is a relatively nat-
ural dichotomy between public- and private-sec-
tor roles in REDD+ efforts. Eliasch et al. (2008), 
for example, differentiate among various costs: 
‘up-front capacity building’, or the development 
of governance and of measuring and monitor-
ing capacity; ‘forest protection’, or the adoption 
and implementation of forest emissions reduc-
tion policies; and ‘opportunity costs’, or payments 
made for avoiding deforestation. The first two 
activities lie squarely in the realm of the public 
sector, although the private sector can certainly 
assist governments in building capacity at various 
levels and in determining effective policies. De-
termining which actor is best suited to carry out 
the third activity, however—making payments for 
avoiding deforestation on the ground—requires 
further reflection on exactly what types of activi-
ties these payments will fund on the ground. 
2.3 Avoiding Deforestation from the Bottom Up
If ‘payments made for avoiding deforestation’ 
consisted simply of paying known landowners 
the equivalent of the opportunity costs incurred 
for keeping trees standing, then the task would 
be relatively straightforward. In reality, however, 
halting deforestation requires much more than 
passing out cheques: it requires developing and 
implementing complex strategies tailored to the 
specific economic drivers of deforestation in any 
given area. Effective strategies will require work-
ing to reduce demand-side pressures with regard 
to a range of goods and services and reduce the 
destruction of marginal land for agricultural and 
other livelihood purposes. The intention is noth-
ing less than encouraging permanent changes in 
deeply ingrained and, at times, highly profitable 
land-use behaviour among a variety of actors. 
In some cases it will require working closely with very 
large private-sector interests, such as multi-national 
timber companies, to reconsider sourcing practices 
and possibly mitigate demand-side pressures. This 
work is likely to be contentious and complicated, 
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requiring appropriate technical and business ex-
pertise in order to develop viable solutions from 
the perspectives of both the company and the for-
est. Private-sector REDD practitioners, with support 
from governments, are likely to be the best choice if 
this minefield is to be negotiated successfully. 
At the other end of the spectrum, REDD strategies 
will also require working closely with small land-
owners and marginalized communities to develop 
alternative livelihoods, teach agricultural intensifi-
cation practices and encourage fuel-wood savings, 
among other things. Such activities could include 
the organization of training programs for alterna-
tive livelihoods, such as harvesting non-timber for-
est products; the implementation of strategies to 
improve yields on existing agricultural land; and 
the introduction of improved cook stoves to save 
fuel wood (and improve indoor air quality in many 
cases). It will also require building the capacity of 
such communities to engage in project develop-
ment and operation. Such capacity-building could 
consist of working with communities to strengthen 
tenurial authority through mapping and bound-
ary demarcation; to develop relationships with 
commune, district and provincial representatives; 
to organize community patrols to monitor illegal 
logging; to develop fire control strategies; and to 
develop annual carbon stock monitoring systems5. 
As with the provision of micro-finance, in which 
largely private entities provide very small loans to 
many low- or no-income clients, small-scale REDD 
activities are labour-intensive and thus require 
many practitioners on the ground who are ready 
and able to deploy innovative strategies with agil-
ity. Such a role undoubtedly provides a better fit 
for private entities than for governments. Indeed, 
as they implement specific REDD+ strategies, pri-
vate practitioners will also develop further exper-
tise that is crucial for continual improvement in 
REDD+ performance and the expansion of REDD+ 
activities to areas facing stronger pressures to de-
forest. In this way, project activities on the ground 
act now and will continue to act as the tool for scal-
ing up and the building blocks upon which nation-
al and international efforts can be constructed.
 
Some might argue that the public sector could take 
on the role of developing and implementing bottom-
up approaches to address deforestation drivers such 
as those described above. Doing so, however, would 
disregard the lessons that led to the development 
of successful contemporary public-private partner-
ships. Private actors have the experience, available 
capacity and agility to develop and undertake proj-
ect-level REDD strategies; governments generally do 
not. Governments have the ability to put in place the 
infrastructure and policies that create an enabling 
environment for their success; private practitioners 
and investors do not. A comprehensive REDD+ 
framework should embed this natural dichotomy by 
putting in place rules that incentivize private-sector 
participation in REDD+ efforts from the bottom up, 
thereby freeing the public sector to focus on getting 
the top-down activities right.
When it comes to REDD efforts, a
top-down approach will help create an 
enabling environment and catalyze further 
efforts, but it will not be sufficient to address 
fully the drivers of deforestation or offer 
alternative livelihoods in order to maintain 
forest protection over the longer term.
5 For a real-world example of the activities that REDD projects engage 
in, see ‘Designing Collaborative REDD Projects: A Case Study From 
Oddar Meanchey Province, Cambodia,’ Mark Poffenberger, Ph.D, 
Steven S. De Gryze, Ph.D, and Leslie L. Durschinger, http://www.
communityforestryinternational.org/publications/research_reports/
REDD-Final.pdf.
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2.4 Bringing the Private Sector On Board, and 
Keeping it there 
 
Recognizing that private-sector involvement is 
critical to ensuring the success of REDD+ ef-
forts is an important first step, but we must go 
further to guarantee the initial and continued 
participation of private-sector actors. To guaran-
tee private-sector involvement, we need a clear 
understanding of what will encourage private 
practitioners to remain involved in REDD+ and 
to convince private investors to provide much-
needed finance. This requires taking a close look 
at the risks facing the private sector in the con-
text of a potential REDD+ crediting mechanism.
Any REDD+ crediting mechanism promises to be 
dauntingly complex given the scale of the chal-
lenge of deforestation and degradation, the many 
levels at which REDD+ activities must be under-
taken and the variety of actors, governmental and 
non-governmental, who will be involved. Engag-
ing with such a mechanism will be uncharted ter-
ritory for private-sector actors, entailing signifi-
cant risks for the investment of private capital. 
Private-sector actors will face various levels of risk. 
In general, they will face a high level of sovereign 
risk, or the political risk that stems from the need 
to engage with and, in most cases, rely on the abili-
ties of a sovereign government for direction and 
enforcement. Sovereign risk is exacerbated in the 
case of REDD+ activities given the complexity of 
the challenge, which requires a much higher level 
of involvement by developing country governments 
than was required in previous offset mechanisms, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The respective government 
must play a leading role in establishing the domes-
tic action plan, in devising, implementing and en-
forcing the top-down policies to create an enabling 
environment and in agreeing a national or sub-
national crediting baseline with the international 
regulatory body that will credit REDD+ activities. 
Given the fact that government must play a lead-
ing role, depending upon system design, any of 
the following delivery risks may apply:
•	 Implementation Risk: the risk that the 
government fails to establish an appropriate 
regulatory framework or to enforce estab-
lished laws adequately for reasons of insuffi-
cient capacity or negligence. This creates an 
environment that works against private-sec-
tor practitioners, undermining their ability 
to perform and generate credits. 
•	 Default risk: the risk that the government 
fails to honour agreements made regarding 
crediting with private-sector entities where 
crediting is directed through governments, 
rather than directly to projects.
•	 Performance risk: the risk that the top-down 
strategies developed by the government fail 
to meet the performance objectives set by 
the system, despite being fully implemented 
and well enforced. In this case, the delivery of 
credits to well-performing projects may not 
be proportional to their individual perfor-
mance or might be withheld entirely. 
All of these constitute versions of delivery risk, 
which stems from the increase in sovereign risk. 
A comprehensive REDD+ framework
should embed this natural dichotomy by 
putting in place rules that incentivize 
private-sector participation in REDD+ 
efforts from the bottom up, thereby 
freeing the public sector to focus on 
getting the top-down activities right.
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Private-sector actors will need to evaluate these 
risks for every national or subnational program 
established. They will know that options for the 
enforcement of a sovereign-to-private entity con-
tract are minimal, which will further increase their 
perception of risk. Some increase in sovereign risk 
cannot be avoided given the complexity of the 
REDD+ challenge, but it must be acknowledged 
and mitigated through REDD+ system design if 
private actors are to be encouraged to participate.
How can REDD+ system design effectively mitigate 
the risks perceived by private-sector actors? First 
and foremost, the system must provide the greatest 
possible regulatory certainty over the lifetime of the 
activity or throughout its pre-determined crediting 
period. The international regulatory body6 and, in-
deed, the REDD+ crediting mechanism itself must 
have sufficient stability to allow the project to com-
plete its crediting period(s) and/or to allow the in-
vestment to reach maturity. Uncertainties about the 
institutional security of the CDM after the expiry of 
the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period have 
caused great anxiety among private-sector partici-
pants in the CDM and mean that subsequent mech-
anisms must pay even greater attention to ensuring 
institutional longevity ex-ante in order to draw in 
private-sector participation (UNFCCC, 2010).
Secondly, the system must offer private actors as-
surance that their investment will remain viable 
through the stages of phasing in a REDD+ pro-
gram, particularly when crediting moves from be-
ing solely project-based to the subnational and 
national levels. Several proposals for the establish-
ment of a REDD+ crediting mechanism, including 
those discussed to date in the US Senate, include a 
very limited term of direct project-based crediting 
and then allow, but do not ensure, so-called ‘nested 
crediting’ for private sector-led project activities if 
the domestic government allows. To be clear, these 
proposals include the possibility of nested credit-
ing without any assurance that host countries will 
agree to it and without further clarifying how the 
rules of a transition from solely project-based to 
nested crediting may be set or what they will be. 
Provision for nested crediting is a step in the right 
direction, but simply including the possibility 
of nested crediting is not enough to spur private 
investment on a large scale. The system must pro-
vide a clear path to nesting from the onset of the 
program, including agreement by the host coun-
try that pre-existing projects will be nested within 
the new system and the application of the rules of 
crediting to nested projects. It must insure against 
retroactive decision-making that impacts on in-
vestments that have already been made.
Thirdly, when designing the REDD+ mechanism, 
policy-makers should strongly consider includ-
ing a provision that guarantees direct crediting 
from the international regulatory body for nest-
ed project activities. Giving the authority to is-
sue credits for projects to an international body 
greatly reduces the sovereign risk to investment, 
maximizes investor security and should therefore 
encourage greater private-sector participation. 
There is no room here to discuss even the most 
basic ideas, but there are many options for how 
the rules for direct crediting could be written so 
as to maintain the integrity of a national or sub-
national crediting baseline (The Nature Conser-
vancy and Baker and McKenzie LLP, 2010). For 
example, even if a pre-established, project-specif-
ic baseline was the basis for crediting, arrange-
ments could be made to include a percentage of 
‘at risk’ credits in the private-sector accounting. 
These credits would be held back until the na-
6 Such a regulatory body could be similar to the CDM Executive Board, 
with largely centralized control of registration, approval and crediting 
under the mechanism. It could also have a more decentralized regulatory 
structure consisting of dual authorities, with a Board at the UNFCCC 
level for relatively high-level approvals and a regulatory body in the host 
country for the monitoring and enforcement of more discrete program 
requirements. 
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tional or state/provincial baseline was achieved, 
thus allowing both public and private actors to 
share some level of risk in achieving the nation-
al- or state/provincial-level baseline. 
The key for attracting private-sector investment, 
however, is ensuring that the risks to invest-
ment and participation are clearly identifiable 
and calculable at the beginning of the program. 
Further, accounting for the loss of the at-risk in-
vestment must not render the investment com-
mercially unviable, so the percentage of at-risk 
credits must be relatively limited7. If all or a ma-
jority of the credits are ‘at risk’, as in the situa-
tion where the crediting of a project is wholly 
dependent upon the achievement of a national 
or state/provincial baseline, the risk will be in-
calculable and the accounting implications will 
be great. Very few if any investors will participate.
If crediting does not flow directly to project-lev-
el activities from the international regulatory 
body but rather through the domestic govern-
ment and then to private-project practitioners 
and investors, this may still be attractive to 
private-sector investment. The attractiveness of 
investing will depend largely upon the gover-
nance capacity and extent of rule of law in the 
country in question. Also, domestic policy and 
accounting frameworks must ensure the fair 
distribution of credits by assigning clear car-
bon rights to the actors involved and allowing 
them to enter freely into legal purchase agree-
ments with other private-sector credit buyers. 
Doing so will partly address counter-party risk 
by ensuring that the private sector has a buyer/
seller relationship with other private actors to 
which it has legal recourse. 
iii. knitting it all Together: Frameworks for 
integration
In order to address risks and incentivize private-
sector involvement sufficiently, the design of the 
REDD+ mechanism must ‘knit it all together’, in-
cluding existing project-level activities, as well as 
jurisdictional (national and subnational) activities 
and national accounting and crediting systems. At 
this time of uncertainty in terms of the future of 
international and US climate policy, activities at 
the project and jurisdiction levels are still advanc-
ing, and any eventual international mechanism 
for REDD+ will have to take these activities into 
account. If we fail to create workable frameworks, 
even at this early stage, we risk ending up with a 
plethora of different approaches at different lev-
els that result in irreconcilable accounting issues 
and missed opportunities for capturing synergies
3.1 Options for Integrated Framworks
There are numerous ways in which an integrated 
REDD+ framework may be structured, and this 
article does not attempt to outline all of the 
various technical and political issues, but rather 
highlights the potential high-level options that 
will affect private-sector investment and address 
deforestation and degradation. The choice of an 
appropriate framework will be determined by lo-
cal factors and priorities, and no single frame-
work will fit all circumstances. The one char-
acteristic that all integrated frameworks share 
is that they allow crediting at different levels, 
whether this is done directly by an international 
regulatory body or via host governments. 
In order to achieve crediting at multiple levels, 
any integrated framework will need to account for 
project and jurisdictional level (e.g. at the munici-
pality, state/province and national levels) activities 
7 Necessary limits will depend on the country (sovereign risk) and the 
difficulties of REDD project implementation for the land area in question. 
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against a national reference level. In addition, non-
overlapping reference levels for distinct regions/
jurisdictions will need to be delineated so that 
together they add up to the national reference 
level. Project activities would use the appropri-
ate baseline for their areas as defined under the 
overarching reference level for the entire region/
jurisdiction, thus streamlining the necessary proj-
ect accounting, as well ensuring that emissions 
reductions add up across the different scales. Set-
ting such reference levels will require political ne-
gotiation and compromises and will face a number 
of challenges, but it will ultimately result in more 
workable frameworks for activities at all levels.
Beyond the setting of reference levels, the form of 
integrated accounting and crediting will have to 
be determined by the government to account for 
country preferences and circumstances. As recent 
reports have outlined (O’Sullivan et al. 2010), there 
are a number of variations possible for integrated 
REDD accounting and crediting, for example: 
1) National-level crediting, where an interna-
tional regulatory body directly credits only 
the national government. Accounting and 
MRV systems would be adopted at the na-
tional level, with project activities approved 
by the national government. All credits 
would flow directly to the national govern-
ment, which would determine how credits are 
shared and would directly distribute credits 
amongst jurisdictions or projects, where any 
credits issued to jurisdictions and project 
activities would be deducted from national 
accounts. The risk of underperformance 
may be managed by buffer pools or insur-
ance mechanisms, as is further outlined in 
section 3.3. This option places the greatest 
demands on national governments, requiring 
high capacity, good governance and strong 
institutions to ensure transparent and ef-
fective implementation. Though potentially 
the least controversial option, it may be dif-
ficult to implement for key REDD+ countries, 
many of which have political instability, weak 
institutions and capacity, and poor enforce-
ment mechanisms. Private-sector investors 
may hesitate to become involved due to high 
counter-party risk, as outlined in section 2.4.
2) National and project crediting, where an 
international regulatory body directly credits 
both national and project activities. Account-
ing and reference levels would be adopted at 
the national level, but project activities (which 
would still be approved at the national level) 
may be independently monitored and verified. 
Credits would flow both to national govern-
ments and directly to sub-national activities, 
including directly to projects, as well as to sub-
national jurisdictions, ensuring that project 
and sub-national jurisdictional issuances are 
subtracted from national accounts to prevent 
over-issuance or double counting. This option 
requires careful design so that credits issued 
to projects, to other sub-national activities 
and to the national level add up, and that 
the risk of under-performance by projects or 
countries is adequately addressed. This option 
also places demands on national governments 
and requires strong institutions, but it is the 
most attractive option for the private sector, 
as it would allow direct buyer/seller relation-
ships where projects are credited directly. 
The choice of an appropriate framework 
will be determined by local factors and 
priorities, and no single framework will fit 
all circumstances.
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3) Sub-national and project crediting. 
There may also be a period of time between 
the current dominance of project-focused 
and purely voluntary REDD+ markets 
and the establishment of an international 
mechanism for REDD+, where accounting 
and crediting could be done directly at 
the sub-national jurisdictional scale, with-
out a national framework having to be in 
place. This would resemble either option 
one, where a jurisdiction may be credited 
directly and the jurisdiction would deter-
mine how credits are distributed to project 
activities; or option two, where projects and 
jurisdictions are directly credited against a 
jurisdictional reference level. This option 
could potentially cover the gap between 
current bottom-up project activities and 
the day when systems, and an interna-
tional agreement, are in place for national-
scale activities, as well as serve as a testing 
ground for the development of credible in-
tegrated frameworks that could be adapted 
to, and adopted by, national governments. 
Table 1 shows a comparison of three potential 
options. Options one and two require strong na-
tional institutions. In the long term option two 
(option three potentially, where projects may be 
credited directly) is the most attractive for the 
private sector because sovereign risk for investors 
is lowest, as it does not rely on the national gov-
ernment to manage domestic credit issuance or 
benefit sharing. Although institutional require-
ments are still high, such a framework would place 
a lower burden on national governments, as proj-
To whom are 
credits issued? 
How would projects receive 
credits or benefits? 
 
Accounting & MRV 
Option 1  
Option 2  
Option 3 
 
National 
governments  
National governments would 
determine domestic credit 
issuance and/or benefit sharing  
National accounting 
and MRV 
National 
governments and 
project activities 
Standalone project activities may 
be credited directly from an 
international body. Such credits 
would be deducted from national 
accounts, to ensure no double 
issuance of credits 
3a)  Subnational 
programs 
(governments) 
 
3a) Subnational governments 
would determine credit issuance 
and/or benefit sharing to projects 
within the jurisdiction  
• Project and national 
accounting and MRV 
• Mechanisms to ensure 
crediting at different 
scales ‘add-up’ are 
required  
 
• Project and 
subnational 
(jurisdictional) 
accounting and MRV
• Mechanisms to ensure 
crediting at different 
scales ‘add-up’ 
required  
3b) Subnational 
programs 
(governments) and 
project activities 
3b) Standalone project activities 
may be credited directly from an 
international body. Such credits 
would be deducted from 
jurisdictional accounts, to ensure 
no double issuance of credits
 
Table 1. REDD+ Crediting and Accounting Options
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ect activities could be developed, monitored and 
verified by independent third parties.
This is not to say that private-sector engagement 
and bottom-up activities are not possible under 
option one. Whether projects and jurisdictions 
are eligible for direct crediting, or whether cred-
its are dispersed by the national government, 
what is essential is that there is a pathway for 
project activities to be credited for emissions re-
ductions achieved.
3.2 Case Study
Even within a fully integrated REDD+ framework 
at the national level, there will be differences be-
tween countries. Below is just one example from 
Indonesia that shows the different options both 
between and within different countries.
In addition to readiness activities at the na-
tional level, Indonesia is currently developing 
a number of different strategies at the provin-
cial and district levels, as well as a number of 
project activities. It is difficult to identify the 
exact number or extent of current project-level 
activities, but there are at least twenty distinct 
voluntary projects under development across 
Indonesia8. These activities represent the most 
advanced on-the-ground development of REDD 
in Indonesia, providing valuable insights into 
the structure of effective REDD+ activities, 
and building capacity for local communities, 
governments and non-governmental actors. 
It would be a mistake to disincentivize or dis-
courage the continuation of such activities that 
have pioneered the REDD markets. 
Much like the decentralization of the manage-
ment of forest resources, which Indonesia trans-
ferred to regional governments in the late 1990s, 
an integrated REDD framework in Indonesia may 
engender a decentralized system in which prov-
inces determine how projects are nested within 
jurisdictional programs, while supporting poli-
cies and programs are developed at the national 
level, including systems to ensure that jurisdic-
tional and national emissions reductions are 
properly reconciled. 
Current funding to the national government and 
REDD readiness activities include funding un-
der the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF), the UN-REDD Programme (with 
funding of USD 5.6 million for 2009-2011) and 
directly from the government of Norway (up to 
USD 1 billion over 7-8 years)9. These activities 
primarily focus on assisting the Government of 
Indonesia in attaining REDD readiness, includ-
ing the establishment of a national reference 
level, MRV systems, benefit-sharing and stake-
holder engagement mechanisms and capacity 
building, as well as some pilot/demonstration 
activities. The UN-REDD Programme funding 
also aims to develop capacity at decentralized 
levels, one example being the capacity for spa-
tial socio-economic planning, including REDD, 
at the district level, as well as district plans for 
REDD implementation. 
These top-down developments fit nicely with the 
‘natural dichotomy’ between public and private 
8 UN-REDD Program (2009). Indonesia. Available at www.un-redd.org/
UNREDDProgramme/.../Indonesia/.../Default.aspx
9 See UN-REDD Program (2009). Indonesia UN-REDD National 
Joint Programme. http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_
docman&task=doc_download&gid=263&Itemid=53, FCPF (2010) 
Summary of Indonesia REDD Readiness Activities Financed through 
FCPF Programme. http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/
forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Jul2010/Website_
FCPF_Definition_of_activities_FINAL25Juni2010.pdf, and Royal 
Norwegian Government (2010) Norway-Indonesia REDD+ Partnership. 
http://www.norway.or.id/Norway_in_Indonesia/Environment/-FAQ-
Norway-Indonesia-REDD-Partnership-/
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roles in REDD+ efforts discussed above. REDD 
readiness activities are focused on the up-front 
capacity-building and establishment of support 
policies for forest protection. However, they are 
not primarily focused, despite some funding for 
pilot/demonstration activities, on addressing the 
site-specific drivers of deforestation and degrada-
tion, the development of alternative livelihoods or 
the implementation of other activities necessary to 
prevent deforestation which are being addressed 
(at a local level) by the project activities that are 
currently under development. At the jurisdictional 
level (province, district, municipality), REDD im-
plementation plans and current activities vary, as 
demonstrated by the examples of West Kalimantan 
and the Berau District in East Kalimantan.
West Kalimantan Province on the island of Borneo 
has promoted a number of pilot projects, most of 
which have been developed under voluntary mar-
ket standards, including the Voluntary Carbon 
Standard (VCS), with the aim of moving to an in-
tegrated framework post-2012 that will encourage 
private-sector investment. Current government in-
terventions focus on setting a provincial reference 
level and developing MRV systems, stakeholder 
consultations and promoting the development of 
REDD+ projects for integration within provincial 
and national frameworks10. Most current proj-
ect activities are being developed under the VCS, 
which is often combined with the Climate, Com-
munity and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard to cover 
the social and environmental co-benefits of such 
projects. The VCS provides a robust platform for 
the development of project activities, including 
addressing leakage and permanence. An effective 
integrated framework will include and allow credit-
ing to such project activities, which are currently 
proving that such site-scale interventions can ad-
dress drivers of deforestation, build local capacity 
and maintain private investment, and can do so in 
a credible manner that addresses concerns over 
leakage and permanence.
Berau District in East Kalimantan, however, is 
taking a top-down jurisdictional approach. The 
Berau Forest Carbon Program, which is a part-
nership between The Nature Conservancy and 
national, provincial and district governments 
together with civil-society and private-sector in-
terests, is developing the entire district as a sin-
gle REDD+ program within a top-down managed 
framework. The program includes site-level direct 
interventions such as improving the manage-
ment of protected areas and logging practices, in 
addition to institutional developments to create 
a jurisdictional measurement and accounting 
framework. Such sub-national activities could 
be credited either directly from international 
carbon markets (option 2), or via the national 
government (option 1), and this decision will 
vary by country and potentially by jurisdiction. 
Creating a policy environment and designing 
a REDD mechanism that encourages activities 
at these different levels will ultimately be more 
effective, as drivers of deforestation can be ad-
dressed at an appropriate level, whether project, 
jurisdictional or national, and will facilitate the 
continuation of private-sector investment.
Many other jurisdictions, for example, in 
Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and elsewhere, 
are developing strategies and frameworks for 
REDD+ activities at the state, regional and 
district levels, in addition to national-level 
REDD+ readiness activities. In some countries 
like Guyana, national frameworks will be much 
more centralized and top-down, rather than 
encouraging or allowing different state/prov-
ince-level frameworks or promoting project ac-
10 West Kalimantan Province presentation at Governor’s Climate and Forest 
Task Force (GCF) meeting (APR 2010).
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tivities. Ultimately it will be up to national and 
state/province governments to determine the 
framework most appropriate in their countries 
through the political process.
However, such national programs will take time 
to develop, and sub-national frameworks may in 
some cases be developed in advance of, or some-
what independently from, those at the national 
level. It will clearly be important for such pro-
grams to be harmonized at the national level, 
and developing integrated frameworks as soon 
as possible will help to avoid the risk of ending 
up with a patchwork of different approaches and 
conflicting accounting systems that may later be 
impossible to integrate. Developing integrated 
frameworks at this early stage is the best way to 
ensure that early action, pilot activities, ongoing 
projects and jurisdictional programs can later 
dock into national accounting frameworks being 
developed top-down. 
3.3 Key issues
As we move up the scale from project to jurisdic-
tional to national accounting and crediting, many 
of the risks associated with project-level activi-
ties are addressed. In particular, permanence and 
leakage become less problematic when national 
inventories can be used to account for all changes 
in forest cover at the national level. Maintaining 
project activities within these frameworks will 
help to maintain investment and address local 
drivers of deforestation, but allowing crediting di-
rectly to projects and other sub-national activities 
does raise a number of other issues that must be 
addressed to ensure environmental integrity.
A well-designed system will need to address a 
number of issues, including:
•	 Measurement, monitoring and verifica-
tion of emissions reductions at all levels, 
including project (where applicable), ju-
risdictional and national levels. This will 
require integration of MRV results at all 
levels in a transparent system. Accounting 
for reductions at multiple levels will ensure 
that sub-national activities do not ‘add 
up’ to greater reductions than those real-
ized nationally. A mechanism for resolving 
potential inconsistencies between project 
and jurisdictional claims is needed to en-
sure there is no double counting. 
•	 Determination of the number of credits 
to be issued and the ownership of such 
credits. This is likely to vary based on 
whether crediting is allowed sub-national-
ly or only via the national government. It 
also requires appropriate legal frameworks 
for carbon and credit ownership. 
•	 Risk assessment and mitigation, for ex-
ample, the creation of risk-management 
systems to address potential underperfor-
mance or reversals, and including different 
options to address project and jurisdic-
tional risk management. Options to man-
age liabilities and risks may include the 
creation of reserve accounts, where proj-
ects and jurisdictions would deposit a per-
centage of credits to be used in the event 
of underperformance, insurance or other 
mechanisms.
•	 Addressing project-level and regional 
leakage. This may include some sort of 
‘leakage tax’ paid by projects, additional 
buffer withholdings, or other systems. 
Where both projects and jurisdictions are 
credited, jurisdictions should not be fully 
responsible for any leakage from project 
activities that result outside the project 
boundary. While leakage may ‘disappear’ to 
some extent when projects are integrated 
into jurisdictional and national account-
ing, there must still be a mechanism to 
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distribute credits fairly among projects 
and jurisdictions to account for the pos-
sibility that some deforestation may shift 
elsewhere in the jurisdiction when project 
activities are implemented. Leakage may 
also remain between jurisdictions, and this 
must be addressed by national accounting.
Ultimately, the structure of an appropriate 
REDD+ mechanism must be designed to ensure 
the most efficient and effective means to address 
the drivers of deforestation and degradation, as 
well as to ensure a transparent and fair means 
to distribute credits among those responsible for 
emissions reductions. An integrated system will 
be most effective in doing this by ensuring that 
activities to reduce emissions at multiple levels 
can be directly rewarded. The limited public 
funding available should be directed at the key 
policy issues that need to be resolved, includ-
ing the mechanisms to allow a functioning in-
tegrated REDD+ framework that are effectively 
managed at the national level, while jurisdic-
tions (states, provinces, regions) implement local 
activities and programs and allow project-level 
activities where appropriate.
The voluntary markets (see box 1) may serve as a 
model for how bottom-up activities nest within 
jurisdictional accounting and crediting frame-
works, providing a testing ground to ensure that 
projects being developed now will be able to 
dock into jurisdictional and eventually national 
frameworks in the future. This would also unlock 
some of the funding gap between REDD+ readi-
ness funding being supplied today and the day 
when private finance (through compliance car-
bon markets) is flowing. 
box 1. Voluntary Market developments
According to the State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2009 report (Hamilton et al. 2010), 5.3 mil-
lion tonnes (5.3 MtCO2) totalling USD 37.1 million were transacted in the forest carbon market 
in 2008, of which only 0.2 MtCO2 were transacted in regulated markets. And historically, 75% of 
forest carbon transactions have been in the OTC voluntary carbon markets. 
The VCS was the first large-scale GHG program that included project activities from the agriculture, for-
estry and other land-use (AFOLU) sectors in a way that made credits from these activities fungible with 
credits from other, more traditional sectors (e.g., landfill gas, renewable energy). The VCS achieved this 
through a comprehensive two-year stakeholder and public consultation process, drawing on leading for-
est and agricultural carbon experts and practitioners, including from CATIE, Winrock International, The 
Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, the Nicholas Institute at Duke University, CO and OH 
State Universities, the Chinese Academy of Forestry, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Joanneum 
Research, TÜV SÜD and others. This work resulted in the requirement that projects facing the risk of 
non-permanence set aside a certain percentage of the credits they generate in a pooled buffer account 
that then serves as insurance against potential future losses. This work also resulted in robust approaches 
for addressing leakage. Both of these approaches, which the VCSA continues to refine and update as new 
technical and scientific information is published, have played an important role in helping to lend legiti-
macy to AFOLU project activities and in encouraging further investment in such efforts.
Further developments in the voluntary markets, such as the possibility to credit jurisdictional (national, 
state, municipality) emissions reductions under standards such as the VCS, could promote critical de-
velopments for the integration of project activities into state and national accounting frameworks.
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iv. Conclusions 
In order to stop, or even halve, global deforesta-
tion, we must address the causes and not just the 
symptoms of deforestation. While the drivers of 
deforestation differ in kind around the world, 
they are all fundamentally linked to economic 
activity. Whether the main driver is the produc-
tion of commodities (timber and agricultural 
commodities) for export or subsistence-level 
consumption of resources by forest communi-
ties, shifting the dynamic requires nothing less 
than the re-alignment of economic incentives 
for local communities, regions and countries. 
Unless we address the economic drivers of de-
forestation at the various levels, it will not be 
possible to halt deforestation. Engaging the 
private sector does not mean engaging only pri-
vate-sector REDD+ project developers, inves-
tors, or insurance providers: private-sector in-
volvement goes way beyond that. It also means 
engaging local communities, local governments 
and companies undertaking activities that re-
sult in deforestation. 
By directing private-sector investment into spa-
tially well-defined project interventions, we en-
sure that robust and credible MRV of such reduc-
tions is possible. National policies and programs 
will provide the legal and policy frameworks and 
may directly reduce deforestation and degrada-
tion, but in many cases it will not be possible 
to attribute any reduction from these activities 
to a particular area that can be monitored and 
verified. Therefore, establishing credible mecha-
nisms to credit project-level activities directly is 
not only more attractive to the private sector, it 
is ultimately more robust. 
No entity is more effective than national 
governments at creating enabling policy en-
vironments for broad national policies. How-
ever, governments have proved less effective 
at implementing the myriad site-scale inter-
ventions that are necessary to address the un-
derlying drivers of deforestation, livelihood 
issues and community engagement. In addi-
tion, major gains have been made around the 
world in the last few decades to devolve rights 
to forest resources to local communities. Sep-
arating rights to carbon from rights to forest 
resources risks cutting local communities off 
from the benefits they deserve for protecting 
their resources. 
Effective REDD+ implementation will require 
the interaction of a huge number of stake-
holders, who will likely be at odds and must 
be brought together. Ensuring effective frame-
works for actors at different levels to participate 
should create clear pathways for participation 
and therefore greater commitment. Such sys-
tems should be structured strategically and 
with stakeholder input in order to be effective. 
By allowing crediting directly to project- and 
jurisdictional-level activities, those who are 
closest to the resources and drivers of defores-
tation can be engaged and rewarded, thus in-
centivizing participation, maintaining rights to 
resources and, where projects are well designed, 
ultimately ensuring the sustainable alternative 
livelihoods that are necessary for the ongoing 
protection of forest resources. 
In order to stop, or even halve, global 
deforestation, we must address the causes 
and not just the symptoms of deforestation. 
While the drivers of deforestation differ 
in kind around the world, they are all 
fundamentally linked to economic activity.
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1. introduction
One of the main issues being discussed within the 
context of the ongoing negotiations on an inter-
national mechanism for Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation, conserving 
and enhancing carbon stocks and sustainable for-
est management (REDD+) under the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) relates to the ‘scale’ of initiatives to be 
incentivized by such a mechanism. 
Many Parties to the Convention have proposed that 
only emission reductions achieved at the national 
level should be incentivized, arguing that only a 
country-wide accounting of emissions could en-
sure that emissions caused by leakage from specif-
ic initiatives carried out within the country would 
be accounted for, and due to the political need to 
demonstrate meaningful, large-scale participation 
The ‘Nested Approach’ to REDD+: 
How Could it Be Implemented?
The ‘Nested Approach’ is a framework for structuring 
effective incentive mechanisms for reducing GHG 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
at multiple scales. The approach is designed to 
encourage immediate emission reductions in 
developing countries at a scale compatible with their 
capacities and levels of governance. Subnational 
and national mitigation activities are both eligible 
for international performance-based incentives, and 
a negotiated but limited time has been granted to 
governments for moving from sub-national to national 
implementation. The proposed framework creates the 
conditions needed for early involvement of the private 
sector in mitigation initiatives, which is essential to 
complement public efforts and achieve meaningful 
emission reductions to keep the global average 
temperature increase below 2ºC in this century.
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by developing countries in global mitigation ef-
forts in the post-2012 period. National approaches 
would be led by national governments, and the 
international incentives generated through the 
REDD+ mechanism would be granted to them if 
country emissions are reduced compared to a his-
torical reference level during a determined period 
(e.g. a commitment period). Governments would be 
in charge of managing such incentives to enhance 
their policies and measures or of distributing them 
among communities and individuals representing 
successful REDD+ initiatives. 
Other countries have supported sub-national 
approaches, based on the concept of the Clean 
Development Mechanism and building on its na-
tional and international infrastructure. In this 
case, incentives would flow directly to successful 
projects and programs (e.g. through the issuance 
of carbon credits), and the role of the govern-
ment would be limited to issuing letters of accep-
tance of such activities on the grounds of their 
sustainable development benefits. 
A third approach, called the ‘Nested Approach’ 
(NA), was introduced in the UNFCCC negotia-
tions by a group of observers,2 and Latin Ameri-
can countries3 as an alternative to an exclusively 
national approach. The idea was originally elab-
orated by Pedroni et al. (2009) and is further de-
scribed in this paper. 4 
Today, the concept of ‘nesting’ sub-national miti-
gation activities in broader national frameworks is 
frequently mentioned in the discussions on REDD+ 
(e.g. Angelsen et al., 2008; Parker et al., 2009; Cor-
tez et al., 2010; Estrada, 2010). Many stakeholders 
in the political process realize that developing-
country governments are faced with REDD+ re-
lated demands and initiatives from sub-national 
governments, indigenous groups, civil society and 
the private sector, that national capacities and ca-
pabilities may take more time to be developed, and 
that public funding alone may not be sufficient to 
induce mitigation activities at the scale required to 
keep the global average temperature increase below 
2 ºC in this century. There is a need to find effective 
approaches to incentivize public and private actors 
responsible for addressing the drivers of deforesta-
tion, to integrate sub-national REDD+ initiatives in 
national REDD+ frameworks and to leverage private 
investment in mitigation activities, whilst maintain-
ing the overall environmental integrity of the system. 
In this paper, we aim to clarify how a ‘Nested Ap-
proach’ to REDD+ could achieve these objectives. 
In essence, the NA enables immediate reductions of 
GHG emissions in developing countries at a scale 
compatible with their capabilities and levels of 
governance. It encourages improvements in forest 
governance by providing a negotiated but limited 
time frame for developing countries that are unable 
to achieve emissions reductions from deforesta-
tion and forest degradation at the national level in 
the near term to start acting through sub-national 
mitigation activities (projects and programs) and 
proceed over time to fully national (wall-to-wall) 
emission reduction schemes. Sub-national activi-
ties could encompass areas as large as entire biomes 
(such as the Legal Amazon in Brazil), individual states 
or provinces (political and administrative units), and 
smaller units of lands under specific projects, such 
as indigenous territories, protected areas, forest 
concessions, and private lands. In fact, sub-national 
2 FCCC/SBSTA/2006/L.25: Submission to the UNFCCC by the Tropical 
Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE) and the 
German Emissions Trading Association (BVEK) regarding Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries.
3  FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14: Submission of ‘Paraguay on 
behalf of Honduras, Mexico, Panamá, Paraguay and Perú’ and the 
submission of Chile.
4  I.e., a scheme through which international incentives would only be 
granted to developing-country governments for reducing national 
emissions compared to national reference emission levels, and which 
would not allow individual sub-national initiatives to access such 
international incentives.
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efforts are supposed to scale-up over time from one 
such scale to a larger one, until they reach a point 
where a national scheme becomes feasible.
The NA requires sub-national and national mitiga-
tion activities to be implemented under consistent 
and credible frameworks for reference emission 
levels and monitoring, reporting, and verification 
(MRV). It is therefore based on a registry system that 
maintains separate carbon accounting records for 
each sub-national initiative carried out in a country, 
thus avoiding double counting of emission reduc-
tions where these are sold as offset credits to gov-
ernments or private entities with legally binding 
emission reduction commitments. To prevent the 
creation of non-permanent emission reductions, 
the NA proposes an insurance mechanism that sets 
aside part of the emission reductions, which is kept 
as a reserve, or ‘buffer’, to compensate for any pos-
sible future deforestation that could undermine the 
environmental credibility of REDD+ credits.
Mobilizing private-sector investment is essential 
to reach the levels of finance required to cover the 
costs of REDD+, which may well be higher than 
the USD$ 5 to 15 billion per year estimated by 
Nicolas Stern (2006) and Johan Eliasch (2008)5. 
The accounting framework put forward by the NA 
guarantees developers of successful mitigation ini-
tiatives direct access to international incentives, 
regardless of the scale at which the initiatives may 
be implemented and the aggregate performance of 
all mitigation efforts of the host country vis-à-vis 
a national emission reference. This is done whilst 
maintaining overall environmental integrity, as ex-
plained later in this paper. By giving direct access 
to international incentives and delinking invest-
ment risk from national performance, two critical 
conditions are met for inducing the early engage-
ment of the private sector in REDD+ efforts. 
In addition, the flexibility and transparency of 
the NA may facilitate the recognition and in-
corporation of current REDD+ initiatives in fu-
ture schemes regulated by the United Nations, 
and, as the case may be, in emission reduction 
schemes that certain countries and states could 
establish independently.
The implicit goal of the NA is to promote the 
widest participation by countries and stakehold-
ers from the outset, in order to achieve real, fast 
and significant emission reductions in a ratio-
nal way, based on countries´ capacities, circum-
stances and development needs. This will ensure 
the permanence of carbon (and wider develop-
ment) benefits, thus contributing to early, deep, 
and cost-effective climate-change mitigation. 
 
2. assumptions and conditions for imple-
menting the Na
The NA assumes that Parties to the UNFCCC will 
adopt market-based approaches to incentivize 
There is a need to find effective 
approaches to incentivize public and 
private actors responsible for addressing 
the drivers of deforestation, to integrate 
sub-national REDD+ initiatives in 
national REDD+ frameworks and to 
leverage private investment in mitigation 
activities, whilst maintaining the overall 
environmental integrity of the system.
5 Stern estimated the opportunity costs of forest protection in eight 
countries responsible for 70% of emissions from land use to be around 
USD 5 billion per year. Eliash’s review increased this estimate to about 
USD 15 billion per year. The costs of institutional capacity-building, 
MRV, enforcement, permanence and supplementarity, etc. are not 
included in these estimates. 
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REDD+ and that such approaches will be linked 
to developed countries’ emission reduction com-
mitments that are ambitious enough to generate 
demand for REDD+ carbon credits, ideally by 
following IPCC-recommended levels of global 
emission reductions to keep global warming 
within an acceptable range. It also assumes that 
developed countries will assist developing coun-
tries with technical and financial support, at 
least initially, to build the infrastructure required 
to run mitigation activities at the national scale. 
The NA may be adapted to an international 
system of performance-based incentives for 
REDD+ solely relying on public funds (e.g. Of-
ficial Development Assistance). However, the 
scale of emission reductions that could be 
achieved by a system that does not mobilize 
private-sector investments at an early stage is 
likely to be lower than a system combining di-
rect private-sector investment in mitigation ac-
tivities and public investment in national ‘read-
iness’ 6 planning and implementation. 
In principle, the NA allows developing countries 
to start implementing their mitigation initiatives 
at either the sub-national or national levels, de-
pending on their national circumstances. In both 
cases incentives may be channeled directly to the 
promoters of successful initiatives. However, the 
approach might also be adapted through national 
arrangements in developing countries in case only 
national schemes would be allowed internationally.
Additionally, the following conditions will facili-
tate the implementation of the NA:
(i) Political will and leadership to encour-
age intra- and inter-sectoral dialogues on 
forest governance, enabling the design 
and implementation of policies, institu-
tions, financing arrangements and man-
agement plans for the adoption of a na-
tional REDD+ implementation scheme in 
a defined time frame. 
(ii) Transparent and expeditious procedures 
for the evaluation of sub-national REDD+ 
initiatives and their approval by the nation-
al government. Such procedures should be 
effective enough to exclude initiatives that 
do not meet national criteria of sustainable 
development. 
(iii) A registry system of approved initiatives, ref-
erence emission levels, monitoring reports 
and carbon transactions, enabling transpar-
ent carbon accounting and avoiding the 
double counting of sub-national and nation-
al emission reductions. Such a system may be 
under national or international institutions.
(iv) Clearly defined rights of ownership of 
emission reductions under differing cir-
cumstances of use, possession, concession, 
administration, etc., of forested areas.
(v) Clarity and fairness on the definition of 
tributes, duties and royalties to be paid on 
In principle, the NA allows developing 
countries to start implementing their 
mitigation initiatives at either the sub-
national or national levels, depending on 
their national circumstances
6 ‘Readiness’ is a term coined in the context of the World Bank´s Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) to indicate planning activities that 
developing country´s governments should consider to enhance national 
policies and institutions in getting ‘ready’ for implementing REDD+ at 
the national level.
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REDD+ investments, credit transactions 
and benefit distributions. 
(vi) A national monitoring system, which may 
consist of sub-national monitoring systems 
properly organized and coordinated by a 
national entity, able to ensure consistency 
between reports from initiatives of varying 
scales and having the capacity to deliver 
timely, reliable, accurate and verifiable infor-
mation to all REDD+ initiatives in the coun-
try, creating economies of scale in MRV.
3. Major differences of the Na with an exclu-
sively national approach
The process of preparing and implementing 
REDD+ at the national level currently consid-
ered in the negotiations is viewed as falling into 
three phases: 7
Phase 1: Development of action plans or na-
tional strategies, including the design 
of policies, measures and capacity-
building (‘readiness’);
Phase 2:  Implementation of national policies 
and measures;
Phase 3:  Actions centered on results, which should 
be measured, reported and verified.
Consequently, a national approach would gen-
erate tradable emission reductions only in 
Phase 3, once all the required capacities have 
been built and the governance of the country 
has been strengthened. Under an exclusively 
national approach, successful sub-national 
initiatives would not be rewarded if emission 
reductions do not occur nationally, unless 
governments are willing to reward them with 
resources from their own budgets, which is 
unlikely to happen given the financial situa-
tion in developing countries. If national emis-
sion reductions are achieved, rewarding sub-
national activities would depend on national 
benefit distribution policies. In both scenar-
ios, public and private promoters of sub-na-
tional initiatives would have no control over 
the factors that determine the return on their 
investments, making it too risky for them to 
invest in REDD+. Under these circumstances, 
large guarantee funds need to be established 
to reduce risks and to motivate private and 
local government action, thus increasing the 
overall costs of REDD+.
With the NA, sub-national initiatives could 
generate emission reductions and earn credits 
even if the country as a whole does not achieve 
an overall reduction in emissions compared to 
a national reference emission level. In this way, 
the risk of investing in sub-national activities 
would not be linked to the performance of na-
tional governments, of their policies and pro-
grams, or of other projects over which promot-
ers of sub-national initiatives have no control. 
This is an essential condition for the private 
sector to invest in REDD+ activities, and a rea-
son why the NA could lead to greater levels of 
funding for REDD+, which in turn could accel-
erate the enhancement of capacities in devel-
oping countries and the achievement of more 
emission reductions globally in the near term. 
By not requiring the immediate existence of na-
tion-wide MRV capacities and high governance 
levels, the NA would allow a greater number of 
countries to participate in REDD+ from the be-
ginning, thus achieving early and larger reduc-
tions in emissions and diminishing the risk of 
international leakage. 
7 See Meridian Institute (2009) and AWG-LCA, Non-paper No. 39, 
paragraph 7 (outcome of the AWG-LCA meeting in Barcelona, 2-6 
November 2009). 
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The cost of reducing emissions at the national 
level is often too high8 for developing countries 
to cover with their own budgets, particularly con-
sidering the many other pressing needs that such 
countries normally face. With an exclusively na-
tional approach, public budgets (including those 
of developed countries providing ‘readiness’ and 
implementation funds) would have to cover most 
if not all of the cost of REDD+, since there would 
be virtually no incentive for private investment. 
In contrast, with the NA, private actors could par-
ticipate in covering such costs by investing in spe-
cific and independently rewarded activities, with 
identifiable counterparts and manageable risks. 
Additionally, this would incentivize local stake-
holders and institutions with better knowledge 
of the local conditions and greater flexibility to 
adopt innovative solutions to improve local gov-
ernance and increase efficiency in land use and 
forest management. Numerous national and in-
ternational technical and financial stakeholders, 
with great capacities to generate innovative solu-
tions, could actively seek to implement projects in 
areas where the presence of public institutions is 
weak and the threat of deforestation high, given 
the potential to generate emission reductions 
in these hotspots. In this scenario, governments 
could focus their programs on forests with lower 
pressure levels, where opportunity costs are lower, 
allowing them to cover larger areas with the same 
budget. Directing government incentives outside 
areas subject to sub-national initiatives could also 
have an important effect on reducing the risk of 
leakage that such activities could give rise to, thus 
achieving greater efficiency and effectiveness for 
all stakeholder interventions.
The NA would also facilitate site-level tracking 
and reporting of the impact that REDD+ interven-
tions would have on local stakeholders (including 
marginalized groups, such as indigenous peoples 
and forest-dependent communities), which could 
help build support for REDD+ from the develop-
ment and pro-poor constituency. Similarly, the NA 
would enable conservation organizations to focus 
on, and be rewarded for, REDD+ interventions in 
specific regions of high biodiversity value9. 
4. how would the Na work in practice?
4.1 Level of participation
Developing countries would voluntarily decide their 
initial scope of participation in the REDD+ mecha-
nism, according to their circumstances and national 
interests. In this way, a country could adopt a full 
national implementation regime early on, defining 
national reference levels and reduction targets for 
its forest emissions; or, if national circumstances re-
quire more time and resources to strengthen tech-
nical capacities, institutional frameworks, policies, 
etc., a country could begin to participate with sub-
national REDD+ activities. A variant proposed in the 
literature (applicable to the NA) is the ‘committed 
forests approach’ (Forner et al., 2006), whereby a 
country initially commits only a certain percentage 
of its forests in defined areas where conditions exist 
to exercise control, later adding more areas, depend-
ing on the evolution of governance capacity.
4.2 Triggers for transition to a national scheme
If a country decides to participate by imple-
menting sub-national REDD+ activities ini-
8 As an example, a recent study published by SERNANP (Armas et al., 
2009) in Peru assessed the opportunity costs of reducing expected 
deforestation at somewhere between 54% and 88% in the next 10 
years, i.e. between 127 and 170 million dollars annually. This estimate 
does not include the costs of institutional capacity-building, MRV or 
enforcement, among other costs that a country would have to cover to 
implement REDD+ at the national level.
9 For instance, the widely used Climate, Community & Biodiversity 
Standards enable REDD+ project impacts on local communities and 
biodiversity to be independently assessed and reported.
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tially, two ‘triggers’ would serve to motivate the 
country’s public sector and to help it establish 
the infrastructure, capabilities and govern-
mental conditions needed to adopt a nation-
al REDD+ scheme. As proposed by the NA, a 
country should adopt a national scheme when:
(i) the total area covered by sub-national 
REDD+ initiatives reaches a certain per-
centage of national forest land or, alterna-
tively, when
(ii) an agreed number of years elapse from 
the date of registration of the first sub-
national activity endorsed by the national 
government.
The level of both triggers – the percentage 
area (i) and the maximum number of years 
(ii) – would be proposed by each country and 
negotiated by the Parties to the UNFCCC. 
However, the countries that start with sub-
national activities could voluntarily adopt a 
national scheme before reaching the thresh-
old of the ‘triggers’.
4.3 Recognition of sub-national initiatives in 
the long-term
When countries are ready to implement REDD+ at 
the national level, they must recognize the previ-
ously authorized sub-national initiatives and al-
low them to continue generating carbon credits 
throughout their crediting period (which could be 
20 to 100 years, as in the VCS10 ). In this way, sub-
national initiatives would be assured of reaching 
their investment horizons, which is critical if such 
initiatives are to be started in the first place.
4.4 National authorization
To achieve international recognition, sub-na-
tional REDD+ initiatives should be approved 
and registered by the national government in 
the first instance. In this way, there is assurance 
that the initiatives have been designed in accor-
dance with the sustainable development priori-
ties of the host country and its national REDD+ 
strategy. Therefore, the establishment of project 
evaluation criteria and transparent and expedi-
ent procedures for national authorization are 
important steps in the process.
4.5 Carbon Credits
Carbon credits for emission reductions generated 
sub-nationally would be issued directly to par-
ticipants of the registered sub-national initiatives 
by a specialized body of the UNFCCC11, following 
methodologies, procedures and rules agreed upon 
by the Parties of the REDD+ mechanism. Sub-
10 The ‘Voluntary Carbon Standard’ (VCS) is a program of the voluntary 
carbon market that works like the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). 
11 While this section of the paper talks about potential UNFCCC pathways 
for operationalizing the NA, it should also be recognized that the House 
and Senate climate bills currently under consideration in the U.S. provide 
a clear pathway for supporting sub-national initiatives, spelling out how 
project- and state-level activities could be directly credited on their own 
and under national accounting frameworks. Furthermore, the Waxman-
Markey and Kerry-Boxer bills would both allow developing countries to 
participate in sub-national REDD+ activities for a maximum period of 8 
years, a proposal highly compatible with the second ‘trigger’ of the NA. 
The period of 8 years was reduced to 5 years in the Kerry-Liebermann 
bill (or ‘American Power Act’).
“When countries are ready to implement 
REDD+ at the national level, they must 
recognize the previously authorized 
sub-national initiatives and allow them 
to continue generating carbon credits 
throughout their crediting period”
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national REDD+ initiatives would receive credits 
even if the host country has adopted a national 
implementation scheme. In this case, national gov-
ernments would receive credits for emission reduc-
tions generated in forests that are not covered by 
sub-national initiatives. These forests should be 
the primary objective of public policies and pro-
grams and other sub-national initiatives promoted 
by governments themselves. Consequently, after 
the adoption of a national implementation scheme, 
communities, local governments and other private 
actors could choose between developing their own 
sub-national initiatives to access international in-
centives directly, or join the REDD+ programs of 
the national government.
4.6 Reference emission levels12 
Reference emission levels could be established 
sub-nationally and nationally as follows, al-
though in practice these procedures would have 
to be adopted by the UNFCCC: 13
a)  Sub-national reference emission levels: 
a.1) In countries that choose to start with 
sub-national activities, reference 
emission levels would:
•	 Be	spatial-temporal	projections	of	histori-
cal emissions from deforestation (and deg-
radation or any other eligible activity of 
the REDD+ mechanism);
•	 Be	 established	 using	 methodologies	 or	
guidelines approved by a body of the UN-
FCCC designated for such purposes. In 
principle, the methodologies developed 
under the Voluntary Carbon Standard 
(VCS) are rigorous enough and compat-
ible with CDM rules, so that future valida-
tion, approval and registration under the 
UNFCCC REDD+ mechanism, or national 
schemes that certain countries, such as the 
USA, may establish independently, should 
be possible with few if any modifications;
•	 Be	 validated	 by	 independent	 auditors	 ac-
credited under the UNFCCC, following 
procedures agreed by the Parties of the 
REDD+ mechanism;
•	 Be	limited	to	a	specific	timeframe	(e.g.	10	
years), after which they should be reviewed 
and re-validated to take into account 
changing circumstances in the region 
where REDD+ activities are carried out. 
Within the new baseline circumstances, 
public policies and programs adopted after 
a specified date (e.g. the date of adoption 
of the Bali Road Map) would be excluded to 
avoid a perverse incentive developing for 
national governments to postpone the im-
provement of their policies and programs;14 
•	 Cover	 reference	 regions	 that	 are	 wider	
than the areas covered by the individual 
sub-national initiatives, ideally regions 
with socio-economic conditions and de-
forestation patterns that are similar to 
those observed in such areas, which may 
12 This section refers only to methods for establishing reference emission 
levels for unplanned deforestation activities. Approaches for setting 
reference emission levels for planned activities (legally authorized 
deforestation) may be different from those described here.
13  It must be noted that during its 15th session, held in Copenhagen, the 
COP adopted guidance for developing-country Parties in implementing 
REDD+ activities, which recognizes the possibility of establishing, 
if appropriate, sub-national systems as part of national monitoring 
systems (although this does not by itself imply the issuing of credits or 
rewards to sub-national activities, which is a decision to be agreed on by 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention and adopted by the COP). See decision 4/CP.15 (http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=11). 
14 This principle has its precedent in the CDM, under which policies and 
programs adopted after November 11, 2001 will not be considered in 
the additionality analysis and the baseline alternatives.
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involve the entire territory administered by 
one or more sub-national governments, or 
the area covered by entire eco-regions or 
biomes. This is necessary to ensure that:
(i) The areas threatened by deforesta-
tion inside and outside the geo-
graphical boundaries of the initia-
tives’ areas of intervention can be 
identified; and
(ii)  Leakage can be measured, reported 
and verified against a validated refer-
ence emission level.
Where it makes sense, reference region boundar-
ies should coincide with the boundaries of the 
territories administered by sub-national govern-
ments (e.g., states, provinces, districts, depart-
ments), particularly in those countries where 
sub-national governments have responsibilities 
in the forestry sector or are designing or imple-
menting REDD+ programs. In that way, a com-
mon reference emission level and MRV system 
could be established for all sub-national REDD+ 
initiatives within the territory under the over-
sight of the sub-national government, which 
may in turn be responsible for applying national 
guidelines on these issues. This approach would 
also avoid the cost of establishing reference 
emission levels and of MRV systems for each of 
the individual initiatives and facilitate the inte-
gration of sub-national reference emission levels 
and MRV systems in the future national scheme.
•	 The	 geographical	 boundaries	 of	 the	 refer-
ence regions and their respective reference 
emission levels should be registered nation-
ally and internationally15 to ensure that fu-
ture sub-national activities implemented in 
the same region are consistent (using the 
same regional reference emission level).
a.2)  When a country adopts a national 
reference emission level: 
•	 The	 validated	 and	 registered	 sub-national	
reference emission level should remain valid 
until the date provided for review, after which;
•	 The	 national	 government	 should	 ensure	
coherence between the national reference 
level and the existing sub-national refer-
ence levels by following methodologies ad-
opted under the UNFCCC. 
b) National reference emission levels:
•	 It	is	likely	that	developing	countries	will	have	
to establish historical emissions (tCO
2
e per 
year) or deforestation (ha year-1) reference 
levels, as such references can be objectively 
measured, reported and verified (e.g. average 
emissions or deforestation from the previous 
ten years). Such historical reference levels 
may then be adjusted to account for different 
circumstances (e.g. traditionally high-forest, 
low-deforestation countries facing increas-
ing conversion pressure) to establish the ref-
erence for performance-based incentives. 
•	 Emissions	could	be	estimated	and	reported	
periodically using the methodologies and 
verification procedures similar to those 
used by Annex B countries to demonstrate 
compliance with their emission reduction 
commitments (which would ensure that 
credits resulting from national REDD+ ac-
tivities would be of the same quality and, 
therefore, completely fungible).
•	 At	the	beginning	of	each	commitment	pe-
riod, countries would negotiate a national 
15 This is one of the requirements for the VCS to become fully compatible 
with the NA and the prospective REDD+ scheme regulated by the U.S. 
and UNFCCC. The VCS is currently assessing how it might best register 
such regional reference emission levels.
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reference level taking into account the av-
erage emissions from the preceding period.
•	 In	 principle,	 these	 reference	 levels	 would	
be revised downwards as emissions are re-
duced so as to lead to higher mitigation 
volumes at each new commitment period. 
However, this will not be feasible for coun-
tries needing to deforest certain areas (in 
a controlled manner) to ensure develop-
ment of critical sectors such as energy, in-
frastructure and food security. Therefore, 
historical reference emission levels may be 
disaggregated to differentiate:
(i) Emissions from planned deforesta-
tion (government approved defores-
tation to build water reservoirs, road 
infrastructure and other infrastruc-
ture that is vital for national develop-
ment).
(ii) Emissions from unplanned defores-
tation (basically all non-authorized 
and illegal deforestation).
•	 At	the	beginning	of	each	commitment	pe-
riod, gross emissions reduction targets for 
non-planned deforestation should be more 
ambitious than for the previous period, 
while the targets for planned deforestation 
(on a gross basis) may vary from one period 
to the next, and even increase, depending 
on national circumstances.
•	 To	discourage	and	offset	planned	defores-
tation, countries would commit themselves 
to increasing their levels of compensa-
tory afforestation and reforestation, which 
would be subject to measurement, report-
ing and verification. However, to protect 
the biodiversity of natural ecosystems, off-
setting emissions from unplanned defores-
tation through afforestation and reforesta-
tion would not be allowed. In other words, 
developing countries would commit them-
selves to reducing planned deforestation 
on net basis and unplanned deforestation 
on a gross basis.
•	 It	is	important	to	highlight	that	decisions	
regarding how deforestation should be 
reported (planned, unplanned, gross, net, 
etc.) are not core one for the NA, and that 
any decision taken on these matters will 
not affect the applicability of the NA.
4.7 Leakage
To account for the possible displacement of 
emissions from deforestation (leakage) from ar-
eas where sub-national activities are implement-
ed, the NA provides two options:
(i) Estimate, using approved method-
ologies, the emissions from leakage, 
and subtract them from the verified 
emission reductions within the sub-
national initiative’s area of influence 
(Credits = Reference emissions - 
Monitored emissions - Leakage).
(ii) Incorporate the sub-national ini-
tiatives into the area subject to 
MRV under a larger scale (sub-
national or national) REDD+ pro-
gram. In this case, it would not be 
necessary to measure, report and 
account for leakage of each ‘nest-
ed’ sub-national initiative because 
emissions would be measured, re-
ported and verified by the moni-
toring and accounting systems of 
the larger program. The national or 
sub-national government respon-
sible for the larger program could 
opt, following its own policies and 
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regulations, to collect some sort of 
compensation (for example, a per-
centage of the credits or a leakage 
tax) from the ‘nested’ sub-national 
activities which have not adopted 
the first option (i). 
Sub-national activities would be able to choose 
between option (i) and option (ii) where both are 
available according to national REDD+ policies.
4.8 Permanence
Credits for verified emission reductions could 
be temporary, without the country or the 
sub-national developers incurring any liabil-
ity (similar to the tCERs from forestry CDM 
projects), or permanent, backed by a ‘buffer’ 
of credits that would have to be transferred 
to a national permanence or reserve account, 
whose function would be to offset for any fu-
ture emissions above the reference emission 
level, like the practice under the VCS program 
for agricultural and forestry projects. This 
second option is generally preferable from 
the standpoint of the credits’ fungibility and 
competitiveness in the carbon market, due to 
the fact that temporary credits transfer non-
permanent liability to the buyer, who must re-
place them before their expiry date, a feature 
which is unattractive to buyers of credits. On 
the other hand, the use of temporary credits 
allows stakeholders from developing countries 
to avoid responsibility for future deforestation.
Using a ‘buffer’ approach, national govern-
ments and promoters of sub-national ac-
tivities could sell only a percentage of their 
credits; the rest would be transferred to the 
national reserve account to guarantee the 
permanence of emission reductions sold 
from all national and sub-national activities. 
The number of credits to be transferred to 
the national reserve account at the end of a 
MRV period16 would be calculated using the 
following equation:
CN
reserve
= CN
total
 *RN% + CSN
total
*RSN% (1)
Where:
CN
reserve
 = Credits transferred to the na-
tional reserve account at the 
end of the MRV period.
CN
total
 = Credits issued internationally 
to the national government for 
national emission reductions 
in the MRV period.
CSN
total
 = Credits issued internationally 
and directly for sub-national 
emission reductions in the 
MRV period.
RN% = Percentage of CN
total
 to be de-
posited in the national reserve 
account.
  Note: The value of RN% would 
be established by the CoP.
RSN% = Percentage of CSN
total
 to be de-
posited in the national reserve 
account.
Notes:
•		 In	countries	applying	a	national	scheme,	
the value of RSN% would be set by the 
national government, using transparent 
and previously defined criteria and pro-
cedures.
•		 In	 countries	 without	 a	 national	
scheme, the value of RSN% is deter-
16 It is assumed that one commitment period (e.g. 5 years) has a 
fixed reference emission level that will be revised in the subsequent 
commitment period and that each commitment period is subject to 
periodical (e.g. every 1-2 years) monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV). The period of time between two events of MRV is called an ‘MRV 
period’ in this paper.
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mined on the basis of a non-perma-
nence risk assessment (similar to that 
used by the VCS).
4.9 Accounting
If, at the end of its first MRV period, a country 
reported emissions above its national refer-
ence level, the country would not receive cred-
its, and the excess emissions would not be ac-
counted as debits. However, the country would 
assume responsibility for the permanence of 
emission reductions sold in the market (emis-
sion reductions sold by sub-national activities 
would be backed from the start through buf-
fers or temporary credits17). 
Figure 1.a National Reference Emission Level
Historical reference
Emissions
Historical Average Emissions
Years of MRV
National Emissions Reference
Start date of the first period of
voluntary commitment
End date of  first period of
voluntary commitment
Actual emissions periodically
reported and verified
tCO - e2
Years
Average emissions from
deforestation
(historical reference period)
Figure 1.a shows a country’s national emis-
sions from deforestation before its voluntary 
commitment for REDD+ action and its actu-
al verified emission and reference emission 
levels after the implementation of REDD+ 
action during the period of voluntary com-
mitment. As indicated in the above Figure, 
1.a, in some years its actual emissions re-
ported and verified exceed its reference 
emission levels, while in some years its ac-
tual emissions reported and verified are less 
than the reference emissions. Upon the end 
of the voluntary commitment, the national 
reference emission level is lowered to reflect 
the commitment to achieve greater emission 
reductions.
17 It should be noted that sub-national activities transfer a percentage 
of their emission reduction credits to the country's national reserve 
account.
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Figure 1.b shows how the amount of credits in 
the country’s national account will change dur-
ing the voluntary commitment period. During 
the first MRV period, the country emits more 
than its reference emission level, but as it is 
voluntary ‘no-lose’ commitment and the coun-
try has neither received nor sold any emission 
reduction credits, the excessive emissions will 
be forgiven. During the second MRV period the 
country achieved B1+B2 emission reductions, 
of which B1 is credits sold, while B2 is the buf-
fer credits reserved. From then on, any emis-
sions above the reference emission level in a 
future MRV period should be compensated by 
the country. . To compensate for the excess emis-
sions, credits would be cancelled in the national 
reserve account up to the total amount of credits 
sold and, if that were not enough to back-up the 
Figure 1.b National Accounting
Historical reference
emissions
Historical Average Emissions
Years of MRV
National Emissions Reference
Start date of the first period of
voluntary commitment
End date of  first period of
voluntary commitment
Actual emissions periodically
reported and verified
tCO - e2
Years
Forgiven
Reserve Immediateoffsetting
To offset past
debits
Future
offsetting
CREDITS DEBITS
A
B1
D1
D2
D3
E2
E1
C1
C2
C3
B2
Tradable
A, B = Emissions above the baseline
B = B1 + B2 = Credits for reduced emissions; B1 = Credits sold, B2 = Credits reserved
C = C1 +C2 + C3 = Emissions above the baseline
C1 = Emissions to be offset in the following MRV period (C1 = D3)
C2 = Emissions offset by purchasing credits in the market
C3 = Emissions offset bye cancelling reserve credits (C3 = B2)
D1 = Credits sold
C2 + C3 = B1
D2 = Credits reserved
D3 = Credits used to offset emissions not offset in the previous period (D3 = C1)
E = E1 + E2 = Credits for emissions reductions; E1 = Credits sold; E2 = Credits in reserve.
Average emissions from
deforestation
(historical reference period)
credits sold, the country would have to buy cred-
its in the market (including reserve credits from 
other developing countries, if available). Excess 
emissions above the total amount of credits sold 
may be offset through greater mitigation efforts 
in the next MRV period.
4.10 Net contribution to mitigating climate 
change 
As long as a country does not increase emis-
sions in relation to its national reference emis-
sion level, the balance of credits deposited 
in the national reserve account represents a 
country's net contribution to mitigating cli-
mate change, taking into account the fact that 
such credits would not be used to offset emis-
The ‘Nested Approach’ to REDD+: How Could it Be Implemented?
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sions from developed countries (see Figure 
1.c and 1.d). If deforestation continues to be 
reduced, the stock of emission reductions in 
As indicated in Figure 1c., under a purely nation-
al approach, a country only obtains credits at the 
national level. Hence, during the first MRV pe-
riod, the excessive emissions A are forgiven and 
the national reserve account’s balance is zero. 
During the second MRV period, the country’s na-
tional account achieves a balance of B2 to buffer 
the B1 credits sold on the market. During the 
third MRV period, the country’s actual verified 
Historical reference
emissions
Historical Average Emissions
Years of MRV
National Emissions Reference
Start date of the first period of
voluntary commitment
End date of  first period of
voluntary commitment
Actual emissions periodically
reported and verified
tCO - e2
Years
A
B1
D1
D2
D3
E2
E1
C1
C2
C3
B2
Years
tCO - e  in the national reserve2
Volume the country *or its insurance
should buy in the carbon market
B2 D2
C2
D2
E2
Average emissions from
deforestation
(historical reference period)
emissions are higher than the reference level, to 
the extent of C1+C2+C3. Among the three parts, 
C1 will be solved through future offset (the coun-
try will not claim credits for the same amount of 
emission reduction D3 in the next MRV period). 
The reserve in the national account, B2, will be 
used to cancel the same amount of excess emis-
sions C2, while the remaining gap C3 will be 
cancelled by purchasing credits from the market. 
the reserve account is carried over to the next 
MRV period (e.g. as represented by D2 in Fig-
ure 1.c and 1.d). 
Figure 1c. Changes in a country’s national reserve under the Purely National Approach
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Figure 1.d. National account reserve change under the Nested Approach
Figure 1.d shows that, using the Nested Approach, 
sub-national initiatives can start and receive 
credits before the country makes any voluntary 
commitment. After the starting of national vol-
untary commitment, sub-national programs and 
national programs can co-exist, their geographi-
cal scopes being mutually exclusive and their 
actual and reference emission levels calculated 
independently. Sub-national programs can con-
tinue to earn credits even when national verified 
emissions exceed the reference level. When they 
earn and sell credits, they need to transfer buffer 
credits based on their reserve rate to the national 
reserve account. If the actual deforestation, and 
thus emissions, exceed the reference level under 
sub-national programs or the national program, 
an equal amount of reserve in the national reserve 
account will be cancelled. 
4.11 ‘Factoring out’ the impact of natural disasters
If, at the end of a MRV period, a country can dem-
onstrate that emissions were caused by natural di-
sasters beyond its control (such as extreme weather 
events, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and other 
‘forces majeures’), the country would not have to ac-
count for these emissions. Methods and principles 
used to account for the effects of such events should 
be the same as those that would apply to Annex 1 
countries in the post-2012 period (this issue is cur-
rently being negotiated). Additionally, to encourage 
the restoration of areas affected by natural disasters, 
these should be eligible for activities that generate 
carbon credits (only if natural re-growth may not be 
expected to happen), regardless of the date at which 
the disturbance happened, unless such activities are 
counted in the reports of planned deforestation.
Historical reference
emissions
Years of MRV
Historical Average Emissions
National Emissions Reference
Start date of the first period of
voluntary commitment
End date of  first period of
voluntary commitment
Actual emissions periodically
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C2
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D2 D2SN SN SN
B2
D2 D2
E2
SN + B2 - B1
Reserve generated by
early start initiatives
Average emissions from
deforestation
(historical reference period)
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4.12 Measures to avoid double counting of 
carbon credits
To calculate the amount of credits attributed to 
national governments, the volume of credits is-
sued to sub-national initiatives would be sub-
tracted from the emission reductions reported 
nationally, which would require the establishment 
of national or/and international REDD+ regis-
tries to track the issuance and transfer of credits.
Therefore, the domestic credits a government 
would receive at the end of a MRV period are 
calculated as follows:
CN
total
= ENLB
MRV
– ENMRV
MRV
– ENE
MRV-1
– CSN
total
  (2)
Where:
CN
total
 = Credits issued internationally to 
the national government for na-
tional emission reductions gen-
erated during the MRV period. 
ENLB
MRV
  = National reference for emis-
sions for the MRV period.
ENMRV
MRV
 =  National emission measured, report-
ed and verified for the MRV period.
ENE
MRV-1
 = National emissions above the ref-
erence level for the previous pe-
riod (MRV-1) that have not been 
offset by canceling reserve credits 
or acquiring credits in the market. 
  Note: ENEMRV-1 will always 
equal zero for countries that nev-
er received credits for national 
emission reductions.
CSN
total
  = Credits issued internationally 
for sub-national emission re-
ductions in the MRV period.
It is important to note that for the same MRV pe-
riod CN
total
 could be less than zero, in which case 
the country would not receive credits (and CN
total 
would be considered equal to zero), while CSN
total 
could be greater than zero – that is, the sub-nation-
al initiatives that successfully reduce emissions over 
a period would receive credits, even if in the same 
period the entire country has emissions above the 
reference level. Moreover, if a country started with 
sub-national activities before adopting a national 
scheme, the national buffer reserve account would 
have a positive balance (generated by the same sub-
national activities), which would allow the country 
to offset emissions debits that may occur later at the 
national level (see Figure 1.d).
The credits issued to sub-national initiative would 
be calculated using equation (3) in countries that 
have not yet initiated a national scheme and equa-
tion (4) in countries that already have adopted a na-
tional MRV scheme.
CSN
total 
 = ESNLB
MRV
 – ESNMRV
MRV
 - ESNF
MRV
 (3)
 CSN
total
 = ESNLB
MRV
 – ESNMRV
MRV
    (4)
Where:
ESNLB
MRV 
 =  Sub-national emissions refer-
ence level for the MRV period.
ESNMRV
MRV
 =  Sub-national emissions mea-
sured, reported and verified for 
the MRV period.
ESNF
MRV
 = Leakage emissions by sub-na-
tional activities. 
Notes:
•	 In	 countries	 that	 have	 initiated	 a	 national	
scheme, the ESNF
MRV 
factor is automatically in-
cluded in the variable EN
MRV,
 which is why leak-
age does not appear in equation (4).
•	 National	 governments	 can	 freely	 decide	
whether or not to collect a percentage of the 
CSN
total
, or a tax, from sub-national activities 
for leakage as compensation for the sub-
national leakage they assume and in order 
to obtain additional resources to implement 
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their national REDD+ programs. However, 
it would be more logical for governments to 
tax those activities that cause deforestation 
(including planned deforestation)18 and to 
minimize the tax (and bureaucratic) burden 
of sub-national activities so that these multi-
ply quickly and help reduce deforestation.
5. Steps to implement the Na in a develop-
ing country
The implementation of the NA may occur in suc-
cessive steps, starting in some countries with the 
18 This principle has been included in the Peruvian Law of Ecosystem 
Services (still in the Peruvian Congress).
Years
Steps
7. National implementation
Triggers
xx% of area or YY years
National approval and international
registry og the 1  sub-national initiative
Adoption of a national
reference and MRV system
National reference
and MRV
Implementation
with credits and 
debits
Implementation,
evaluation &
adjustment
Consultations,
design
Sub-national
MRV
Analysis,
consultation,
definition
Consultation
& design
Design
Design
Quotas of deforestation
rights allocated to sub-
national regions
Transfer of rights and
payment of taxes
Sub-national emission
reference levels
National & sub-
national credits
Registry in
place
Sub-
national
credits
Government reviews and when appropriate
approves sub-national initiatives
National and sub-
   national emission
      reference levels
M  : national;
RV : national and
  sub-national
M  : national;
RV : sub-national
(0 - 10 + years)
6. National policies and
 programs for REDD+
4. Carbon rights and fiscal
 rules applicable to 
 subnational activities
2. National criteria &
 procedures for
 project approval
1. Sub-national
 initiatives
5. MRV system
3. Registry system
development of independent sub-national activi-
ties, ending with a complementary set of activities 
under a national accounting framework, and whose 
aggregate result would be monitored, reported and 
verified at the national level19. In other countries, 
the first step may be the development of a national 
implementation system, and only afterwards would 
sub-national activities be allowed. Therefore, the 
main steps in the process can occur in a bottom-up 
sequence, a top-down sequence, or simultaneously. 
We assume that in many developing countries the 
typical sequence will be bottom-up, initiating with 
sub-national activities and ending with a compre-
hensive national scheme (see Figure 2).
19 Yet records of individual sub-national initiatives’ outcomes would 
be maintained, thereby ensuring that successful initiatives receive 
compensation while preventing, through the registration system, the 
double counting of carbon credits.
Figure 2. Example of steps and timelines for implementing the Nested Approach 
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As illustrated in the previous figure, the main 
steps to implementing the NA starting from 
sub-national activities can be summarized as 
follows: 
1) Preparation of voluntary sub-national ini-
tiatives, based on UNFCCC guidance, al-
though they could have begun before such 
guidance was issued by using internation-
ally recognized standards for carbon ac-
counting and project design. In such cases, 
sub-national initiatives would need to ap-
ply subsequently the methodologies and 
procedures defined by the UNFCCC if the 
standard applied initially is not compat-
ible with such methodologies. In the final 
stage, when the host country has adopted a 
national reference emission level, the sub-
national reference emission level could be 
defined by using internationally approved 
methodologies, which should provide 
guidance for ensuring consistency between 
sub-national and national reference levels, 
or be assigned by the national government 
to the sub-national area (e.g. as a fraction 
of the national reference emission level) 
using a nationally defined mechanism.
2) Definition by the national government of 
transparent criteria, procedures, and ex-
peditious review and endorsement of sub-
national activities.
3) Registration of sub-national activities, in-
cluding their spatial and temporal bound-
aries, reference emission levels, verified 
emission reductions and carbon credits, 
to ensure an orderly and consistent pro-
cess for defining the sub-national ref-
erence emission levels and to avoid any 
possibility of double counting emission 
reductions.
4) Definition of emission reduction owner-
ship rights and removal of any ambiguity 
from the fiscal system applicable to car-
bon credits within the national regulatory 
framework.
5) Transition from isolated sub-national 
monitoring systems to a single integrated 
and institutionalized national account-
ing, monitoring and information system. 
6) Improvement, design and implementation 
of national policies and programs and 
their subsequent evaluation and adjust-
ment to enable them to become truly ef-
fective for REDD+. 
7) Adoption of a national reference emission 
level in the land-use or forestry sector.
The steps described above are indicative only and 
may vary from country to country, depending on na-
tional circumstances, capacities and REDD+ policies.
6. Conclusion
This paper has provided a detailed description of the 
‘Nested Approach’ (NA), a proposal designed to pro-
mote the immediate and widespread participation of 
countries and stakeholders in REDD+ activities by mo-
bilizing adequate levels of private and public funding 
The implementation of the NA may 
occur in successive steps, starting in 
some countries with the development of 
independent sub-national activities,
ending with a complementary set of 
activities under a national accounting 
framework, and whose aggregate result 
would be monitored, reported and 
verified at the national level.
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whilst maintaining environmental integrity. As is now 
acknowledged by many stakeholders in the interna-
tional policy process, ‘a nested approach to REDD+ 
has the potential to address many of the drawbacks 
of pure national or pure sub-national approaches by 
accounting for in-country leakage, engaging national 
governments, and taking advantage of certain econo-
mies of scale, while also motivating sub-national actors 
to participate in REDD+ and attracting greater private 
investment’ (Cortez et al., 2010). It also has the poten-
tial to yield greater returns in terms of carbon effective-
ness, cost efficiency and equity (Angelsen et al., 2008).
In a context where donor countries have commit-
ted substantial, but still insufficient, public funds 
to REDD+ through various bilateral and multilater-
al channels, and where national and sub-national 
governments as well as civil society and the private 
sector have launched several REDD+ initiatives, 
the NA remains an important proposal for building 
an international agreement on reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation.
Although the proposal was originally published by 
a group of UNFCCC observers, it was later submit-
ted to the UNFCCC by a group of Latin American 
countries. Some of these countries have changed 
their position relative to the climate-change poli-
cy negotiations in general and REDD+ in particu-
lar, while others are still supporting their original 
proposal and are currently trying to implement 
the NA in a context where the future of the over-
reaching climate-change agreement is still highly 
uncertain. Some countries, including Colombia, 
Brazil, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru and the USA, 
are already discussing how to use the approach 
described in this paper in their national climate-
change programs and laws. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the NA described 
here is compatible with the basic elements of the 
REDD+ mechanism being defined in the current UN-
FCCC negotiations. The text on a REDD+ mechanism 
being negotiated by the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action contains the possibili-
ty (although between brackets) of implementing ‘sub-
national strategies’ and requests developing country 
Parties to establish a robust and transparent national 
forest monitoring system, ‘with, as appropriate, sub-
national monitoring and reporting as an optional 
interim measure’, whilst the guidance for developing-
country Parties in implementing REDD+ activities 
adopted by COP15 recognizes the possibility of estab-
lishing, ‘if appropriate, sub-national systems as part of 
national monitoring systems’. 
The authors hope that this paper will contribute 
further to a positive discussion of REDD+ that ur-
gently needs to conclude with an agreement that 
will enable developing countries to scale up their 
capacity and commitment to reduce the speed at 
which the remaining tropical forests, their biodi-
versity and forest-dependent people are lost.
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Pursuing REDD+ through PFM:
Early Experiences from the Bale 
Mountain’s REDD Project in Ethiopia
In an effort to reverse the situation of deforestation 
and forest degradation that is threatening the 
livelihood security of Ethiopia’s largely rural 
population, Participatory Forest Management 
(PFM) has been initiated and has proved to be a 
viable strategy. As PFM brings about improvements 
in forest condition, it can also be linked to carbon 
finance. Drawing on early experience of a Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) project being developed in the Bale 
Mountains Ecoregion, this paper outlines how 
REDD can be pursued through PFM and how 
forestry carbon can act as a catalyst in shifting 
towards sustainable forest management in Ethiopia
abstract
1. introduction
The Bale Ecoregion Sustainable Management Pro-
gram (BERSMP) is a partnership initiative between 
Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise (an autono-
mous public enterprise) and two NGOs: FARM-Af-
rica/SOS Sahel Ethiopia. The Program is funded by 
the governments of Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Norway and implements a Participatory Natural 
Resource Management intervention in the Bale 
Mountains area. One of the six component themes 
of the program is to ensure continuity of the com-
munity-based conservation approaches aimed at 
identifying sustainable financing opportunities, 
mainly focusing on carbon trading.
The paper provides a case study of the Bale 
Ecoregion Sustainable Management Program, 
where a REDD project with Participatory Forest 
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Management (PFM) is being set up. It shows how 
PFM, an approach that has proved successful in 
forest conservation, can be linked to REDD in or-
der to create new opportunities to address bet-
ter the long-standing threats to forest resources. 
In addition, the expected risks associated with 
REDD implementation and ways of mitigating 
these are also discussed.  
While REDD+ is achieving increasing recogni-
tion as a critical strategy for mitigating climate 
change at the national and international levels, 
it is hoped that the early experiences of the Bale 
REDD will be picked up by similar initiatives in 
Ethiopia and elsewhere. 
2. Forest Status in Ethiopia
Ethiopia is a country of 80.7 million people, with 
a total land area of 1,104,300 square kilometers 
(UNdata, 2008). According to the FAO (2009), 
the extents of forest1 and other wooded land2 in 
Ethiopia are estimated to be 13 million ha (in-
cluding a 491,000 ha forest plantation) and 44.6 
million ha respectively. The forest area covers 
11.9% of the country’s land area. 
The same document states that the estimated 
deforestation rate in Ethiopia is 141,000 ha per 
year (or 1.1%). Recent estimates of deforestation 
rates for selected woredas3 of the Bale Mountains 
revealed a rather severe situation. For example, 
deforestation in the two woredas of Nensebo and 
Berbere was as high as 6.5% and 8.1% per an-
num respectively between 2001 and 2006 (BER-
SMP, 2009). This means that the 2006 forest 
area for the two woredas was respectively 67.4% 
and 59.3% of the cover in 2001.
Owing to the unsustainable nature of human 
activities in relation to them, the forests are ex-
posed not only to deforestation and fragmenta-
tion across the landscape but also to degradation 
(the thinning out of the biomass stock without 
loss of forest area). Even though extensive areas 
have clearly been affected by forest degradation, 
the lack of up-to-date data has made it difficult 
to record the situation definitively.
The main drivers for deforestation and degrada-
tion of the natural high forests and woodlands are 
agricultural encroachments in the forests, livestock 
grazing with detrimental effects on the natural re-
generation, and unsustainable wood harvesting.
Even though considerable efforts have been 
made during the past few years to increase forest 
cover through massive tree-planting programs 
and area closure activities, the effects of these 
efforts simply could not keep pace with the level 
of forest land-use changes. 
1 Forest is defined as land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees 
higher than 5 m and a canopy cover of more than 10 percent, or trees 
able to reach these thresholds in situ (FAO, 2006). 
2 Other wooded land is land not classified as forest, spanning more 
than 0.5 hectares, with trees higher than 5 m and a canopy cover of 
5–10 percent, or trees able to reach these thresholds in situ, or with a 
combined cover of shrubs, bushes and trees above 10 percent (ibid.).
PFM is a working partnership between 
government (the official owner of the 
resources) and forest communities for 
forest conservation that involves sharing 
responsibilities, roles and benefits so as 
to restore biodiversity and improve the 
livelihoods of forest-dependent communities.
3 The woreda is a lower-level administrative unit equivalent to a district.
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3. Experiences with PFM in Ethiopia
Continued deforestation and forest degradation 
have made it clear that the conventional ap-
proaches to managing forests in Ethiopia are not 
able to guarantee the conservation of such re-
sources. It was therefore found necessary to con-
sider a system which can give local people well-
defined rights and obligations over local forest 
resources and provide incentives for sustainable 
forest management, namely PFM.
Over the last fifteen years, the two NGOs, 
FARM-Africa and SOS Sahel Ethiopia, have suc-
cessfully promoted PFM in Ethiopia through 
the facilitation and provision of technical sup-
port. Based on the positive outcomes achieved, 
PFM has been incorporated into regional and 
federal forest policies. Currently, the total forest 
area under community–government joint man-
agement in Ethiopia is about 300,000 ha. Two 
new projects for scaling up PFM in four regional 
states, funded by the European Union, have just 
been launched, one by the Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, the other 
by FARM-Africa and SOS Sahel Ethiopia. It is 
expected that more areas will come under PFM 
in the near future.
PFM is a working partnership between govern-
ment (the official owner of the resources) and 
forest communities for forest conservation that 
involves sharing responsibilities, roles and ben-
efits so as to restore biodiversity and improve the 
livelihoods of forest-dependent communities. 
In this arrangement, the community groups will 
manage and develop the forests and utilize forest 
products and services in a sustainable way. The 
government is providing technical and adminis-
trative support. Any revenue generated from the 
forest is shared in accordance with the signed 
agreements based on the level of responsibilities 
and roles. These close partnerships under PFM 
have brought about the stabilizing and even re-
versal of deforestation and forest degradation.
It is now widely accepted that PFM is effective, not 
only in terms of the conservation of forests and 
biodiversity, but also in contributing to sustainable 
rural livelihoods and hence to poverty alleviation. 
Participatory Natural Resource Management is 
about involving local people, institutions and other 
relevant stakeholders in the management of natu-
ral resources and is recognized as one of the most 
viable approaches for sustainable development and 
for increasing people’s responsibility and sense of 
ownership (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000). In 
those areas where PFM has been implemented, sig-
nificant improvements have been recorded regard-
ing forest condition and management, as well as 
rural livelihoods and social issues. 
The positive impacts on forest conditions include 
increased forest regeneration (with a marked de-
crease in deforestation rates); greater respect of 
forest boundaries by local communities; communi-
ty-initiated tree-planting on degraded forest areas; 
more efficient use of forest products; reappearance 
of wildlife; a tighter control of open access; a lower 
incidence of forest fires; and a decline in forest pro-
tection costs for government. Rural livelihoods are 
more secure and sustainable as a result of increases 
in financial returns and a sense of local empower-
ment gained through the securing of legal rights. 
Another benefit is a sustainable supply of forest 
products (water, medicines, firewood, food, tim-
ber) which local communities can use or sell to 
contribute to improvements in the livelihoods of 
the local population. Moreover, PFM has resulted 
in improved relationships among the communities 
as a result of conflict mediation practices and the 
exercise of good governance through democratic 
functioning of the community-based organizations 
(CBOs) (Tadesse, 2008).
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4. Significance of the Bale Mountains
The Bale Mountains of Ethiopia (with the Bale 
Mountains National Park at their center) rep-
resent the second largest stand of remaining 
moist tropical forest in Ethiopia. They are in-
side the ‘Eastern Afromontane’ biodiversity 
hotspot, one of the world’s 34 hotspots (Con-
servation International, 2007), and contain 
the largest Afro-alpine habitat on the African 
continent (ca. 100,000 ha). Located within the 
Regional State of Oromia (see map 1), the Bale 
Mountains are of critical economic, biodiversity 
and ecological importance. 
The main central area of the Bale Mountains is 
a high plateau, most of which is over 4000 me-
ters above sea level (masl), with several peaks 
rising from it. The highest of them is Tulu 
Dimtu (4377 masl), the second highest point 
in Ethiopia. South of the plateau the land falls 
steeply to the moist tropical Harena Forest, 
starting at approximately 3700 masl and ex-
tending down to 1500 masl. The northern area 
is made up of high ridges and broad valleys 
mainly lying at altitudes of 3000-3500 masl 
and comprising Juniper (Juniperus procera) 
and Hagenia (Hagenia abyssinica) woodlands, 
grasslands and wetlands.
The area harbors a unique and diverse fauna and 
flora which include a large percentage of Ethio-
pia’s endemics (26% of endemic fauna), with 
some species only found in Bale. For example, 
over half the global population of Ethiopian 
wolves (Canis simensis), the rarest canid in the 
world (found only in suitable Afroalpine habi-
tats of Ethiopia and listed as ‘endangered’ by the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature 
[IUCN]), the largest population of the endemic 
Mountain Nyala (Tragelaphus buxtoni) (estimat-
ed to be approximately two-thirds of the global 
population) and the entire global population of 
the Giant Mole-Rat (Trachyoryctes macrocepha-
lus) are found in the Bale Mountains (BERSMP, 
2006). The Mountains are also home to stocks of 
valuable genetic material, including wild coffee 
(Coffea arabica).
In addition to these biodiversity values, the 
area is of significant benefit to the more than 
twelve million people downstream who are de-
pendent on its ecological processes, primarily 
water. Four major rivers arise from the massif: 
the Wabe Shebelle, Web, Welmel and Dumal. 
Moreover, the water for numerous springs in 
the lowlands originates in the Bale Moun-
tains. These rivers are the only sources of 
perennial water supply for the arid lowlands 
of the east and southeast of Ethiopia, includ-
ing Somalia and parts of northern Kenya. The 
livelihoods and food security of the people in 
these lowland areas, particularly during the 
dry season, are therefore highly dependent 
on good environmental management in the 
highland areas.
However, unsustainable resource exploitation 
throughout the massif, resulting from agricul-
ture expansion, livestock pressure and the un-
sustainable use of wood and other products, has 
led to degradation and is increasingly threaten-
ing the unique biodiversity and the livelihoods 
of people who are directly dependent on the 
natural resources, including the all-important 
watershed values.
This situation led to the launching of the BER-
SMP initiative in 2007 with the goal of contrib-
uting to the enhancement of the unique biodi-
versity and vital ecological processes of the Bale 
Mountains Ecoregion and the social and eco-
nomic well-being of communities that are de-
pendent on the natural resources of Bale.
117
The initiative focuses on combining and ex-
panding conservation and development ac-
tions, bringing local communities into a central 
role in sustainable natural resource manage-
ment, and promoting sustainable natural re-
source-based livelihoods. This is being done 
by involving local communities as stakehold-
ers in the sustainable management of the area, 
supported by government services. To this end, 
the program is facilitating and enabling the 
relevant government offices to integrate the 
needs of conservation and development by de-
veloping a strong implementation partnership 
with the Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise 
and other relevant regional, zonal and woreda 
government offices. 
The program is based on models and on the 
experience of recent work in Ethiopia, specifi-
cally, experience and best practices developed 
in community-based natural resource manage-
ment, participatory development and livelihoods 
diversification in the Oromia region. 
5. The need for sustainable finance
The aim of sustainable financing mechanisms is 
to secure and ensure long-term finance for con-
servation program objectives beyond the lifes-
pan of a project or program. Such projects and 
programs normally secure financial resources 
from various sources (government, donors, etc.) 
to support a project’s development and imple-
mentation. Sustainable finance goes beyond the 
usual government or donor funding by introduc-
ing innovative market-based approaches such as 
payment for ecosystem services. 
Conservation finance is also increasingly val-
ued as a mechanism to help alleviate poverty by 
creating equitable approaches to sustainable fi-
nancing that benefit rural populations through 
the enhancement of sustainable livelihoods 
(WWF, 2007).
The practice of PFM that has been initiated by the 
Bale Ecoregion Sustainable Management Program 
cannot succeed without the continued technical 
support of Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise 
and incentives for the communities involved. This 
also becomes apparent when seen from a sustain-
ability point of view, that is, taking into account 
the period after such PFM projects come to an 
end. Hence, if large areas of forest such as that 
in the Bale Mountains are to be managed in a 
sustainable manner through community–govern-
ment partnership in order to continue provid-
ing forest products and environmental services, 
long-term finance is needed to cover the costs. 
The Bale REDD project aims to meet this need. By 
avoiding deforestation that would have occurred 
in the project’s absence, carbon credits are gener-
ated and sold to individuals or organizations in 
the voluntary carbon markets.
A critical aspect of this process is the sharing 
of the revenues that will be generated between 
the OFWE and communities, as both major ac-
tors will bear the costs of conservation, but with 
distinct roles. Apart from determining who gets 
what, it is also important to work things out 
carefully and make sure that the shares reach 
Hence, if large areas of forest such as 
that in the Bale Mountains are to be 
managed in a sustainable manner through 
community–government partnership in 
order to continue providing forest products 
and environmental services, long-term 
finance is needed to cover the costs.
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the communities in order for the project to 
be successful. Even though communities and 
the OFWE have some common understanding 
about carbon revenue sharing, no consensus 
has been reached so far on how that will be 
done. It should also be remembered that, as a 
wide range of costs need to be covered for for-
est conservation activities, leakage mitigation 
actions, monitoring, etc., only some of the rev-
enues will be available for sharing. 
The current plan is to establish a ‘forest fund’ 
managed by representatives of the OFWE, com-
munity-based organizations, and other relevant 
bodies. This fund will receive a large proportion 
of the carbon revenues, and OFWE will facilitate 
a performance-based distribution of funds to 
communities through their ‘community-based 
organizations’ (CBOs). The search for an effec-
tive way of revenue sharing and implementation 
mechanism is still going on.
6.1 Project Structure and Management
The aim of the Bale REDD project is to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation in the Bale Mountains Ecoregion of Ethi-
opia. This will be done through the protection 
6. The bale Mountains REDD project
A study conducted by the Bale Ecoregion Sustainable Management Program to identify sustainable 
financing opportunities for the Bale Mountains has come up with an assessment of the general en-
vironmental services that could be included in Payment for Environmental Services. Based on this 
assessment, a business case for a carbon finance project has been drawn up and a Project Idea Note 
(PIN), including a legal, institutional, and technical project design, prepared in order to approach 
carbon funds. 
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and rehabilitation of the natural forests in the 
area and will be coordinated by OFWE.
On-the-ground project implementation and man-
agement activities will be carried out by the two 
OFWE branch offices (Bale Branch Enterprise 
Map 1. The Bale Mountains location and forest areas (Source: BERSMP)
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[BBE] and Arsi Branch Enterprise [ABE]) and the 
local forest conservation cooperatives (CBOs) that 
are currently being established (Figure 2). FARM-
6.2 Ownership of Carbon Credits
Based on the 1995 Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the ownership of 
land and other natural resources, including natural 
forests, is vested in the people and the State. But 
the right to use land and forests can be transferred 
by the State to individual users, communities, and 
others (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
2007; Oromia National Regional State, 2009).
In terms of ownership, therefore, the REDD proj-
ect’s land and forests (approximately 700,000 
ha in total) fall under two government agencies:
- The Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise 
(OFWE), a regional agency that has under its au-
thority all the forest area within the Bale Ecore-
gion (ca. 500,000 ha), with the exception of the 
Bale Mountains National Park (BMNP); and 
Figure 2. Proposed organization of the Bale Ecoregion REDD Project
Bale Ecoregion 
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Forest
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Technical support Forest Fund
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FARM-Africa/SOS sahel
Africa and SOS Sahel Ethiopia will provide techni-
cal support to the enterprise branch offices and 
the CBOs through the BERSM Program (Figure 2).
The above structure briefly indicates that, under 
the BERSMP, capacity-building and technical 
support will be provided to the Oromia Forest 
and Wildlife Enterprise and the Forest Conser-
vation Cooperatives (CBOs). REDD implemen-
tation is carried out jointly by OFWE and the 
CBOs. OFWE delivers the voluntary Carbon 
Units (VCUs) to the buyers and receives pay-
ments in return. Based on agreements to be 
signed, the benefits will be shared among OFWE 
and the CBOs.
So far, Joint Forest Management Agreements (JF-
MAs) have been signed with nine CBOs covering 
over 70,000 ha of forest. Additional CBOs are 
being established, and more JFMAs will be con-
cluded. In the near future, these agreements will 
be supplemented with benefit-sharing modali-
ties that determine the distribution of revenues 
generated from the sale of carbon credits. 
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- The Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Au-
thority (EWCA), a federal agency that ad-
ministers the Bale Mountains National 
Park, a ca. 200,000 ha area located at the 
centre of the Bale Ecoregion.
This means that ownership of the carbon credits 
is retained by OFWE and EWCA, the appropriate 
authorities to sell carbon credits generated by the 
project under Ethiopian law. Even though the two 
areas are under different jurisdictions, the REDD 
project that is being developed is a combined one. 
The two agencies are currently working out a modal-
ity of partnership.
6.3 Project Design
According to the analysis made with respect 
to the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), the 
planned project activities would mostly be re-
garded as Avoiding Unplanned Frontier Defor-
estation and Degradation (AUFDD) under the 
VCS’s Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use 
(AFOLU) Guidelines and are eligible as a REDD 
project (UNIQUE Forestry Consultants, 2010).
The reference area for the project consists of the 
project area, which will include all natural for-
ests in the Bale Mountain Ecoregion, a total of 
more than 700,000 ha (including the National 
Park); and the leakage belt, an estimated area of 
140,000 ha that includes woodlands adjacent to 
the project area that will be affected as a result of 
the project activities. 
For preparation of the initial technical analysis, 
REDD Modular Methodology, the draft method-
ology proposed by Avoided Deforestation Part-
ners4 was used. This methodology was selected 
on the basis that it is designed to address a wide 
range of potential project scenarios and also in-
cludes the methodology that was previously pro-
posed by the BioCarbon Fund5. 
6.4 Preliminary baseline, elaboration of car-
bon stocks and carbon credits
As part of the setting up of the carbon model 
to calculate the expected emission reductions 
for each woreda, a preliminary baseline rate 
of deforestation was developed using histori-
cal data based on Landsat / SPOT images from 
1986, 2002 and 2006. These data are for six 
woredas (Adaba, Berbere, Dodola, Dolo Mena, 
Harenna Buluk and Nensebo) out of fourteen 
in the project area and cover a forest area of 
approximately 400,000 ha. The data from these 
woredas indicates an increasing rate of defor-
estation, averaging 3.44% in the period from 
2001-2006 and 1.3% from 1986-2001. 
Some of the woredas have high deforestation 
rates of up to 8% and some are at relatively lower 
rates of about 1%, owing to the existence of a 
customary management system due to the pres-
ence of coffee forest.
With respect to carbon stocks, the average 
above- and below-ground carbon stocks across 
the project area was estimated to be 185 tons/ha 
by taking the low end of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) range for tropi-
cal Africa, reflecting the widespread degradation 
in the project area. Field data were also used 
from the Bale Mountains National Park to esti-
mate below-ground biomass from above-ground 
data (UNIQUE Forestry Consultants, 2010).
4 REDD Methodology Modules. http://www.americancarbonregistry.org
5  Methodology for Estimating Reductions of GHG Emissions from Mosaic 
Deforestation. http://www.communitycarbonforestry.org
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Taking into account the uncertainty regarding 
the methodological requirements, a preliminary 
emission reduction potential of 18.5 MtCO
2
 over 
twenty years without taking into account leakage 
and non-permanence and a marketable volume 
of 6.4 MtCO
2
 or 2.7 MtCO
2
 over ten years (tak-
ing into account leakage and non-permanence) 
was estimated.
This preliminary estimate of the potential car-
bon credits that can be transacted was based on 
a number of assumptions. Annual deforestation 
rate was taken as 4% in the baseline. With re-
gard to leakage, a 25% rate was assumed by tak-
ing the mid-point between typical ranges of 10% 
and 40%. For non-permanence, a 40% buffer 
at the high end of the range was considered. It 
is also assumed that the effectiveness of REDD 
activities will increase over the years (UNIQUE 
Forestry Consultants, 2010).
6.5 Next actions
 
Baseline of carbon stocks within different strata 
and Project Design Document (PDD) including 
third-party validation leading to registration are 
the next significant actions.
The baseline model will be developed in such a 
way that it does not rely only on observed histori-
cal rates but also incorporates socio-economic 
drivers, such as projected population growth (us-
ing a statistical relationship between past defor-
estation and population), and that it covers the 
entire project area and leakage belt. Moreover, a 
field inventory will also need to be undertaken to 
establish the carbon stocks in the project area, in-
cluding the leakage belt at the start of the project.
Another piece of work also involves a full elab-
oration of the monitoring plan. The approach 
will be based on the approved methodology 
and will generally involve obtaining classified 
forest-cover data from satellite imagery for 
the project area, and estimating emissions as-
sociated with any losses since the start of the 
project or since the date of the last monitoring 
event (using the carbon stock data of the ini-
tial field inventory). 
An analysis of the social aspects, including aware-
ness-raising on climate change and avoided de-
forestation, will be conducted with the local com-
munities. One immediate action is also related 
to working on the benefit-sharing arrangements 
with detailed implementation modality.
7. Linking PFM with REDD+
The details of each PFM type may vary based 
on forest type, forest condition, socio-econom-
ic issues, etc., but in most cases an agreement 
is signed between the community and the For-
est Agency (in the case of PFM in a state for-
est) in which a management plan is drawn up 
for a given block of forest. The community will 
be granted use rights over forest products (fire-
wood, NTFPs, and in some cases also timber). In 
The current plan is to establish a ‘forest 
fund’ managed by representatives of the 
OFWE, community-based organizations, 
and other relevant bodies. This fund will 
receive a large proportion of the carbon 
revenues, and OFWE will facilitate a 
performance-based distribution of funds 
to communities through their ‘community-
based organizations’ (CBOs).
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return, some activities to protect and develop 
the forest are taken on by the community, most 
often patrol duties, seedling plantings, and tend-
ing operations. Bylaws regarding the use of for-
est products and the grazing of cattle are estab-
lished, and the CBO is empowered to manage 
it, often including the distribution of benefits 
among community members and the collection, 
management, and use of community funds that 
are derived from sales of produce and from fines 
imposed on transgressors (Skutsch, 2010). 
If under such initiatives communities are able 
to manage forests in a sustainable way, then for-
ests will be protected from degradation. This also 
means that the rate at which carbon dioxide is 
emitted into the atmosphere is reduced. There-
fore, PFM could be one means for countries to 
implement REDD+.
One of the impacts of PFM is that tree cover 
is increased. For example, a change-detection 
study in the Adaba-Dodola forest compared the 
state of vegetation between 2002 and 2006 in 
community-managed forest blocks and found 
that forest cover had increased by up to 15.6% in 
these blocks (Ameha et al., 2006). If PFM results 
in increased tree cover, it can be concluded that 
it leads to increased sequestration of carbon.
Such positive impacts of PFM on forest conditions 
indicate that PFM should be used as a strategy for 
REDD+ implementation. Obviously, the addition-
al gains from REDD could be an incentive to for-
est conservation, and this will in turn positively 
contribute to the success of PFM. REDD is also 
seen as more cost-effective than other methods 
of carbon sequestration (Banskota et al., 2007). 
Watersheds and riparian areas are protected as a 
result of the restoration of forest areas, and this 
has positive impacts on the enhancement of ag-
ricultural productivity. Expected revenues from 
REDD will create employment and new liveli-
hoods. Pursuing REDD through PFM also allows 
the continued use of forest products by the com-
munities involved, which could serve as a safety 
net for those who depend more on the forests and 
help to maintain their traditional livelihoods and 
culture. An integrated part of PFM is the organi-
zational frameworks for the effective protection, 
development and proper utilization for forest re-
sources. Organizational frameworks designed for 
sustainable forest management could be funda-
mental inputs for REDD implementation.
As indicated earlier, the main approach to 
achieving the envisaged improvements in forest 
conservation and livelihoods in the project re-
gion is the adoption of PFM. Even though the 
scope of PFM covers a wide range of targets and 
activities, originally it was not designed as a 
REDD implementation approach. Its major aim 
is the maintenance of forest condition and im-
provement of livelihoods. Therefore, assessment 
of any gap in the ongoing PFM implementation 
activities against the planning and implementa-
tion requirements of REDD has been done for 
adjustment as necessary.
In this connection, the future PFM approach 
and proposed management activities in light 
of the actions necessary for REDD are being 
drafted. The Implementation Plan outlines the 
necessary activities (including estimated quan-
tities and costs) and proposes a timeline for 
their implementation.
8. Challenges, risks and mitigation strategies
As forest degradation remains difficult to esti-
mate, designing a proper method for assessing it, 
especially over large areas of forest, will remain a 
significant challenge.
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A transparent system needs to be in place for 
allocating financial rewards when they come. 
A strong and reliable structure for the imple-
mentation of benefit-sharing is required for the 
system to operate smoothly. It should also be 
noted that, even without REDD, PFM is already 
a demanding task. Additional activities such as 
monitoring and reporting require a strong com-
mitment from both the communities and the 
government forest agency.
Some of the risks involved in REDD implementa-
tion include ‘leakage’, that is, the displacement 
of deforestation from the project boundary to 
other places, leading to lower actual net carbon 
savings by the project. The entire project area 
needs to be conserved, and the ‘leakage belt’ 
should also be managed and monitored. The 
main leakage risk is expected to be from agri-
cultural expansion. However, based on previous 
experiences with PFM in areas within the Bale 
Mountains and elsewhere, communities greatly 
appreciate the concept of sustainable forest 
management and will therefore agree to regulate 
the expansion of agriculture.
Based on the WBISPP supply and consump-
tion pattern estimates, it is necessary to es-
tablish approximately 4,000 ha of new plan-
tations to compensate for fuel wood supply 
from the natural forests in the project area. 
BERSMP is undertaking ongoing plantation 
activities through supporting communities 
to establish some 2,000 ha of woodlots (to 
which the communities have full access) by 
2012. OFWE is also funding the establishment 
of additional 200 ha/year woodlots over the 
next ten years. Details of the timeline and 
responsibility for the establishment of the 
woodlots are to be outlined in the REDD Im-
plementation Plan. The new plantations and 
community woodlots will enable households 
to have alternative sources of wood for fuel 
and construction materials. Without such 
measures, it is possible that deforestation will 
merely shift outside the project area, leading 
to no actual emission reductions.
In addition, efficient cooking stoves (including 
wood-saving and solar-powered ones), which 
can reduce current fuel-wood requirements, 
are being introduced, with the aim of cover-
ing some 10,000 households in the coming two 
years. This could be supported by raising aware-
ness about alternative fuel-wood sources such 
as establishing fuel-wood hedges.
The other risk is ‘reversibility’ or the risk of non-
permanence. Carbon sequestered and credited 
from forests can be released back into the atmo-
sphere in case of a fire, tree diseases, or other 
unexpected deforestation. Such incidents could 
cause non-permanence resulting in a failure to 
deliver the expected emission reductions. An ef-
fective forest-fire management system focusing on 
prevention activities to reduce the related risk will 
be drawn up. Also, as indicated above, it is assumed 
that 40% of the generated carbon credits will be 
placed in a risk buffer (not to be transacted).
Furthermore, past experiences indicate that the 
instability of forestry institutional frameworks 
could also be a source of risk. Therefore, struc-
tural provisions for the handing over of key re-
sponsibilities in the event of institutional reor-
ganizations should be carefully considered.
9. Early experiences
Experiences so far show that PFM implemented 
jointly by community-based organizations and 
the government forest agency is a viable tool 
for reversing historical deforestation trends in 
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Ethiopia and therefore should be adopted as the 
main approach in implementing REDD. 
Carbon revenues should be considered as one 
of the several possible incomes that PFM would 
help to bring about. Communities can benefit 
from forest product and service businesses based 
on sustainable forest management. Co-benefits 
beyond emission reductions, such as biodiver-
sity, poverty alleviation and livelihood diversifi-
cation, are also important because they can at-
tract buyers and help the carbon credits obtain a 
premium price in the voluntary carbon markets.
Conflicts related to equitable sharing may arise 
in connection with the new benefits not only 
among participating stakeholders, but also 
among the heterogeneity community members. 
It is therefore crucial to look into the issue right 
from the start to guarantee the successful imple-
mentation of the REDD scheme through the 
clarification of rights and effective law enforce-
ment.
The implementation of REDD benefits greatly 
from the knowledge and experience of conser-
vation and development organizations, but busi-
ness expertise is also required. With high upfront 
costs, price risks and delayed financial returns, 
business expertise can help manage REDD proj-
ect risks. Also, given the evolution of a design for 
an international REDD+ mechanism, the expect-
ed financing support for REDD projects will also 
change. Project developers should be aware of 
international developments to ensure that they 
can create and realize value from their project 
activities (Watson, 2010).
It is also necessary to manage the expectations of 
REDD project stakeholders (communities as well 
as government) in light of delays between proj-
ect activities and returns on investments. The 
fact that payments are based on delivery means 
that there is a lot of work to be done before the 
revenues actually start to come in. Therefore, a 
long-term stakeholder commitment is necessary, 
given the complex nature of the project. 
10. Conclusions 
The Bale REDD project is in the early stages of 
project development. As the project evolves, one 
of its key components is incorporating and ac-
commodating the diverse stakeholder needs. 
If these needs can be met, the project could 
bring in the much needed finance to conserve 
the forests of the Bale Mountains and maintain 
their environmental services, which support the 
livelihoods of millions. Moreover, in addition to 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the 
REDD project has the potential to generate sub-
stantial co-benefits, such as positive impacts on 
biodiversity, poverty reduction and the strength-
ening of local community rights.
The revenues from a PFM-driven REDD can con-
tribute to a new source of sustainable revenues 
for the government and also serve as incentives 
for concerned communities to enable strong 
support for sustainable forest management.
With regard to building REDD readiness for a 
post-2012 climate-change regime, Ethiopia is in 
the process of preparing its national REDD strat-
egy. National REDD strategies must take into 
account a wide range of policies and national 
circumstances, including the drivers of defores-
tation, previous experience with forest conserva-
tion policies, cross-sectoral synergies, conflicts, 
rights, governance and administrative capacity. 
Building readiness for REDD ensures that an 
enabling environment is created for REDD ac-
tivity implementation by different stakeholders. 
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As the potentials of PFM for the implementation 
of REDD+ is widely recognized, the Bale REDD 
project will serve as a pilot creating experiences 
for the upcoming implementation of the nation-
al REDD+ strategy and targets.
References 
Ameha A., Neumann, M. and Tadesse T., 2007. “Participatory Forest 
Management (PFM) and Forest Conservation: A Change Detection in 
Community Managed Forest” (Unpublished).
Banskota K., Karky B. and Skutsch M. 2007. Reducing Carbon Emissions 
through Community-managed Forests in the Himalaya, International Centre 
for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Kathmandu, Nepal. 
BERSMP, 2006. Program Document for the Bale Ecoregion Sustainable 
Management Program.
BERSMP, 2009. Activity Report of Semester 2, 2009. Bale Ecoregion 
Sustainable Management Program.
Borrini-Feyerabend, G., M. T., Nguinguiri, J. C. and Ndangang, V. A. 
(2000): Co-Management of Natural Resources: Organizing, Negotiating 
and Learning-by-Doing.Conservation International, 2007. http://www.
biodiversityhotspots.org/
FAO. 2006. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005, Main Report. 
Progress Towards Sustainable Forest Management, FAO Forestry paper 
147, Rome.
 
FAO, 2007. State of the World’s Forests 2007. Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Rome. 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), 2007. A Proclamation to 
Provide for the Development, Conservation and Utilization of Forests. 
Oromia National Regional State (ONRS), 2008. Regulation to provide for 
the establishment of Oromia Regional State Forest and Wildlife Enterprise.
Skutsch, M. M. & Ba, L., 2010. “Crediting carbon in dry forests: The 
potential for community forest management in West Africa,” Forest Policy 
and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 264-270, April.
Tadesse T., 2008. PFM in Ethiopia: Achievements, Opportunities and 
Challenges. Proceeding of a workshop held at Chilimo Forest and Ghion 
Hotel, November 25-27, 2008, MELCA Mahiber.
UNdata, 2008. United Nations Statistics Division. http://unstats.un.org/
unsd 
UNIQUE Forestry Consultants, 2010. Consultancy Report, Bale Eco-Region 
REDD Structuring, Marketing and development preparation.
Watson C., 2010. Rapid Guide to REDD. FARM-Africa. Available at www.
pfmp-farmsos.org/Publication.html
WBISSP, 2002. A Strategic Plan for the Sustainable Development, 
Conservation and Management of the Woody Biomass Resources. Woody 
Biomass Inventory and Strategic Planning Project (WBISSP), Ethiopia .
WWF, 2007. WWF Standards of Conservation Project and Programme 
Management Version: 09 February 2007, World Widelife Fund. 
Pursuing REDD+ through PFM: Early Experiences from the Bale Mountain’s REDD Project in Ethiopia
Tsegaye Tadesse, who has an MSc in Forest Management, is an 
Ethiopian, currently working with the Bale Ecoregion Sustainable 
Management Programme as Programme Manager. Prior to this, 
from 2004 – 2006, he worked with GTZ as Policy Advisor for 
the Sustainable Utilisation of Natural Resources for Food Security 
(SUN) Programme in Ethiopia. 
Contact: tsegayet@farmafrica-eth.org
126
127
Carol Mwape 
Ministry of Tourism, Environ-
ment and Natural Resources, 
Zambia.
Davison Gumbo
East and Southern Africa 
Regional Office, CIFOR 
Communities Reorganization for 
REDD+ Implementation in Zambia
Establishing a global mechanism for reduced emissions 
from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) has now 
become part of the global climate-change negotiations. 
Proposals put forward for such a mechanism are 
intended to enable developing countries to maintain 
and manage forest stocks in return for financial support 
through carbon trading. Expansive forests in Africa facing 
serious deforestation and degradation threat are under 
community management. Such communities stand to 
benefit if enabling frameworks for carbon trading are put 
in place. Current governance systems are wanting, and 
the role of the state in future carbon markets is unclear. 
Approaches to forest management at the national and 
community levels must be changed if communities are to 
benefit from REDD+ driven markets. Using Zambia as a 
case study, a framework through which communities can 
benefit from REDD+ is presented. The community-based 
natural resources management approach is presented as 
the best way to enable community reorganization and 
entry into carbon and forest products markets. 
abstract
1. introduction
Between 2000 and 2005, Zambia’s economy did 
remarkably well in posting an average growth rate 
of 4.8% per annum, much of which was based 
on natural resources, especially minerals (Pope, 
2006). However these gains have not gone to the 
rest of the population. According to the World 
Bank, 68% of Zambia’s population lives on under 
$1.25 per day (World Bank, 2008). This is largely 
due to resource constraints, poverty traps, weak 
policies, poor governance systems and poor de-
velopment planning, which characterise many 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. In addition, 
and despite the decentralization policy of the 
Zambian government, there is an evident failure 
to prioritise and promote the devolved manage-
ment of resources or the harmonization of cross-
sectoral policy and legislation that affects the 
management of land and natural resources. In 
addressing rural poverty in Zambia, one option 
that has been missed is the natural linkage be-
tween people and forests.
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Zambia’s national development indicates that 
forests and forest industries contribute at least 
3.7 percent to GDP, with the largest contribution 
coming from woodfuel.1 The most significant con-
tribution from the forest sub-sector is the provi-
sion of energy for the agricultural and domestic 
needs of 90 percent of the Zambian population 
(GRZ, 2006). The contribution that natural prod-
ucts make to rural livelihoods is critical. The 2003 
Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) 
shows that at least 25% of all female-headed 
households rely on these products to meet basic 
food and other household needs in times of stress. 
In addition, those Zambian households that are 
locked into chronic poverty also rely on wild 
fruits, vegetables and other natural products to 
meet their livelihood requirements (CSO, 2003). 
It is therefore not surprising that the role of the 
forestry sector, especially in local livelihoods, was 
recognized in Zambian’s Fifth National Develop-
ment Plan (GRZ, 2006); but this recognition was 
not accompanied by the necessary strategic and 
financial support to raise the profile and contri-
bution of this sector to poverty reduction. The op-
portunity to appreciate this role fully may be lost, 
as forests in Zambia are under increasing pressure 
from agricultural expansion, infrastructural devel-
opment and human settlement.
Zambia’s forest estate is estimated at 425,000 
km2 (57.1%) of the country’s land area or 0.036 
km2 (i.e. 3.6 ha) of forest per capita, meaning 
that Zambia is often considered one of the 
most highly forested countries in the southern 
African region (FAO, 2009). In comparison, for-
est land ownership per capita for Malawi (2.6 
km2), Zimbabwe (13 km2) and Mozambique (10 
km2) is significantly higher than that in Zambia 
(WDI, 2005). Zambia’s protected forest reserves 
occupy about 9 percent of its total land area 
and forests in national parks another 9 per-
cent, with 82 percent of the forests on custom-
ary lands under the jurisdiction of traditional 
chiefs who are responsible for their manage-
ment (Kalinda et al., 2008; Njovu, 2004). Yet 
this endowment is under threat, as between 
2000 and 2005 Zambia lost at least 4,450 km2 
of forests per year (FAO, 2009). These losses put 
Zambia among the ten countries with the high-
est annual deforestation rates. 
2. Forest ownership and Management in 
Zambia 
The 1973 Forest Act and the forest policy of 1998 
vest ownership of all forests in the President on 
behalf of Zambia’s citizens (GRZ, 1973, 1998). The 
act establishes a Forestry Department as the au-
thority to manage the country’s forests. Forests 
outside protected areas are under the control 
of the Commissioner of Lands (under the Land 
Act of 1995), local and municipal councils and 
traditional leaders and constitute 82 percent of 
Zambia’s total forest cover (Jumbe et al., 2009). 
The majority of forest is not under formal forest 
management and is therefore vulnerable to over-
use, conversion and loss from increased demand 
for land and forest products from the growing 
population and associated economic activities. 
One aspect of the history of forest management 
in Zambia is the failure to put in place policies to 
foster the involvement of communities in this sec-1 Woodfuel as used here refers to charcoal and firewood.
Most countries that have promoted 
Community Forest Management (CFM) 
have failed into achieve sustainable 
forest management or recognize the role 
of forests in rural people's livelihood.
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tor. The 1998 forest policy covered this gap, but 
the critical subsidiary legislation, the Forest Act 
of 1999, which provided for community partici-
pation in forest management, never became law. 
Phiri (2009) noted that the continued failure to 
involve communities may have been a key reason 
why the Zambia Forestry Action Programme had 
to be launched to increase community involve-
ment in forest management. To do this, however, 
a special statutory instrument (SI 56 of 1999) had 
to be put in place (GRZ, 1998; 1999b). 
Between 2000 and 2005, the government 
transferred over 2,000 km2 (200,000 hectares) 
of forest to eight state-owned and two commu-
nity-owned forests under a Joint Forest Man-
agement (JFM) scheme. This approach involved 
communities in the management of gazetted 
forests, as well as sharing the benefits derived 
from such collaboration (Barnes 2010). As in 
Tanzania, Kenya, Morocco, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan 
and Mali, Zambia attempted to shift from tra-
ditional state control of forest resources. This 
came with changes in policy and legal frame-
works and was driven in part by the need to 
curb the rising deforestation rates (Alden-Wily, 
2004). Most countries that have promoted JFM, 
Community Forest Management (CFM) or any 
other forms of participatory forest management 
have cited the failure of centralized systems of 
forest management to achieve sustainable for-
est management or recognize the role of for-
ests in rural people’s livelihoods. Bwalya (2004) 
attributes this shift in Zambia to the fact that 
the centralized, top-down approach to natural 
resource management (NRM) failed to arrest 
the irretrievable losses of biodiversity from the 
colonial and post-independence periods and 
made it necessary to change the NRM regimes. 
Furthermore, the shift was influenced by inter-
national calls for the decentralization of forest 
management, rather than building capacity in 
communities in the direction of self-gover-
nance in forest management (Ribot 2003; Ribot 
et al., 2008). While these management efforts 
have been implemented since the early 1970s 
in sub-Saharan Africa, many were supported 
from external donor resources and could not be 
sustained as neither the participating commu-
nities nor the state had resources dedicated to 
such developments. 
In a study to evaluate the performance of the JFM 
programme in Zambia’s Dambwa forest reserve, 
Phiri (2009) established that only a small number 
(8%) of local people reported an improvement in 
the socio-economic conditions of their house-
holds after the introduction of JFM. The same 
report shows that 79% of the people involved in 
the survey perceived the Forestry Department 
as the major beneficiary from JFM. The study re-
vealed that there was a loss of enthusiasm for JFM 
among local people largely because they did not 
receive any tangible economic benefits form this 
initiative and had limited decision-making powers 
(Phiri, 2009). Similar results were noted by Bwalya 
(2007) in a study of another JFM site, Katanino. 
Those living around the Dambwa forest reserve 
may have failed to benefit from JFM because nei-
ther the SI 52 of 1999 nor the Forest Act of 1973 
provided for clear community benefits from for-
ests (GRZ, 1999). Further, as noted by Campbell 
et al. (2007), the economic opportunities of dry 
forests and their productivity are limited and 
therefore affected the range of possible benefits. 
While under JFM the communities involved did 
not receive any benefits because of a flawed piece 
of legislation, it is important that future processes 
and initiatives such as REDD+ should widen the 
incentive base beyond traditional products such 
as woodfuel. The new packages should encourage 
value addition as well payment for ecological ser-
vices, including water catchments, carbon storage 
and sequestration, as a long-term strategy and 
Communities Reorganization for REDD+ Implementation in Zambia
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contribute to poverty alleviation. Some of these 
issues can be addressed under REDD+.
3. Models for Participatory Forest Management 
Schreckenberg et al., (2006) cites the FAO defi-
nition of participatory forest management (PFM) 
as processes and mechanisms that enable those 
people who have a direct stake in forest resourc-
es to be part of decision-making in all aspects 
of forest management, from managing resources 
to formulating and implementing institutional 
frameworks. More specifically, community for-
estry refers to an aspect of participatory for-
estry that emphasises local communities as key 
stakeholders for sustainability. Various forms of 
PFM have been implemented in African coun-
tries since the 1970s. The approach has taken 
the broad forms of community forest manage-
ment (CFM) in community-owned forests and 
joint forest management (JFM) in state-owned 
forests (Pofenberger and McGean, 1996). In 
Zambia, JFM was piloted in an attempt to bring 
state-owned forest resources under sustainable 
management, thus reducing deforestation while 
providing economic incentives to participating 
local communities through benefit sharing. 
The scenario in these approaches shows that 
participatory forest management can denote 
different relations between forest management 
and community involvement in different coun-
tries, possibly varying from a token notion of 
participation to a full role in decision-making. 
The constructs of PFM in Africa range from full 
community ownership over forests to small, or-
ganised forest-user groups and top-down ‘com-
munity’ structures imposed on traditional user 
groups by intervention agencies, including state 
forestry departments and NGOs (Odera, 2004). 
In these approaches, attempts are made to de-
volve authority to local communities in anticipa-
tion of a cost-effective means of halting defor-
estation through locally prescribed management 
plans mainly to regulate harvesting. While aim-
ing at sustainable forest management, the mod-
els of participatory forest management have fo-
cused notably on curbing illegal resource use, 
encroachment and forest fires (Skutsch, 2009) 
and to some extent provide access rights to state-
controlled forests for local communities. 
4. From Participatory Forest Management 
to Community-based Natural Resources 
Management 
In past decades, Zambia has mainly followed 
the centralized natural resource management 
approach, forests included. In 1988, Zambia 
implemented the Administrative Manage-
ment Design (ADMADE), ushering in a shift 
from the centralized management of wildlife 
resources to Community-Based Natural Re-
source Management (CBNRM). From then on a 
shift was noted in the forestry sector towards 
Community-Based Natural Resource Manage-
ment (CBNRM), which are more devolved mod-
els of participatory forest management. The 
shift started by pioneering JFM, as mentioned 
in the sections above. CBNRM is viewed simply 
as management of local natural resources that 
brings local benefits (Adams and Hulme, 2001; 
Murphree, 1991). The central premise is that 
community benefits and control lead to more 
sustainable natural resource management, as 
locally accountable institutions for natural re-
source use and management are strengthened, 
and local resource-user groups make better 
decisions about the use of land and resources 
(Ribot, 2002). Where forests are concerned, 
this entails the transfer of authority over for-
est resources to the local communities under 
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whose jurisdiction a given forest falls (Alden-
Wily, 2004; Pofenberger and McGean, 1996). 
Potentially valuable resources such as timber, 
NTFPs and carbon associated with that forest 
are incorporated into a benefit package. Be-
cause CBNRM involves the transfer of authority 
over natural resources to local communities, it 
often produces major institutional reforms and 
fundamental changes in power (Jones 2004; 
Litvack et al., 1998; Andersson 2006). It is ac-
cepted that these models mean different things 
to different people, but in southern Africa CBN-
RM is most clearly defined in terms of the devo-
lution of rights to make management decisions 
and capture benefits in relation to resources 
located on communal lands (Jones, B.T.B. and 
Murphree, M.W., 2004; Campbell et. al., 2002; 
Murphree, 1991).
Through CBNRM, more sustainable natural-re-
source governance regimes that enhance local 
economic benefits can be realised (Ribot, 2003). 
By re-crafting existing community-based organ-
isations for the management of forests, immedi-
ate opportunities for establishing pilot projects 
for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) can be realised (Peskett, 
2008). This can provide valuable lessons for 
any planned international finance mechanisms 
linked to the UNFCCC. Under CBNRM, commu-
nities not only focus on forests for timber, char-
coal, fuel wood and NTFPs, but take a broader 
perspective of the value of the forest, including 
ecological services such as carbon capture, se-
questration and ecotourism. As Agrawal and Ri-
bot observe (1999), local communities are more 
empowered to make decisions and are able to 
designate community-forested land to various 
uses. Furthermore, the local-level institutions 
responsible for such changes are downwardly ac-
countable (Ribot 2001). In Zambia, the history 
of community involvement and the impact of rev-
enue distribution on community attitudes have 
had lasting effects, most strikingly the impact 
of the combination of tangible and transforma-
tional benefits which led to notable changes in 
positive attitudes towards wildlife conservation 
(Dalal-Clayton and Child 2003). This attitudinal 
shift lays the social foundation for later progress 
in the uptake of responsibility for resource man-
agement by communities, especially in the forest 
sector. This model of sustainable forest manage-
ment therefore presents a worthwhile opportu-
nity for building on REDD+.
5. REDD+, Carbon Trading and Payment for 
Ecological Services 
Since 2007, parties to the UNFCCC have been 
considering a new policy and framework for Re-
duced Emission from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD+), which is being conceived 
as a two-pronged approach: first, by developed 
countries as a cost-effective means of reducing 
emissions; and secondly, by developing coun-
tries as a means of compensating local commu-
nities that have been historical custodians of the 
forest resource. 
For Zambia, with REDD+ investment 
potential in 82% of the forests that are 
under community jurisdiction, the main 
challenge is whether local communities 
have adequate capacity to participate in 
carbon trading, which requires forests to 
be quantified and assessed, carbon credit 
prices negotiated and carbon stocks 
measured, reported and verified.
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At its inception, carbon trading has predomi-
nantly been industrial based and has been 
through the regulated Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) in the recent past. The 
CDM Executive Board Report for 2009 indi-
cates that, of the 1,899 CDM project activi-
ties registered globally, A/R accounts for only 
0.43%. In Africa, very minimal carbon trading 
from small-scale afforestation and reforesta-
tion (A/R) projects has been implemented 
under the CDM (Jindal et al., 2006), and in 
Zambia only one project has been approved 
under this scheme (Chundama 2009a). It is 
not surprising that most countries that are 
implementing forest carbon projects have cho-
sen to sell their carbon credits in the voluntary 
market. However, given the slow development 
of REDD+ discussions, the full potential for 
a REDD+ mechanism in contributing to miti-
gation efforts can be informed by a thorough 
analysis of existing projects. 
For a region such as Africa with an estimated 1.3 
million hectares of forested land under various 
forms of community management (Odera, 2004), 
it becomes very important for a REDD+ mecha-
nism to be established and provide payment for 
ecological services, as well as for lost develop-
ment opportunities from direct use of forests 
(Peskett, 2008). The emerging carbon markets 
under REDD+ not only offer Zambia’s rural 
communities an opportunity to diversify and in-
crease their incomes from forest resources, they 
also offer the global community a cost-effective 
means to achieve climate change mitigation (Eli-
asch, 2008; Tavoni et al., 2007). 
The Global Canopy Programme shows that the 
greatest mitigation potential in the forest sec-
tor is in developing countries. Of the 17 billion 
tonnes of emission reductions required by 2020, 
70% is achievable in developing countries (GCP, 
2009). It therefore follows that this potential has 
implication for the scale of carbon trading and 
thus offers increased opportunities for carbon 
trading in the forest sector. The current scenario 
shows that a larger amount, if not all, of car-
bon credits generated from REDD+ projects are 
traded in the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM). 
For Zambia, with REDD+ investment potential 
in 82% of the forests that are under community 
jurisdiction, the main challenge is whether local 
communities have adequate capacity to partici-
pate in carbon trading, which requires forests to 
be quantified and assessed, carbon credit prices 
negotiated and carbon stocks measured, report-
ed and verified.
6. Preparedness for REDD+ at community 
level
To harvest the benefits of international forest car-
bon finance, Zambia’s rural communities must pre-
pare for REDD+ implementation. Currently, from 
a global point of view, the United Nations REDD+ 
Initiative is fostering country preparedness for 
REDD+ to generate information, lessons and expe-
riences. At the international level, the UN REDD 
Programme seeks to build consensus and knowl-
edge about REDD+ and raise awareness about the 
importance of including a REDD+ mechanism in a 
For local communities in Zambia to
participate in REDD+ markets, an 
effective national policy framework 
should be put in place by government 
through which the communities can access 
markets, negotiate and sell their carbon.
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post-2012 climate-change agreement. It also pro-
vides opportunities for dialogue between govern-
ments, civil-society organizations and technical 
experts to ensure that REDD+ efforts are based 
on science and to take into account the views and 
needs of all stakeholders (UN-REDD Programme, 
2010). While communities are expected to be in-
volved in this process, as far as the REDD pilot in 
Zambia is concerned, it is notable that only the 
government is active. Thus, the agency’s under-
standing of REDD+ is increasing, while that of 
communities and other players such as the private 
sector is not. Further, the capacities of communi-
ties living in and around the large expanse of forest 
in Zambia are low, which may severely limit the ex-
tent to which they can engage in REDD+.
This poses a big challenge for a national roll-out of 
REDD+ activities in forests outside protected areas, 
as engaging in REDD+ processes and the envisaged 
markets requires that all levels of forest resource 
management, from local communities via NGOs to 
national governments, share a common understand-
ing and have enough capacities for effective engage-
ment. For local communities in Zambia to partici-
pate in REDD+ markets, an effective national policy 
framework should be put in place by government 
through which the communities can access markets, 
negotiate and sell their carbon. The same framework 
must not only recognise the rights and responsi-
bilities of the communities but also their limitations 
and ensure that the necessary safeguards are put in 
place. For example, rural communities cannot assess 
and negotiate with international companies as they 
neither have the skills nor the resources to do so. 
This is something that the governments will have to 
help with. In addition, the roles of district and other 
meso-level structures have to be clearly articulated, 
as must the facilitation roles of NGOs that may opt 
to assist rural communities. In this way, some forms 
of relationship will need to be established that link 
communities, government and REDD+ markets. 
7. Community re-organization and for-
ests zoning for REDD+
In the absence of the management regulation of 
forests outside protected forest areas, it is impor-
tant that the Zambian rural communities under 
whose control such large amounts of forest exist 
should be better managed. For this to happen, the 
government must take the lead and create an en-
abling environment through which communities 
can trade in carbon. This may mean clearly articu-
lated guidelines for carbon trade, indicating prepa-
rations to be done before a community can enter 
into this form of trade. Once the guidelines are in 
place and safeguards have been articulated, com-
munities can then begin to organise to meet these 
requirements. Five developments are envisaged: 
First, communities need to re-organize them-
selves beyond the existing centralising tradi-
tional structures based on chiefs and lineages 
into more legally recognized governance insti-
tutions that can mobilize the larger community 
population to get involved in forest management 
and REDD+. Under the Forests Act (1999), the 
Government of Zambia has made provision for 
the creation of Forest Management Committees 
(MTENR, 2008). This only applies to forests for 
which it is intended to implement JFM (GRZ 
2006), though NGOs can organize communities 
with forest resources under their jurisdiction 
into such committees or boards that can provide 
forest management leadership. These structures 
could seek a legal identity through registration 
as trusts, based on experience of the JFM pilot 
(GRZ, 1999a); 
Second, communities with facilitation from an 
NGO can identify and request a local chief to set 
aside land for purposes of establishing a commu-
nity carbon reserve under REDD+. This set-aside 
will also go to the respective district council for 
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approval and to draw up guidelines for the man-
agement of such a piece of land. The necessary 
consultations will be carried out at the commu-
nity level, and the users must agree to the pro-
posed changes. The area will be surveyed, and 
through a resolution in a district council meet-
ing the process of setting aside that piece of 
land for this specific purpose will begin. By-laws 
and rules of resource use within this area will be 
agreed, and the district council can apply to the 
Ministry of Local Government for an enactment 
of the by-laws. In Zambia, this is possible under 
the Lands Act of 1995 as well as the Forest Act of 
1973, where a Minister responsible for the Act 
can set aside land for conservation purposes. The 
most critical element is that the by-laws will not 
necessarily exclude or bar people from using the 
forest, but they have to follow the rules in force in 
the particular zone in doing so (see below). The 
specially designated area will not be taken from 
the communal land, but will simply be managed 
differently. It is anticipated that issues pertaining 
to tenure, rights and responsibilities and the own-
ership of benefits derived from these, including 
carbon credits generated, will also be part of the 
bigger framework governing this venture.
Third, one of the centrepieces of this framework 
is capacity development for all the institutions 
and community groups involved. There is a need 
for these entities to advance their social and 
economic development while protecting their 
resources. The range of commitments that the 
community will be expected to carry out against 
the background of limited knowledge of for-
est management, illiteracy, poor understanding 
of trade, benefit-sharing and so on point to the 
need for an all-encompassing capacity-building 
programme to address leadership skills, negotia-
tion skills and a general understanding of some 
technical issues pertaining to forest manage-
ment and trade. General awareness of the project 
will be interspersed with more in-depth training 
for specialist groups such as beekeepers. This is 
an essential aspect of the proposed framework.
Fourth, perceptions of what is useful in the 
forest will vary by individual and area. Thus, 
a process of identifying the different uses and 
determining whether they are compatible or 
incompatible is crucial (see Figure 1 below). 
Carbon trade will call for changes in land use 
and opportunity costs, and hence the zoning 
of the forest has to be based on some criteria. 
In this paper we follow Chundama (2009). As 
already mentioned elsewhere in this report, 
Zambian rural households depend on forests 
for a number of products, and within com-
munities some households are more forest-
dependent than others and for different prod-
ucts (Mutamba 2007; Bwalya 2004; Jumbe et 
al. 2007). Also important is the timing of for-
est income (Arnold and Townson 1998), mostly 
at times when households have little else from 
other highly seasonal activities like cropping.
Land uses are either compatible (+) or incompat-
ible (-) but can reinforce each other either nega-
tively (-/-) or positively (+/-). Uses are compatible 
if they do not collectively lead to forest loss: for ex-
ample, neither mushroom nor fruit collection leads 
to woodland loss. Other uses such as charcoaling 
and mushroom collection are incompatible, as the 
former leads to a loss of host trees. At another level, 
wood-carving and charcoaling are negatively mu-
tually reinforcing in that, if found in single area, 
they combine and lead to a loss. In terms of carbon 
trade, the focus is on ensuring that leakages are 
minimised. Therefore, in those areas such as the 
core zone, where carbon is the major commodity, 
land use activities such as charcoaling and shifting 
cultivation will be strictly prohibited. Instead, col-
lecting leafy vegetables, mushroom collecting and 
all other environmentally benign activities will be 
promoted (see Figure 1). 
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Fifth, through stock-taking of current uses and 
inventories, communities should be able to move 
to zonation of the identified forest. A particu-
lar forest could be zoned into 1) a core zone in 
which communities would implement exclusive 
provision of a holistic range of ecological prod-
ucts and services, including water catchments, 
ecotourism and carbon stocks; here communi-
ties would prioritize the products and services to 
harvested and promoted; 2) a buffer zone, which 
would permit the generation of carbon credits 
on assessed stocks, allowing for utilization for 
NTFPs such as beekeeping; and 3) an outer zone 
with assessed carbon stock levels, which would 
permit carbon credits and agroforestry practices 
that incorporate the establishment of woodlots 
to offset the demand for wood in the REDD+ for-
est. The underlying principle is that issues relat-
ing to the permanence of carbon stocks and the 
credits generated are assured in the core and 
buffer zones, while leakage is taken into account 
in the outer zone. The aspect of additionality in 
Figure 1. Compatibility of timber and NTFPs forest products
Source: Chundama (2009) and Gumbo and Chidumayo 2010
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this context is considered at the entire forest lev-
el. It is important that an explicit management 
plan guides the management interventions in 
the forests based on the zoned areas.
In zoning a forest for carbon trade, the causes 
of change must be understood and harmon-
ised and a management plan developed. For 
example, charcoal production involves the 
temporary or permanent removal of trees, 
causes leakage and thus cannot be carried out 
in the carbon trading zone. Shifting agricul-
ture construction poles, commercial timber, 
firewood, carpentry and woodcarving will have 
the same effect. Generally, activities with a 
benign impact on the forest are the gather-
ing of medicines, edible caterpillars, beekeep-
ing, mushrooms, fruits and leafy vegetables, as 
most of these are actually gathered and do not 
require the removal of trees. Some of these ac-
tivities, such as medicines and edible caterpil-
lars, can also have a destructive impact if host 
trees are cut as part of the harvesting process. 
Conversely spiritual uses of forests to encour-
age standing trees will not result in leakage 
but promote permanence (Chundama 2009). 
Some forest uses can lead to losses of certain 
key tree species. In the absence of stipulations 
on selective cutting at the community level, 
such activities can lead to changes in tree di-
versity and a loss of carbon stocks. 
Zoning means that there will be inflows coming 
from the forests. Revenue will come from three 
sources: first, from the local harvesting of for-
est products, for example, edible caterpillars as 
collected by the locally based entrepreneurs; 
secondly, from externally based collectors who 
pay fees to gather such materials in stipulated 
zones; and lastly, from carbon and other trade 
from outside entities. The need for transparency 
and accountability at all levels involved in the 
handling of revenue is critically important, and 
government must put in place a framework for 
revenue management. This means that the com-
munity must be prepared to pay the government 
for services rendered in respect of the adminis-
tration of international payments for carbon. At 
community level, ‘trusts’ will be set up and will 
be responsible for the management of revenues 
at this level.
However, for local communities to re-organize 
and prepare themselves to participate effec-
tively in REDD+ a combination of regulations 
and capacity-building efforts is essential. It is 
not enough for a community merely to partici-
pate in a REDD+ project when they do not have 
capacity to, for instance, contribute to the man-
agement plan of a forest. In the Zambian case, 
where large populations live either inside or on 
the periphery of the forests, it would not be prac-
tical to close them off or deny them access to the 
resource. Rather, communities need to put in 
place regulations that empower them to safe-
guard and ensure the sustainability of resourc-
es and associated products, including carbon 
credits. Where the potential for the generation 
of and trade in carbon credits exist and limit-
ing access becomes critical, communities need 
to consider which economic incentives can be 
realised, including compensation for ecological 
benefits and advance payments for carbon cred-
its, as the case may be.
However, for local communities to re-
organize and prepare themselves to 
participate effectively in REDD+ a 
combination of regulations and capacity-
building efforts is essential.
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8. Conclusion
Zambia has been involved in community-based 
natural resources management for a long time, 
but as things stand CBNRM cannot be used in 
the country’s forest sector. As noted above, the 
present legal framework for the sector cannot 
sufficiently deal with issues of devolution that 
are central to the successful adoption and use of 
the CBRNM approach in this sector. At present, 
the control and management of forests cannot 
legally be devolved to local communities, as the 
law is still ambiguous on this issue. With pro-
community involvement in forest management 
and the Forest Act of 1999 both failing to bring 
about the expected change, there is a need ei-
ther to hasten the enactment of this piece of leg-
islation or to formulate a statutory instrument 
that can be approved by the Minister of Tour-
ism, Environment and Natural Resources (Natu-
ral Resources Consultative Forum, 2005). It is 
important that meaningful participation and 
democracy in decision-making is engendered 
at the lowest level in Zambia, making it possible 
for the community to make major decisions itself 
rather than depend on central government di-
rectives. There is the potential to piggy-back the 
management of carbon and the disbursement 
of REDD revenues to the poor through these 
structures. What is important is that there is a 
significant change in the enabling legislation, 
for example, the Local Government Act for Area 
Development Committees (ADC), as well as the 
requisite training.
In addition, other robust local-level institutional 
arrangements, such as trusts and societies, would 
need to be formed at the community level. Most 
of them are already provided for under Zambian 
law, for example, the Societies Act. Upon incor-
poration, such entities would obtain a mandate 
to manage a ‘carbon concession’ on behalf of a 
community and establish rules for entry and ac-
cess to concessions where they are in place. The 
benefits accruing would be shared according to 
a negotiated framework. The critical issue here is 
to define who is a member of the community and 
also how this entity would link with government 
and the private sector.
This paper has shown that a large forest-re-
source base is still available in Zambia to sup-
port a national REDD programme. CBNRM and 
JFM initiatives have been tested in the country 
to draw lessons for community organization and 
preparedness for an effective engagement in 
REDD+. It can be deduced that, while the glob-
al community is establishing a mechanism for 
REDD+, caution should be exercised not to leave 
community capacity-building to the last minute. 
It is an acknowledged fact that Zambian com-
munities with forests have been custodians of 
this resource for years, as they have drawn their 
survival and livelihoods from it. Therefore, while 
opportunities for deriving benefits from the re-
source exist, communities should be assisted to 
re-organize and effectively take the lead in issues 
of forest management.
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Preparing Community Forestry for REDD+:
Engaging Local Communities in the 
Mapping and MRV Requirements of 
REDD+
Based on fieldwork carried out over the last five years, 
this article presents the case for communities being 
permitted to make their own forest carbon inventories 
for the purposes of monitoring under national REDD+ 
programmes, following brief training. Modern technology, 
particularly PDAs (small, handheld computers), can 
provide the platform both for mapping and for storing 
data, and can easily be used by people with only a few 
years primary education, although a technical agency 
will be needed to back up such systems. There are many 
advantages to this approach: costs are much lower 
than when professionals do the work, while the data 
are equally accurate. ‘Ownership  ´of the data may be 
important in legitimising communities  ´claims to carbon 
credits in the forests they manage.  
abstract
1. introduction
In her plenary speech on Forest Day 3, 13th 
December 2009, during UNFCCC COP 15 in 
Copenhagen, Elinor Ostrom highlighted the 
importance of creating clear local livelihood 
incentives to ensure the sustainable manage-
ment of forests and woodland resources. Cit-
ing meta-analysis studies – for example, that 
by Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) – Ostrom 
noted that the local monitoring, management 
and control of forest and woodland resources 
create a sense of local ownership and value in 
forests that is crucial to their long-term accep-
tance and sustainability. 
In this article, we argue the case for commu-
nities to monitor those forest lands with which 
they are already engaged through their own 
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direct management for the sake of valorising 
the carbon services provided. Such a strategy 
should be valuable in national REDD+ pro-
grammes within forests under community con-
trol, although the strategy has less relevance for 
forests which are being logged or degraded by 
external public or private entities. We explore 
the notion of community-based forest carbon 
monitoring (CBFCM) as a means of creating lo-
cal employment opportunities and local values 
in forests. We first focus on the ability of CBFCM 
to meet project- and national-scale monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) requirements 
in REDD+. Our material and evidence for these 
skills is based on field research undertaken by 
the authors during the last five years in Africa 
and in Asia. Then a comparison is made of the 
advantages and disadvantages of forest moni-
toring undertaken by local residents as com-
pared to external consultants, also based on 
field measurements. We conclude by discussing 
the livelihood benefits and skills-development 
opportunities created through CBFCM, as well 
as its potential to reduce the transaction costs 
of carbon forestry as a climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation option.
1.1 Objective 
The objective of this paper is to review the expe-
riences of local community people’s involvement 
in MRV-type activities in REDD+ projects, or in 
community carbon forestry in general. There are 
not as yet many examples of communities being 
actively involved in REDD+ MRV, so we refer also 
to experiences and findings from other commu-
nity carbon forestry initiatives or ‘traditional’ 
community forestry projects.
The aim is to provide a practical assessment of the 
capacities of communities to become involved in 
MRV, and to propose recommendations to devel-
op these capacities. Equally important, we look at 
the potential benefits for communities, and what 
real interest communities themselves might have 
in involvement in MRV for REDD+. 
1.2 Context: what are the likely future scena-
rios of REDD+?
Although there is still much uncertainty about the 
form REDD+ will take, in this paper we assume 
it will be implemented at the sector level across 
whole countries, or (for large or physically dis-
jointed countries) sectorally across major admin-
istrative regions, rather than consist of individual 
projects as in the CDM process. The technical rea-
son for this is to avoid leakage from treated areas 
to untreated areas, but there are political reasons 
too. Only 14 forestry CDM projects have been ap-
proved to date by the UNFCCC, partly because of 
the difficult conditionalities imposed. Current ne-
gotiations at the UNFCCC level indicate that many 
countries prefer to treat REDD+ as a national pro-
gramme rather than as piecemeal projects carried 
out by project developers. This is demonstrated by 
the 35 national REDD Readiness proposals submit-
ted to the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
The aim is to provide a practical 
assessment of the capacities of 
communities to become involved in 
MRV, and to propose recommendations 
to develop these capacities. Equally 
important, we look at the potential 
benefits for communities, and what real 
interest communities themselves might 
have in involvement in MRV for REDD+.
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Facility and the 28 submitted to the UN-REDD 
programme. These documents, which result from 
participatory processes in each country, are all 
committed to the national REDD approach, al-
though, given the difficulties of start-ups on a na-
tional scale, a likely scenario is that programmes 
would begin with individual pilot projects. 
This paper assumes that REDD+ will incorpo-
rate measures for enhancing removals of atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide as well as reducing emis-
sions. The detailed policy discussion on REDD+ 
at COP15 (UNFCCC, 2009) strongly suggest that 
incentives should be offered for emission reduc-
tions from lowered national deforestation and 
degradation rates, and also for increases in for-
est carbon stock (forest enhancement). In addi-
tion, there would be some kind of compensation 
for conservation of forest that is intact, although 
how these carbon savings will be rewarded is not 
clear (UNFCCC, 2009; RECOFTC, 2010). 
Many of the national REDD Readiness proposals 
specify community forest management as a cen-
tral component of their national plans to reduce 
deforestation and degradation and enhance forest 
growth. Many forest departments have recognised 
that community forest management is a cheap and 
relatively effective strategy for sustainable forest 
management, particularly in low-value forests, al-
though local communities have rarely been able to 
protect forests of high timber value, which are sub-
jected to stronger commercial forces. Many national 
REDD+ programmes therefore envisage a system of 
payments for carbon services in which communities 
would receive some financial or in-kind reward for 
positive changes in carbon stocks. This would be fi-
nanced from a public purse filled by national level 
sale of international carbon credits.
Another uncertainty revolves around where the 
money for carbon credits will come from, and 
whether the carbon credits can be used for off-
set or not; in other words, whether there will be 
a carbon market or a carbon fund. However, from 
the point of view of developing countries this 
distinction may not be so important because 
the criteria, such as those for designing systems 
to monitor environmental integrity, and prob-
ably also for monitoring social equity, are likely 
to be equally restrictive under either approach. 
More important, though going beyond the scope 
of this paper, will be the size of the demand for 
credits, since this will determine the price at 
which carbon can be sold. 
2. information needs in REDD+ 
2.1 MRV (monitoring, reporting and verifica-
tion) requirements under probable REDD+ 
scenarios 
If REDD+ is run as a sectoral, national-level pro-
gramme rather than at project level, it will create 
immediate difficulties for MRV, since what has to 
be measured includes not only the areas subject to 
special treatment under REDD+, but all forest areas 
within the national territory. Moreover, in the past in-
dividual REDD-like projects, whether financed in the 
voluntary carbon market or simply to combat defores-
tation as in PES (payment for environmental services) 
projects, have used different monitoring and reward 
systems. A national REDD+ programme would have to 
set standard procedures for both data-gathering and 
the payments, which will require additional major ef-
forts in public administration. For example, the stan-
dards of forest inventory would have to be acceptable 
internationally. They may be required to follow proce-
dures recommended by the IPCC in its Good Practice 
Guidance for LULUCF (IPCC, 2003), which provides 
protocols for calculating sample size based on a pilot 
inventory. It also proposes that a randomised system 
of permanent plots should be used.
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Measurement of change in national forest area 
(to detect changing rates of deforestation) can be 
carried out reasonably easily and cheaply through 
remote sensing, but this will not be sufficient for 
REDD+. Quantifying the density of biomass (i.e. 
the level of the carbon stock) in different catego-
ries of forests is much more difficult, but it is es-
sential firstly for estimating the stock in the for-
ests, both remaining and lost, and secondly, also 
for claiming for reduced degradation, forest en-
hancement and sustainable forest management, 
for which the changes in biomass density must be 
measured accurately. In many countries the ma-
jority of losses and gains in forest carbon will be 
in these three categories, rather than through de-
forestation. Therefore the ability to gather reliable 
data on forest density change may be the key to 
countries’ participation in REDD+. It is essential to 
find cheap, reliable methods for establishing rates 
of degradation and forest growth: this includes set-
ting baselines or reference levels for these process-
es. The REDD+ concept is hardly concerned with 
changes in forest composition per se because it is 
the changes in carbon stock that count for valo-
risation, but obviously forest composition affects 
ecological quality, biodiversity, local forest services 
and thus local welfare, and therefore is a vital factor 
in overall national forest policies, as well as in com-
munity land-use decisions. 
Different measurement methods produce data at 
different levels of accuracy (Tiers 1 to 3 in IPCC 
terms),1 and it may be assumed that when a low 
level of accuracy is implied, a greater proportion 
of the estimated carbon savings will be discount-
ed from the crediting on the principle of financial 
conservatism. A method which produces data of 
greater accuracy (i.e. small standard error) should 
in principle generate more confidence in the re-
sults, and hence leverage rewards in terms of eli-
gibility for a higher proportion of the estimated 
carbon savings (Wise et al. 2009) For a national 
REDD programme this presents a trade-off be-
tween the additional costs of increased accuracy 
of estimates of changes in forest density and the 
financial benefits of the additional carbon cred-
its that can be generated. The parameters for 
these calculations have not yet been defined, and 
the margins for conservatism have not been set, 
though experience from the Voluntary Carbon 
Standard (VCS) of using a percentage of the cred-
its as insurance against the risks could be adapted 
for REDD+. It is very evident anyway that govern-
ments will look for methods that generate maxi-
mum accuracy at minimum cost.
2.2 Information and meta-data requirements 
at international level
REDD+ adds carbon sequestration through 
forest enhancement, sustainable manage-
ment of forests and forest conservation to 
the avoidance of deforestation and degra-
dation envisaged under REDD+. Protocols 
for REDD+ have yet to be developed, but 
to make claims internationally a Reference 
Emissions Level (REL) will have to be drawn 
up by each country and approved by an in-
ternational body. As with baselines for CDM 
projects, it is likely that several methodolo-
gies will be made available to meet different 
circumstances. Countries wishing to claim 
for both reduced degradation and forest 
enhancement will have to provide credible 
RELs for this – no easy task, since few have 
much data on changing forest density over 
time. Since most forest departments cur-
rently lack enough skilled staff, additional 
technical assistants (government, NGO, or 
1 Tier 1 estimates carbon stock using regional or even continental 
averages. Tier 2 uses averages from national secondary data in areas 
similar to the site under consideration. Tier 3 uses measurements made 
at the site itself. 
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Table 1. Capacities likely to be required for national REDD programmes
2.3 Information and meta-data likely to be re-
quired at national and community level 
For communities to credit and register the car-
bon sequestered in their forest, two levels of ac-
curate and geo-referenced information are re-
quired for REDD+. First, a meso or ‘landscape’ 
level that involves information at ‘community’ 
scale will be needed to establish the initial for-
est management scenario (year 0). The second 
level represents a more intensive collection of 
detailed plot-level information (biomass sample 
plots within management strata), and some at 
tree level. Accurate data on the size and loca-
tion of every measurable tree and bush in sample 
plots are required for monitoring and to facili-
tate re-measurement in subsequent years (see 
Table 2).
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private sector) are likely to be needed, who 
would have to be funded out of the sales of 
carbon credits. Countries must declare what 
monitoring methodologies they are using, as 
this is essential for transparency of metada-
ta. Probably they will develop and implement 
their internal verification methodology, and 
independent, external verification will then 
be implemented. Table 1 sets out the likely 
requirements. 
Site-level field data on carbon stock changes to indicate: 
• Reduced deforestation and degradation compared to local baseline 
(Reference Emissions Level, REL)
•
 
Increases in carbon stock sequestration/forest enhancement
 
Measurement of 
carbon
• Measurement skills at community level  
• Capability to scale up to region and country 
• Accessible 
Scales of 
functioning
 
• Transparent and independent verification system 
• Information availability from independent sources  
• Leakage estimated and included 
Verification and 
certification
Leadership; participation, resource rules, and enforcement  
• At local levels 
• At national level 
Management 
Capability
 
Acceptability to states, regions and local communities, of the 
management and participation rules 
Acceptability  
Damaging effects to environment and society and e.g. equilty
are dealt with to an acceptable degree
Externalities  
146
For communities, particularly in developing 
countries, finding most of the forest management 
information in Table 2 is not easy. Non-existence, 
unavailability or inadequacy of forest informa-
tion, lack of technical knowhow, and deficient 
support from government institutions to produce 
or handle information are drawbacks commonly 
faced. Therefore, for measuring and monitoring 
their forest resources, communities are likely to 
be dependent on external professionals and tech-
nical assistants, whose services would claim a big 
share of any income from carbon payments.
2.3 Monitoring additional variables comple-
mentary to improved land management.
While assessing carbon stocks and fluxes is cru-
cial to the MRV, it is only one of several compo-
nents that will need to be measured in devel-
oping REDD+ activities. There are additional 
metrics to be monitored under the current proj-
ect-scale standards, such as the VCS and the Cli-
mate, Community and Biodiversity Standard, and 
these are likely to be included in future national-
scale REDD+ frameworks:
•	 Socio-economic	 information:	 documen-
tation of stakeholders, social governance 
structures, household income, biomass en-
ergy use, food and cash crops production, 
and benefit flows,
•	 Quantification	 and	 explanation	 of	 land	
use and land-use change: understanding 
the nature of deforestation drivers so as 
to model deforestation scenarios and de-
velop appropriate responses. Monitoring 
Table 2. Information for Community Forest Management and Carbon Sequestration
Boundaries of the community, and of its forest areas which are intended for a carbon 
payments project. 
Community’s land claims, if necessary
Community Forestry Management Approaches, land-use plans 
Location of activities contributing to forest degradation, such as illegal logging, 
grazing, marginal agriculture, illegal settlements
Location of areas potentially affected by hazards (e.g. fires, erosion, ecosystem 
degradation, flooding, strong winds)
Conflict areas (spatial information about competing land uses and boundaries)
Delimitation of forest ecotype strata (zones)
Location and geo-referencing of the sampling plots for measuring different carbon 
pools
Geo-referencing trees and other features for future location of the sample plots
Field measurement and storage of tree data: DBH (diameter at breast height), tree 
heights, species, status, etc. in databases
Level 2: information for forest biomass inventories (year 0 and later)
Level 1: Spatial and other information for establishing the initial management 
scenario (year 0)
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changes in land-use types and accessibil-
ity (especially roads) is thus an additional 
requirement.
•	 Biodiversity:	 the	majority	 of	 REDD	 verifi-
cation standards currently require quan-
tification of project effects on biodiversity, 
especially threatened species – hence the 
need for adequate assessment of biodiver-
sity, including in the forest surroundings. 
3. The capacity and potential of commu-
nity-based forest monitoring to meet 
information needs
3.1 Comparative advantages and benefits of 
community-based monitoring
Required skill-sets and expertise
Most activities related to carbon monitoring are 
regarded as technically highly demanding and 
therefore in the realm of professionals. How-
ever, experiences in Africa and Asia show that, 
with adequate training, key activities such as 
forest inventories, assessing and measuring for-
est resources, tree measuring and quantification 
of the current carbon stock and changes can be 
carried out by local residents, as demonstrated 
in the K:TGAL programme2 (Skutsch, ed. 2010). 
Under K:TGAL, a ‘participatory geographical 
information system (PGIS)’ was implemented 
in which local communities became conversant 
with the use of IT for carbon forest data cap-
turing and geo-referencing. When trained, local 
people were able to map forest reserves rapidly 
and with precision, locate permanent sampling 
plots with accuracy, and record measurement 
data for trees and other vegetation in the plots. 
Local residents with a basic level of education 
could be trained in approximately two weeks to 
conduct surveys. If they have used cell phones 
before the work can proceed more quickly be-
cause of their similar handling characteristics to 
GPSs and handheld computers. A basic premise 
is that even people unfamiliar with computers 
(including the illiterate and innumerate) can 
learn to follow the inventory protocols used by 
professionals if suitable translation methodolo-
gies are developed and made available. Results 
in several tested areas were within the desired 
levels of precision and reliability of those pro-
duced by professionals (Box 1; Zahabu 2008; 
Skutsch (ed.) 2010).
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2 The K:TGAL programme, which ran from 2003 to 2009, worked at 39 
sites in 7 countries and trained communities to make their own forest 
inventories to assess carbon stock changes for the purposes of REDD+. 
The training manual developed by the project can be downloaded from 
www.communitycarbonforestry.org
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Interest in CBFCM has encouraged the emer-
gence of new techniques and technologies to 
improve the collection of data. Hand-held elec-
tronic data-entry hardware (PDAs) and software 
products developed as field survey equipment 
are being applied to CBFCM to reduce sampling 
error and loss of data. The hardware unit, typi-
cally including a GPS receiver, records location 
and vegetation metrics in predefined fields to 
improve data quality and completeness. The 
data are then uploaded into a database system 
that automatically verifies them and flags po-
tentially incorrect values for the attention of the 
field team. The Tropical Ecology Assessment and 
Monitoring Network (www.teamnetwork.org) is 
an example. Data are either uploaded from a PDA 
unit or entered into a predefined spreadsheet. 
Data are systematically backed-up, and addition-
al analysis can be performed immediately. 
Local people often have a good basic knowledge 
of local tree species, the distribution of spe-
box 1. Costs and reliability of community versus professional carbon-monitoring
In the K:TGAL programme, costs of community measurements were made at several sites, 
including the costs of training by an intermediary organisation and a daily wage rate for the 
community members undertaking the forest inventory. These are compared with the costs of 
professionals at two sites. The variations in cost between communities reflect variations in the 
size of forests (considerable economies of scale), their accessibility (to the intermediary 
organisation) and their carbon productivity. As indicated in the following table, the costs of 
professional measurement appear to be at least double the costs for local measurement. 
Comparing the results of professional and community inventories at the Tanzanian and Indian 
sites indicates that the two sets of estimates are similarly reliable; there were no statistically 
significant differences in their estimates of mean biomass.
Both the professionals and the communities measured diameter at breast height and tree height, 
identified the species and applied the relevant allometric equations to reach the estimate of 
above ground woody biomass (from Skutsch ed. 2010).
Location Cost per 
hectare, 
community ($)
Cost per tonne 
carbon, 
community ($)
Cost per 
hectare, 
professional ($)
Cost per tonne, 
professional ($)
Nepal site 1
Nepal site 2
Nepal site 3
Tanzania
2.4
4.7
5.1
3.1
5.4
3.8
0.2
1.5
2.5
2.3
0.8
0.4
10.0
11.0
7.4
1.6
Papua New 
Guinea
Uttarakhand 
(India)
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cies and forest products, and an understanding 
of the local ecology. Moreover, residents have a 
good understanding of local logistics of access, 
permissions, role players and the local and tradi-
tional authorities. In comparison, external con-
sultants have to go through lengthy introduc-
tion and permission processes, as it is usually 
frowned upon simply to start surveying on com-
munal or private lands. Permissions can absorb 
much valuable time, and even then local resi-
dents are often suspicious of outsiders. External 
consultants therefore require a local facilitator 
to manage logistics, deal with permissions and 
communicate with local residents. Knowledge 
of local languages and traditional structures is 
especially advantageous in monitoring the non-
carbon metrics. Stakeholder engagement and 
the monitoring of socio-economic metrics take 
considerable care and time, requiring frequent 
engagements with individuals and groups. In 
such cases, external consultants may be prohibi-
tively expensive as well as impractical. 
Cost efficiency
 
The financial viability of REDD ventures relies 
on cost-efficient monitoring of carbon stocks 
across landscapes. While technological advances 
allow deforestation to be measured with a rea-
sonably high level of accuracy through satellite-
borne sensors, experiences in assessing carbon 
stocks in the tropical forests of the eastern DRC 
and Miombo woodlands of Zambia indicate that 
the cost of the advanced imagery and process-
ing is often more than the monetary value of the 
change in carbon stocks. 
Relatively inexpensive remote sensing data such 
as MODIS or LANDSAT imagery have been used 
until now to assess forest cover for REDD proj-
ects. Although significant progress has been 
made in the processing and analysis of MODIS 
and LANDSAT data, intensive ground-truthing is 
still required to estimate carbon stocks to an ad-
equate level of certainty, as well as to verify land-
uses changes such as food and cash-crop farming, 
pasture, roads and exotic plantations (Trodd and 
Dougill 1998). In addition, the ground-truthing 
is required over vast, inaccessible areas demand-
ing lengthy investments of time. Empowering lo-
cal people to undertake such monitoring, as op-
posed to external consultants, saves significant 
costs and maybe also time when the additional 
flights, local mobility and accommodation for ex-
ternal consultants are factored in. 
Concerning the precision of carbon estimates, 
there is always the possibility of sampling errors 
creeping in, whether residents or consultants 
undertake them. While monitoring effort should 
be proportional to the improvement in the cer-
tainty of the estimate (Wise et al. 2009), based on 
the central limit theorem, it is generally prudent 
to invest in increasing the number of replicates 
(plot measurements) per stratum rather than the 
accuracy of each sample in order to increase the 
precision per unit cost. The number of replicates 
is key, not necessarily the accuracy of each repli-
cate. Since local wages for field staff are typically 
a fraction of external consultant costs, by in-
corporating local people it is economically fea-
sible to undertake many more replicates in each 
stratum, thereby reducing the variance in the 
carbon estimates of each stratum. This is often 
crucial to project financial viability, especially in 
woodland and savanna systems (Wise et al. 2009) 
(Box 1). Moreover, if communities take the mea-
surements themselves, measurements could be 
taken annually, which would increase reliability 
by increasing the number of replicates and by al-
lowing a trend line to be established within the 
crediting period, rather than just at each end of 
the period..
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Required capacity for national-scale REDD+
In practical terms of capacity, there may not be 
enough external consultants to undertake all the 
carbon, socio-economic and biodiversity surveys 
required for national REDD+ initiatives (Burgess 
et al. 2010). The few consultants available are 
in high demand and charge high fees. Although 
monitoring procedures, techniques and technolo-
gies are becoming more efficient, it will require a 
vast number of monitors to cover all the metrics 
across all countries entering REDD+. Moreover, it 
is proposed that REDD projects have a lifespan of 
at least twenty years. The Noell Kempff Mercado 
Project in Bolivia, for example, is planned for 99 
years, and forest monitoring and verification need 
to cover the project lifespan. A system based on 
external consultants is likely to be financially un-
viable under REDD+, which is an important ra-
tionale for local residents to undertake the moni-
toring, using external consultants only for the 
necessary third party independent verification. 
In countries with entrenched bureaucratic gov-
ernance, officials may balk at handing over a 
function to local residents that is traditionally 
seen as a government responsibility and pre-
rogative. Moreover, currently some REDD+ proj-
ects are being developed by external NGOs that 
are unfamiliar with local government structures. 
This can result in important actors being left out 
of the development and officials feeling alien-
ated and not buying into the CBFCM concept.
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Table 3. Comparison of monitoring components undertaken by external consultants and by teams from the local community
 
High professional fees, travel and 
accommodation costs
Usually poor. Local guides and 
translators usually needed 
Good
Potentially low if same consultants 
cannot continue with monitoring 
over lifespan of project
Usually low. Too costly to spend 
long periods in field.
ow. Usually limited to technical 
input and PDD compilation
Maybe for consultants’ business, 
not for community. 
Expected to be good
Consultants’ flights, vehicles and 
accommodation costs are high.
In remote areas, costs escalate
 when vehicles are needed.
Low. Assumption is that 
professional teams need relatively
 little preparation time
Generally poor. Very challenging 
to understand local 
socio-economy and culture, 
time-consuming to collect the 
data.
High initial set-up and training costs 
followed by substantially lower salary, 
travel, accommodation costs over time
Good. Residents typically know the 
area well in terms of access, logistics, 
local authorities, laws, and species 
names
Good, but dependent on appropriate  
training and data verification 
Potentially high if same team members 
or at least the same coordinators can 
be maintained 
Good. Even if sampling is done 
part-time, substantial travel and set-up 
time is saved
High. Project success depends on 
local resource users. Monitoring by 
locals creates ownership. 
Participation adds to the skills levels 
and capacity of local residents. 
Possible spin-offs to other community  
PES activities 
Potential area of concern in many 
communities.
If locally organised is cheaper and 
more appropriate, e.g. working by foot  or animal can be effective because
 field surveys are spread over time.
 
High. Takes more time to identify, 
train and equip teams
Good. In-built knowledge of local 
economy and culture; easy to collect 
initial information and monitor changes
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Monitoring
component
External Consultants Local Community Residents
Cost
Local
knowledge
Data quality
Consistency
intensity
value addition
Spin-offs
Management
Logistics
initial inputs,
e.g. time
Collection of
other important
data, e.g.
socio-economic
information
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Where there is funding to contract-in external 
monitoring consultants, it is common practice in 
certain countries also to take on local officials to 
act as national facilitators. These posts are often 
paid at lucrative international rates. When local 
community monitoring is proposed in place of 
external consultants, some officials may be ap-
prehensive that it could jeopardise future facili-
tation contracts. 
Management of monitoring teams is a key issue. 
In remote areas people often do not have access 
to the internet, and there is limited accessibil-
ity. This means it is often infeasible to remotely 
manage monitoring teams from, say, the capital 
city or a foreign-based NGO. It is highly recom-
mendable that teams have a permanent local 
manager, especially a CBO or local NGO, who 
can be readily contacted for reporting and who 
will deal with technical matters. 
Resistance to monitoring by the communi-
ties who are managing their forests may also 
come from people within the community who 
may view it as restricting their use of natu-
ral resources. To avoid this, the REDD+ pro-
cess needs to be open and transparent right 
from the outset through a process of public 
participation. However, this in itself will not 
ensure long-term buy-in from local residents. 
Community-based participatory projects by 
governments and NGOs are common today 
in rural areas, and there is often increasing 
reluctance by local people to become in-
volved. Participation is time-consuming, and 
more importantly these projects have often 
brought no real, lasting benefits. These re-
alities are frequently observed by develop-
ment practitioners, but not so often recorded 
(though see, e.g., Hickey and Mohan 2004). 
For REDD+ to succeed, there have to be long-
term financial, material and empowerment 
benefits for local residents. Employing com-
munity residents as monitors is one way of 
achieving this. 
4.  Creating value in forests for local com-
munities through implementing carbon 
projects
Creating rural employment opportunities and 
income flows
A key component of the long-term acceptance 
and sustainability of REDD+ initiatives is the 
creation of a sense of local ownership and value 
in intact forest and woodland systems (Chha-
tre and Agrawal 2009). Moreover, income flows 
and value added by REDD+ activities need to 
be greater than the foregone opportunity costs 
of deforesting or degrading the area for timber, 
charcoal, livestock or agriculture. 
Clear, substantive incentives, such as employ-
ment, direct cash incentives, sustainable live-
lihood opportunities and community devel-
opment projects, are essential to ensure the 
appropriate management of forest resources 
over the long term. The authors’ experiences in 
developing REDD activities in sub-Saharan Af-
rica indicate that creating the incentives in the 
forms of employment and alternative livelihoods 
is particularly challenging in remote rural areas 
where access to communications, and especially 
to markets, is limited.
The sound forest management practices 
needed for REDD+ sustainability demand 
much labour from the community, for fire pre-
vention, livestock grazing controls, water and 
soil erosion management, defence against il-
legal felling and encroachments, and so on. 
The PES model assumes that the real costs 
of this local employment are accounted for 
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and compensated within the carbon payment 
levels. Furthermore, the carbon monitoring 
itself presents an additional opportunity to 
create employment and income flows. While 
the monitoring only takes a portion of the 
year, the trained team can also be involved in 
surveillance, fire control and other manage-
ment tasks. 
Local skills development and creating the hu-
man and institutional capacity needed for na-
tional scale REDD+ implementation
In impoverished rural areas, formal educa-
tional levels are low, thus training people as 
REDD+ monitors adds a set of life skills that 
potentially spill over to other spheres. The in-
volvement can lead to social and institutional 
strengthening in the community. There is not 
only an expanded understanding of local nat-
ural resource management and values, but the 
skills such as data capture and mapping em-
power people and bring at least some of them 
into decision-making processes. When the 
skills are developed and retained or passed on 
to others and new technical knowledge is ac-
quired, then, importantly, the ability to deal 
with powerful government agencies, NGOs 
and commercial capital is greatly strength-
ened. There is great potential for utilising 
the participatory survey and mapping skills 
for other community purposes, such as mak-
ing land claims, resolving land conflicts, col-
laborative land use planning, and applying 
for other PES finance such as hydrological or 
biodiversity services.
Ability to respond from an empowered, in-
formed position to REDD+ developments
Currently, local communities have little say in 
REDD+ developments, due to their limited pol-
icy knowledge and lack of institutional support. 
Whilst participating in monitoring and map-
ping activities, residents can be learning about 
the functioning of climate change policy, REDD 
mechanisms and payments for climate change 
mitigation. This increased awareness would al-
low people to respond to national REDD+ agen-
cies and the global carbon project developers 
from a more informed and confident position. 
Moreover, it should allow communities to engage 
with REDD+ initiatives if they wish, with ‘free, 
prior and informed consent’.
Lower transaction costs are essential for the 
economic viability of community REDD+
The actual price of carbon credits will ulti-
mately determine whether REDD+ activities are 
worthwhile or not for the country as a whole, as 
well as for communities that may participate. At 
this moment there is little information on what 
this price will be. However, it is clear that cost 
efficiency and reducing the transaction costs 
of crediting carbon will be crucial to achieving 
financial feasibility. Their importance is ampli-
fied where the volume of emission reduction 
units produced is relatively small, whether this 
is because of the small size of the management 
units or because the carbon stock growth rate 
is relatively low (Cacho et al. 2004). Thus, re-
ducing monitoring costs is essential in small 
community projects in dry forest and savannah 
areas, for example, in the miombo woodlands of 
sub-Saharan Africa, 
Community-based monitoring greatly reduces 
the transaction costs of monitoring and man-
agement, as the operational costs are a frac-
tion of those of external professionals (Box 1). 
The key is to develop the protocols, mecha-
nisms and associated training, so that com-
munity residents can perform monitoring and 
reporting with sufficient accuracy and reliabil-
ity to be acceptable in a formal carbon finance 
mechanism. 
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5. Conclusions 
Community management is currently be-
ing promoted in many national REDD+ pro-
grammes, but the full implications of the range 
of the data collection is not always considered. 
While changes in forest area (relating to de-
forestation) can be measured relatively ac-
curately using remote sensing, the changes 
in forest density, related to reduced degrada-
tion and forest enhancement, must make use 
of decentralised field measurements. We have 
argued above that, for many reasons, commu-
nities that are already involved in the manage-
ment of their forests should be empowered 
and mobilised to carry this out. Some authori-
ties may view this idea with scepticism, but 
our and others’ experiences show that, given a 
clear protocol and appropriate training, com-
munities are able to gather data as accurately 
as professionals, and at a fraction of the cost. 
The protocols used, such as those in the 
K:TGAL programme, need to be based on in-
ternationally accepted methodology to ensure 
confidence in the data, and independent veri-
fication will be essential. Detailed guides are 
available from various sources (Bhishma et al. 
2010, Theron 2009, Verplanke and Zahabu, 
2010; see also van Laake et al. 2009; Peters and 
McCall 2010) 
´What is in it for communities?` This depends 
crucially on the financial margins that com-
munities would receive as a result of their 
participation in REDD+ activities, and how 
these are distributed. At present it is very dif-
ficult to estimate either the market price of 
REDD+ carbon or the transaction costs that 
will be incurred in running the national pro-
grammes. These issues will become more vis-
ible as national programmes get started. In 
any case, we argue that the low cost and high 
effectiveness of community monitoring offers 
the hope that communities will one day be 
able to measure and sell credits for the in-
creases in carbon in their forests as a form of 
livelihood diversification. 
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            he topic for the 2010 edition of the Perspectives is "Pathways for 
            Implementing REDD+: Experiences from Carbon Markets and Communities". 
           This year, the publication goes beyond opportunities afforded 
by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and includes voluntary markets. 
It reflects the current experiences about implementing REDD+ activities at the project 
and community levels. Some of the articles presented discuss or propose ideas about 
how to create incentives to participate in REDD+, its implementation, and possible 
financing; how to involve the private sector; what are the experiences from the carbon 
markets, and how to engage communities in REDD+. The authors have been carefully 
selected to reflect a mix of different perspectives from the private sector, country 
negotiation teams, research institutions, and carbon market organizations. 
They share their insights and ideas on various important aspects and issues for the 
debates on a global REDD+ mechanism in the ongoing climate negotiations. 
This new publication is targeted to a wide audience, including policy makers, 
country negotiators, research institutions, and other people interested in REDD+. 
The Carbon Markets Perspectives 2010, is produced with financial 
assistance by the European Commission, through its joint 
UNEP/EU Program for Capacity Building related to Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) in African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Countries, of which the CDM forms part of 
the ACP-CD4CDM Project.  (http://www.uneprisoe.org)
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